

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT:
GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

A THESIS SUBMITTED TO
THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES
OF
MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY

BY

TUĞBA ALTUN

IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR
THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF SCIENCE
IN
THE DEPARTMENT OF MIDDLE EAST STUDIES

DECEMBER 2022

Approval of the thesis:

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT: GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

submitted by **TUĞBA ALTUN** in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of **Master of Science in Middle East Studies, the Graduate School of Social Sciences of Middle East Technical University** by,

Prof. Dr. Sadettin KİRAZCI
Dean
Graduate School of Social Sciences

Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER
Head of Department
Department of Area Studies

Prof. Dr. Meliha BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK
Supervisor
Department of International Relations

Examining Committee Members:

Assist. Prof. Dr. Derya GÖÇER (Head of the Examining Committee)
Middle East Technical University
Department of

Prof. Dr. Meliha BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK (Supervisor)
Middle East Technical University
Department of International Relations

Assist. Prof. Dr. Bayram SİNKAYA
Ankara Yıldırım Beyazıt University
Department of International Relations

I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work.

Name, Last Name: Tuğba ALTUN

Signature:

ABSTRACT

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP IN EGYPT: GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

ALTUN, Tuğba

M.A., The Department of Middle East Studies

Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Meliha BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK

December 2022, 111 pages

During the years between 1952 and 1970, Egypt was almost the most influential country in the Arab world. Gamal Abdel Nasser's powerful image in the eyes of the Egyptians and among the Arabs in general as the president of Egypt at that time was influential. Nasser strongly supported Arab nationalism and unity in the Arab world. Also, he was passionately against colonialism and the bipolar system in the world. Therefore, he created a powerful charismatic leadership with his ideas and policies among the Arabs. However, it was interesting to note that he domestic and regional support continued even after the defeats in Yemen and in 1967 War. Thus, this study focuses on understanding how Nasser was able to continue his rule even after the defeats. It is argued that his suppressive policies at home does not explain wholly his popularity in Egypt and beyond. Instead, the thesis claims that the charismatic leadership of Nasser was one of the main reasons for the continuation of Nasser's rule and his popularity. Therefore, the study suggests that Nasser was able to continue his rule and popularity with charismatic leadership by explaining the features of

charismatic leadership, Nasser's domestic and foreign policies, and the process of the establishment of his charismatic leadership.

Keywords: Nasser, Charismatic Leadership, Egypt, Arab nationalism

ÖZ

MISIR'DA KARİZMATİK LİDERLİK: CEMAL ABDÜLNASIR

ALTUN, Tuğba

Yüksek Lisans, Orta Doğu Araştırmaları Bölümü

Tez Yöneticisi: Prof. Dr. Meliha BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK

Aralık 2022, 111sayfa

Mısır, 1952 ile 1970 yılları arasında Ortadoğu ve Kuzey Afrika bölgesindeki en etkili ülkelerden biri olmuştur. Söz konusu etki, o dönemde Mısır cumhurbaşkanı Cemal Abdülnasır'ın Mısır halkı ve onun ötesinde yaşayan Arapların gözünde oluşturduğu güçlü liderlik imajı sayesinde gelişmiştir. Nasır, Arap milliyetçiliğinin ve Arap birliğinin güçlü bir destekçisi olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Ayrıca Nasır, sömürgecilğe ve dünyadaki çift kutuplu sisteme şiddetli bir şekilde karşı çıkmıştır. Bu sayede Nasır, Arap dünyasındaki fikirleri ve politikalarıyla güçlü bir karizmatik liderlik oluşturmuştur. Nasır'ın Yemen Savaşı ve 1967 Arap-İsrail savaşında yaşanan yenilgilerin ardından bile halk tarafından desteklenmeye devam etmesi dikkat çekici olmuştur. Bu çalışma da Nasır'ın yaşadığını yenilgilerin ardından bile yönetimini nasıl sürdürebildiğini anlamaya odaklanıyor. Nasır'ın baskıcı politikaları Mısır'da ve tüm Arap dünyasında devam eden popularitesini tam olarak açıklamamaktadır. Bu tez, Nasır'ın yönetiminin devamı için karizmatik liderliğin en önemli nedenlerden biri olduğu savunuyor. Özellikle bu çalışma, karizmatik liderliğin özellikleri, Nasır'ın iç ve dış politikası, karizmatik liderlik oluşma sürecini inceleyerek Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliği sayesinde yönetimini ve popülerliğini sürdürdüğünü öne sürüyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Nasır, karizmatik liderlik, Mısır, Arap milliyetçiliği

To my mum

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Prof. Dr. Meliha BENLİ ALTUNIŞIK, for her continuous support and patient guidance during the process of this thesis. I am privileged to have her as my supervisor. This thesis is completed thanks to her understanding and kind help. I am grateful for her support.

I owe special thanks to the esteemed examining committee members, Assist. Prof. Derya GÖÇER and Assoc. Prof. Bayram Sinkaya for their positive interpretations, detailed comments, and constructive feedback on my thesis.

Most of all, I am grateful and lucky for my mother's continuous support through all these years. Her prayers and belief in me helped me all the way. Also, I would like to thank my father and brother, who always support me.

Additionally, I must thank all my friends who supported and helped me along the way. Especially, I would like to thank Sibel Dünder and Aylin Mercan for their continuous support in everything. Thank you for being my second family and a great source of support.

Finally, I would like to thank all my teachers, professors, and friends who contributed to my learning and development. I am sure I would not be here if I did not meet with all of them.

Thank you all.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PLAGIARISM	iii
ABSTRACT	iv
ÖZ	vi
DEDICATION	vii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS	viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS	ix
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS	xii
CHAPTERS	
1. INTRODUCTION	1
1.1. Research Objective and Questions	8
1.2. Methodology	9
1.3. Preview of Chapters	10
2. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND GAMAL ABDEL NASSER	2
2.1. Charismatic Leadership.....	3
2.2. Reasons for the Emergence of Charismatic Leadership and Its Followers..	6
2.3. Ways of Creating Charismatic Leadership	10
2.4. Tools for Creating Charismatic Leadership	12
Glorification of the History and Successes	12
Constructing Threats	13
Ideology and Personality	14

2.5.	Reasons for Followers' Loyalty to the Charismatic Leader.....	15
2.6.	Abdel-Nasser and Charismatic Leadership	19
3.	CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP OF ABDEL NASSER	22
3.1.	Colonial Rule in Egypt during the pre-Nasser Period.....	22
3.2.	Emergence of Nationalism	23
3.3.	Free Officers.....	27
3.4.	Nasser and his rule	29
3.5.	Nasser's Background.....	29
3.6.	Foreign Policy Events Enabled the Creation of Charismatic Leadership ..	31
3.6.1.	Development of Egyptian Prestige in the Arab World	31
3.6.1.1.	Baghdad Pact.....	31
3.6.1.2.	Bandung Conference	32
3.6.1.3.	Czech Arms Deal	33
3.6.2.	The Rise of Nasser in the Arab World	34
3.6.2.1.	Suez Crisis.....	35
3.6.2.2.	Establishment of the UAR.....	37
3.7.	Reforms of Nasser	39
3.7.1.	Land Reforms	39
3.7.2.	Cultural and Societal Changes	40
3.8.	Charismatic Leadership of Nasser.....	42
3.9.	Three Foreign Policy Cases During the Rule of Nasser.....	45
3.9.1.	The Dissolution of the UAR.....	45
3.9.2.	Yemen Intervention.....	48
3.9.3.	The Defeat of the 1967 Six-Day War.....	52
3.10.	Implications of Foreign Policy Cases on Nasser and the Egyptians	55

4. CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP: USAGE OF DISCOURSE, MEDIA, AND EVENTS	58
4.1. Ideology and Media.....	59
4.2. Discourse.....	66
4.2.1. Nasser’s Speech on the Nationalization of the Suez Canal.....	67
4.2.2. Nasser’s Speech on the Declaration of the Czech Arms Deal	70
4.2.3. Nasser’s Speech at the Opening of the Bandung Conference.....	71
4.2.4. Nasser’s Speech on the Declaration and the Dissolution of the United Arab Republic	72
4.2.5. Nasser’s Speech on the presentation of the National Charter	76
4.2.6. Nasser’s Speeches on Yemen Intervention	78
4.2.7. Nasser’s interviews and speeches after June 1967.....	80
4.3. Combination of Ideology, Propaganda, and Events.....	83
5. CONCLUSION.....	86
BIBLIOGRAPHY	93
APPENDICES	
A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET	101
B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU.....	112

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

KSA Kingdom of Saudi Arabia

MENA Middle East and North Africa

UAR United Arab Republic

UN United Nations

US United States

USSR United Socialist Soviet Republic

YAR Yemen Arab Republic

WWI World War 1

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

In Egypt, Gamal Abdel Nasser's priorities focused entirely on Egypt's political, economic, and social life and the country's independence in every field as the president between 1952 and 1970. In this respect, Nasser made various reforms and worked on closing the gap between the rich and poor, especially with land reform. He advocated Arab nationalism and unity at every opportunity. Also, he supported other countries in their fight against colonial powers. However, Egypt adopted harsh laws that restricted people's rights and made Nasser the only power which controlled Egypt. He was significantly criticized from that perspective, but he silenced those voices.

In other respects, Nasser was able to impress many people with propaganda materials such as radio, newspapers, etc. He was an influential speaker who knew what he could talk about to attract people. Therefore, he controlled the media and what people could talk and say about his rule and the coup, ending with "revolutionary" reforms. He advocated "revolution", the Egyptian role in the Arab world, the Egyptian army and its power, Arab nationalism, and Non-Alignment Movement in the Cold War environment. He was successful in promoting all of those in a sense.

Nasser began to influence other countries, and many people in those states supported him. There were many victories for Nasser, such as his opposition to the Baghdad Pact, the Czech Arms deal, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the establishment of the United Arab Republic (UAR). All these events contributed to Nasser's reputation in the Arab world, and he became more famous and gained more support. These successes, combined with Nasser's personality, charisma, and propaganda, made him a charismatic leader of his time. He was leading the masses now, contrary to before, and he was an influential leader in every sense.

As one of Nasser's successes, he convinced Lebanon and Jordan not to join Baghdad Pact. Baghdad Pact, established in January 1955, included Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain. Still, Arab League was divided into two groups that went against it, and most of the members supported Nasser. Nasser opposed Baghdad Pact by claiming that it was the work of Western colonialism and challenged the Baghdad pact countries (Heykel 1974, 57–58). Nasser used various tools to challenge the Baghdad Pact, such as radio and newspapers (El-Feth 1965, 270–76). Abdel-Nasser was an influential figure in terms of pushing his agenda to other countries. Thus, his policies prevented Jordan and Lebanon from joining the Baghdad Pact. His charismatic leadership was influential and solid with his ability to impact other countries' politics and their people.

Also, Nasser believed Egypt had to maintain independence, so he did not want to be part of any blocs during the Cold War. He participated Bandung Conference in April 1955 and became part of the Non-Alignment Movement. He was an important pioneer figure in this movement. He became a flag and symbol of third-world countries (underdeveloped or developing countries) thanks to his war against imperialism.

Another success of Nasser was the Czech arms deal. When the US declined Egypt's request for weapons, Nasser declared that if Western countries continued to decline Egypt's recommendations, he could agree with other countries. On September 27, 1955, Egypt and the Czech signed an arms deal, which was considered crucial because it proved the independence of Egypt from Western influence (Dawisha 1976, 12–13). This arms deal made Nasser famous among the Arabs because Arabs were not in favor of Western countries because of the colonial past, and if the West challenged someone, they could become the perfect leader choice for them (El-Feth 1965, 279–81).

Another important event was the nationalization of the Suez Canal. It started with the decision to build Aswan Dam, but Egypt needed budget support. Although the United States, Britain, and the World Bank offered support with some conditions, Nasser hesitated to accept the offer and support because of the conditions (Heykel 1974, 46–47). After Nasser's hesitation, the West thought that Nasser could not be suitable for the Western alliance and that he could want to reach a separate agreement with the Soviet Union (Heykel 1974, 68). Then, on September 28, 1956, Nasser declared that

Suez Canal Company would be nationalized and Aswan High Dam would be built. After the nationalization decision, France, Britain, and Israel attacked Egypt and restored the international status of the Suez Canal on October 29, 1956. However, the US, the USSR, and the UN broke a ceasefire on November 6, 1956, and all the forces withdrew in March 1957. Nasser won the battle politically and became a national hero (Dawisha 1976, 14–15).

Later, as a result of a Syrian delegation's visit to Cairo on January 12, 1958, Nasser was convinced to accept the unity of Syria and Egypt. Nasser decided that a total union should be implemented, and Syria would follow the Egyptian political system. Briefly, Nasser demanded the dissolution of all political parties, withdrawal of the Syrian army from politics; unification of Syrian and Egyptian economies; implementation of state control, and agricultural reform in Syria (Dawisha 1976, 19–20). On February 1, 1958, United Arab Republic was established under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Despite Nasser's reluctance to accept the idea of unity because of the regional and global situation, such as the reaction of Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union and possibly afraid of Arab countries, Nasser made the unity call and be sure that it was shaped by his terms (Dawisha 2003, 186).

However, many ideologies, groups, or leaders generally have ups and downs. The disintegration of Syria from the UAR was crucial in terms of Nasser's prestige and the future of Arab nationalism and unity in the region. Therefore, after this incident, Nasser's charisma and image were harmed. However, he was still an influential leader in the region. He tried to make up for what he lost in the Yemen war, but it became a political and financial disaster for Egypt. Finally, the last challenge was the Arab-Israeli war in 1967 which ended with a big catastrophe for Egypt and the Arab world.

When UAR was established in 1958, the Baath party was discharged, and its members believed a new state would be built upon them, and the party did not rebel. However, Syria lost its independence and came under the control of Egypt. Also, businesspeople in Syria were not pleased with Nasser's economic limitations. (Dawisha 2003, 222–27). After Syria's decision to withdraw from the UAR, Abdel-Nasser declared that

Egypt would not intervene, but it was seen as a hit on Arab nationalism (Dawisha 2003, 231).

After the UAR's dissolution, Nasser focused on exporting Egypt's revolution to the Arab world and consolidating the revolution in Egypt. Also, Abdel Nasser was able to focus more on domestic politics and the political structure of Egypt (Ferris 2012, 28). Also, Nasser became more critical of conservatives who put their interest above national interests after the dissolution of the UAR. For Nasser, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Lebanon were conservative countries. Because of the dissolution and other countries' attitudes towards Nasser and unity, Egypt and Nasser got more isolated by that time (Rogan 2017, 275). However, Nasser continued to use the name of the United Arab Republic even after the dissolution. Egypt and Nasser began to support the revolutionary movements of Arabs (Rogan 2017, 385). Egypt used soft power more until 1961, but after the dissolution of the UAR, Egypt under Nasser started to mix soft power with coercion and hard power (Ferris 2012, 57).

After the dissolution of the UAR and before the Yemen intervention, Egypt was criticized because it intervened in other countries with coups and revolutionary campaigns (Ferris 2012, 8). Yemen was one of Egypt's retributions to Syria's withdrawal from the UAR (Ferris 2012, 33–34). For Nasser and Egypt, the Yemen intervention was not calculated right, and it caused unexpected results. Until 1967, Yemen intervention and war-damaged Egypt, and Egyptians started to digress from Arab nationalism. They began to be abstracted from Arab politics and demanded isolation because of the setback in their lives (Dawisha 2003, 234–36).

Yemen was also a struggle between Egypt and Saudi Arabia between October 1962 and December 1967. For Egypt, this struggle between regional powers was more costly (Ferris 2012, 2–3). Generally, blame or fault of events was put on Saudis and a little Sadat (Ferris 2012, 51–55). Therefore, Saudi Arabia was blamed for the Yemen intervention and seen as an external enemy. In domestic politics, the responsibility for Yemen intervention was in the hands of Anwar Sadat.

Finally, on June 5, 1967, the Israeli air force targeted Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi airfields. Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and West Bank. Israeli army forces almost crossed the Suez Canal (Dawisha 1976, 47–50). Egypt was going through an existential crisis besides the conflict with Saudi Arabia and the effects of the Yemeni civil war. Also, there was a struggle in terms of economic and foreign policy problems in Egypt. Therefore, Nasser wanted to solve these problems and consolidate his international relations position. Nasser aimed to develop his image in the eyes of Arab states by going against Israel (Ferris 2012, 268–70).

After the defeat in 1967, Nasser declared his resignation on June 9. However, Egyptians had significant loyalty to Nasser, and they did not let him resign by taking streets, and Nasser gave up resigning. People believed that Nasser's resignation would diminish the idea of Arab unity and the possible victory against imperialism and international Zionism (Dawisha 1976, 50–51). On that day, the Egyptian Ministry of National Guidance reported that “Thousands of Egyptians surged through the streets during the warnings about the blackout and air raid. There were 50,000 Egyptians gathered, and they were shouting in favor of Nasser's leadership.” (Sharnoff 2017, 35).

Nasser's prestige was harmed after the defeat of the Six-Day War. Egypt's economy was not in good condition, and diplomatic relations between Egypt and the United States were at their lowest since 1952. Egypt became more dependent on the Soviet Union. As a result of the defeat, Egypt partially lost regional leadership, its independence from the Cold War, and its truce with Israel (Ferris 2012, 1–2). However, Nasser continued his rule with the support of Egyptians even after 1967.

As seen by Nasser, charismatic leadership is one of the important aspects of people's support for a leader, especially during times of crisis. Many different dynamics create and contribute to charismatic leadership, but ideology, purpose, and triumphs are crucial for establishing charismatic leadership. Generally, charismatic leadership is accepted as a positive aspect for leaders, but this matter has a different side. Many people can support charismatic leaders for their policies, reforms, ideologies, and skills. However, these leaders and their administrations have huge propaganda

initiatives. Thus, all the things people support can be propaganda for a leader, which the administration establishes.

Nasser had charismatic leadership, which he built based on people's perceptions. However, as mentioned above, charismatic leadership is not just a positive term for beloved leaders in countries. Leaders or administrations can create charismatic leadership naturally or manually to get people's support and consolidate power. Therefore, Nasser was a charismatic leader, loved and supported by many Egyptians from different segments of society. Yet, it cannot be said that all Egyptians supported Nasser and his policies and initiatives were always right with his charismatic leadership.

Also, societies have different segments of people; these people are affected by various events and believe in different things. Therefore, it should not be expected that all the people in a country support the same leader. Also, Gamal Abdel Nasser was not supported by all Egyptians and Arabs during his rule. Nationalists, anti-colonialists, farmers, villagers, and poor people, supported him in a sense, but the middle class, some segments of the military, intellectuals, and traders did not support Nasser entirely (Mansfield 1967, 52–53).

Nasser oppressed many opposition groups to consolidate his power. Besides, Nasser was an inspirational and influential leader in Egypt and the Arab world, he applied many oppressive domestic policy decisions. Nasser banned all political parties and closed non-governmental organizations. Legislation and the executive were under his control, but there were some regulations for the judiciary not to intervene in politics (Bozbaş 2018, 97–98). Also, Nasser closed parliament and banned political parties, social movements, and religious or secular opposition movements. He attempted to prevent every alternative ideology, person, or group. Even he appointed Al-Azhar sheiks directly (Bozbaş 2018, 43–45). All unions, trade associations, universities, and student and religious groups were under Nasser's rule (Bozbaş 2018, 197–286).

As an important propaganda material, the media was under the control of Nasser. He nationalized the press in 1960, and the press focused on limiting independent groups

because they did not want anything to harm the regime (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 19–20). All editors and other vital positions were appointed by Nasser (Bozbaş 2018, 174–75).

Thus, it can be seen that Nasser was a charismatic leader according to his relationship with his followers and the people's perception. However, Nasser also was considered an oppressive leader. To sum up, it is not necessary to consider charismatic leadership solely a positive term for leaders because charismatic leadership and an oppressive rule can be applied side by side.

Besides Nasser's oppressive policies, there were people who supported and liked Nasser on the other hand. Especially some events that contributed to this perception are important. An assassination attempt on Nasser on October 26, 1954, contributed to his powerful stance and charisma and strengthened people's support for him. When Mahmoud Abdullatif tried to assassinate him, Nasser did not move at all, and the Egyptians saw this behavior as heroic. After this incident, Nasser said that he could sacrifice his blood for his country and its people. Also, he emphasized that his possible death would not matter as long as Egypt could be free (Rogan 2017, 338). Therefore, this was seen as a sign for people to believe in and support Nasser because he was heroic and maybe chosen because he was saved from an assassination attempt. This was accepted as the bond between Nasser and God in the eyes of the people, and even Nasser could reflect this situation like that.

Regarding the love and support for Nasser, one of the most important proofs was Nasser's funeral which took place on October 1, 1970. After Nasser's death on September 28, 1970, and before the funeral, government radios called people to restrain their emotions and behave according to the dignity of their leader's funeral. Many segments of society – farmers, workers, students, etc. left their villages and towns to participate in the funeral in Cairo. People shouted, “Gamal lives, our blood, and soul for yours, Gamal.” and “You live in our hearts forever, and you left behind your revolutionaries, Gamal.” (du Bois 1971, 45–46).

There were people around the region and the world alongside many Egyptians. Millions of people came from different parts of Egypt and the world to say farewell to Nasser at his funeral. Many people were crying and screaming in the footage of Nasser's funeral ("The Video of Nasser's Funeral Dirges and Funeral of Gamal Abdel Nasser" 1970). At the funeral, crowds were screaming the name of their passed leader and tried to break through soldiers and policemen to reach his coffin, which was covered with the Egyptian flag. Even the interim president, Anwar Sadat, had a heart attack during the funeral (Anderson 1970). These show how much Nasser was loved by many segments of society in Egypt despite all his coercive policies and defeat in 1967. He was the leader of the Egyptians even when he was buried in the ground in the eyes of his people.

1.1. Research Objective and Questions

Gamal Abdel Nasser was an influential leader in the Arab world between 1952 and 1970. He was seen as the leader of all Arabs, not just Egypt, and his influential initiatives, doings, ideology, and speeches impressed many people and countries. Many events contributed to the development of his prestige and charismatic leadership. However, as much as there were events that ended up with positive outcomes, there were events that led to defeats and failures. The most important and influential one was the defeat in 1967 against the Israeli army.

After that, Nasser lost prestige and charisma in the Arab world despite the continuation of his rule. He and Egypt wished to try to rebuild the Egyptian army and pride with his charisma. Therefore, he continued his rule after such failures and his relatively oppressive regime. Thus, this study focuses on how Nasser could continue to rule even after the 1967 defeat. This study's research question is how Nasser could continue his rule after some failure. On the other hand, the purpose of this study is to understand the effects of Nasser's charismatic leadership on the continuation of his rule by answering the research question.

This thesis helps us to see how charismatic leadership can be a solution or tool for a leader in a problematic condition. Generally, studies about charismatic leadership

focus on its components, effects, routinization, or specific leaders. In this study, charismatic leadership is accepted and studied as a reason for people's support and continuation of an administration. In many studies, a leader's relationship with followers is emphasized. This thesis has focused on this relationship because Nasser's relationship with his people was crucial in establishing charismatic leadership.

However, it is important to note that besides Nasser's charismatic leadership, his domestic policies and propaganda skills were crucial and they were complementary to his charismatic leadership. In the end, he established all of these and made people see him as the charismatic and only leader that could save them. Therefore, charismatic leadership is something that leaders want people to see. This thesis focuses on only what Nasser did in domestic and foreign policy and what were the factors, events, and speeches that contributed to his charismatic leadership. Also, the situation in Egypt at that time is considered, but it is important to stress that charismatic leadership was not the only reason for people's obedience and loyalty to Nasser because he was sure that there would not be any opposition to his rule and obedience would be served one way or another. He provided legitimacy to his rule and consolidated his power. Therefore, this thesis does not indicate all of the reasons why people obeyed Nasser but explains the one possible option, which is charismatic leadership.

1.2. Methodology

In this study, discourses and speeches of Gamal Abdel Nasser in important events are used and discussed to understand Nasser's establishment, usage, and effects of charismatic leadership. Nasser's speeches are used as examples to explain how his speeches were influential among Arabs, and his oratory skills were critical in terms of conducting charismatic leadership, which enabled him to continue his rule.

In addition to primary sources, which are Nasser's speeches and book, there is a need to analyze the situation in Egypt, which help to understand why people supported Nasser. Egypt's history and societal situation are examined to analyze people's support for Nasser. These are important in understanding how Nasser first found a base for his ideology and policies in Egypt. Also, the historical background of Nasser and his coup

with Free Officers are examined chronologically. The process that led to the revolutionary reforms and the establishment of Nasser's charismatic leadership is explained. Thus, the ways and perceptions that made possible outcomes of Nasser's policies are understood. Also, Nasser's reforms and propaganda materials are discussed. Most importantly, as mentioned above, important foreign policy events are discussed in detail. After explaining Nasser's charismatic leadership, the study continued with understanding the effects of ideology and media.

Therefore, as mentioned above, primary and secondary sources are used in this study. The primary sources consisted of speeches of Nasser and his book, *The Philosophy of the Revolution* (Abdel Nasser 1956). The secondary sources include academic articles and studies, books by people who lived during the rule of Nasser, newspaper articles and reports, and books by people who studied Nasser, Egypt, and charismatic leadership.

The result of this study relied on the fact that after all those defeats and failures, how and why people demonstrated for Nasser not to resign instead of accepting the situation. This study claims that this is because of Nasser's charismatic leadership, which was developed during his rule with different domestic and foreign policy events besides his personality and speech skills.

1.3. Preview of Chapters

This study includes an introduction, three chapters, a conclusion, and a bibliography. The introduction presents the thesis's subject, purpose, and methodology. Later, the second chapter of this study focuses on the literature on charismatic leadership, its features, and its necessities. The main reasons and ways of creating charismatic leadership are discussed. Especially the situation of distress, the need for legitimacy, and the savior are explained. Also, propaganda is discussed as a crucial aspect of establishing charismatic leadership. The effects of ideology, the leader's personality, and the perception of charismatic leadership are indicated. Most importantly, the impact of charismatic leadership are touched upon.

The third chapter explains Egypt's colonial background and the process that led to the revolution/coup of Free Officers in 1952. After this section, Nasser's background, reforms, and administration are discussed. As an essential part of the establishment process of charismatic leadership, important foreign policy events, as mentioned above, are touched upon with positive and negative outcomes. Lastly, the relationship between Nasser and charismatic leadership is examined in this chapter.

In the final chapter, there are two main sections "Ideology and Media" and "Discourses." In this context, Nasser's usage of ideology and media is discussed because while ideology was an important supporting material for Nasser, media was a crucial tool for his propaganda. Also, Nasser's speeches on important events are touched upon, and it helps to understand how Nasser was able to impress and direct people in a specific direction with his oratory skills. The last part is about how these aspects contribute to charismatic leadership by becoming combined. Because as mentioned before, ideology, media with other propaganda materials, foreign policy events, etc., helped Nasser to develop his charisma. In the end, this charismatic leadership of Nasser extended the term of his rule.

CHAPTER 2

CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK: CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP AND GAMAL ABDEL NASSER

Gamal Abdel Nasser, a leading figure in 1952 in Egypt, influenced Egyptians and many Arabs in the region. His influence even spread over some countries beyond the Middle East. Various dynamics enabled Abdel Nasser to achieve concrete victories. He was just a man, but Egyptians and Arabs saw him as a hero who would save and enrich them. During the rule of Nasser, there were many different dynamics, some people supported Nasser, but there were also some damaging policies and coercion. Most importantly, Nasser was supported by many in the Arab world, such as Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, etc., which can be understood from his ability to influence these countries' politics and people. Therefore, people believed and respected Nasser beyond their love or fear toward him.

Another essential point for Abdel Nasser was the continuation of his rule even after the military defeats. Abdel Nasser was an influential leader with his abilities and authority. However, even his successes were based on defeats somehow. For instance, Suez Crisis was seen and accepted as a victory by Arabs, but Abdel Nasser lost the battle against Britain, France, and Israel. Yet, he managed to take advantage of this defeat and make it a personal, discrete victory.

Another example was the dissolution of the United Arab Republic which harmed Arab nationalism and Nasser's policies. Also, the Yemen civil war was a crucial challenge for Egypt and the rule of Nasser. Abdel Nasser sent aid and weapons to the revolutionaries and republicans. However, the support to Yemen was a disaster for Egypt and its economy. Yet, Nasser continued to be the revered leader in Egypt and

the leader of the Arab world despite the failures in Yemen. The last and most important event was the 1967 Six-Day War. Egyptians believed that their military could beat the Israeli army. Military culture in Egypt and the trust in the army from the people were immense. Because of that trust and pride, Egyptians were shocked, depressed, and humiliated by the quick defeat against the Israeli military. After the loss, Abdel Nasser took the blame and declared his resignation. However, Egyptians went to the streets to ask him to continue to rule the country and take back what they had lost.

Even after these failures of Nasser, Egyptians continued to support him anyway. This study will be focused on how and why Egyptians supported Nasser after the losses and especially after the 1967 defeat. Regarding people's support and Nasser's rule, the potent of Nasser having charismatic leadership and its contribution to the people will be examined. Therefore, the following sections will explain how different studies define charismatic leadership and its features. Also, why and how charismatic leaders emerge, increase their supporters, and why people follow these leaders will be examined. Moreover, it will be mentioned the ways of creating charisma, such as propaganda and ritual. Finally, it will examine how foreign policy event affects charismatic leadership and how Nasser continued his rule after defeats with his charisma.

2.1.Charismatic Leadership

Charismatic leadership studies are primarily based on the studies of Max Weber. Weber defines charisma as "a certain quality of an individual personality by which he is set apart from ordinary men and treated as endowed with supernatural, superhuman, or at least specifically exceptional powers or qualities." Weber indicates that the charismatic leader puts himself in a revolutionary societal role. Followers of the leader in the society have to recognize the leader's quality; thus, there would be moral legitimacy for the authority of the leader (Weber 1947, 64–65). Also, Weber claims that the effects of charisma are felt on an emotional level and are revolutionary. He indicates that it transvalues everything and breaks all traditions and rational norms (Antonakis et al. 2016, 5). In terms of revolutionary, George C. Banks and other

authors also indicate that charismatic leaders do not try to maintain the status quo and encourage followers to go beyond their limits and standard levels. According to the authors, charismatic leaders motivate followers and make them achieve high levels of performance (Banks et al. 2017, 512).

Weber repeatedly emphasized that it is not about the leader but how the leader is regarded by people that are decisive for the validity of charisma. Therefore, a leader's charisma is based on the perception of the people the leader leads (Willner and Willner 1965, 79). Additionally, Willners define charisma as a leader's capacity to elicit deference, devotion, and awe toward himself as the source of authority (Willner and Willner 1965, 79). In another definition by John Antonakis, charismatic leadership is described as values-based, symbolic, and emotion-laden leader signaling (Banks et al. 2017, 509). Thus, Antonakis defines charisma as an extended leadership influence rooted in emotional and ideological foundations. Charismatic leaders can inspire people and manifest and symbolize desired collective values. Ideological vision is essential for a sense of identity with collectivity (Jacquart and Antonakis 2015, 1054). Also, Antonakis indicates that charisma includes justifying the mission by appealing to values and distinguishing right from wrong and engaging in emotional displays; communicating in symbolic ways to make the message clear and vivid, and also symbolizing and embodying the moral unity of the collective per se; demonstrating conviction and passion for the mission (Antonakis et al. 2016). Antonakis cites House's definition of charisma. According to House, charisma is a characteristic of individuals who, by force, abilities are capable of having profound and extraordinary effects on followers (Antonakis et al. 2016, 13).

Another important definition of charisma is made by ME Spencer in the study "What is charisma?". The author lists the necessities of charisma as follows: (i) skilled performance and (ii) having representation that creates enthusiasm. Spencer indicates that these depend on the leader's personality and the situation. However, Spencer talks about 'historical product,' which combines leader and situation (Antonakis et al. 2016, 6). Also, some scholars like Davies claim that charisma is not about a leader's

personality but the relationship between the leaders and followers (Antonakis et al. 2016, 7).

The things that differentiate between regular leaders and charismatic leaders are (i) impressing people and providing individual loyalty and faith, (ii) a charismatic leader looks like he has a supernatural-extraordinary power such as military prowess, religious zeal, therapeutic skill, heroism, etc., (iii) there is a sense of duty, people are inspired spiritually—communication between the leader and followers (Willner and Willner 1965, 79). Therefore, it can be said that influencing people, having a solid feature like heroism or ideology, and the relationship between the leader and followers are essential for building charismatic leadership.

In addition, people do not follow charismatic leaders just because they are admirable individuals but because they freely inspire people who accept their superior authority (Tucker 1968, 735). Weber believes that a charismatic leader is a part of a social movement or creates a social movement. Therefore, he claims that achieving power is not necessary for becoming charismatic, but to attract people, the leader can become the center of a charismatic social movement (Tucker 1968, 737–40). As mentioned above, an ideology that inspires people can be influential for a leader. Therefore, an ideology and a social movement make a leader more charismatic and popular.

Charismatic leadership is accepted as transformational and inspirational because its higher purpose converts a leader into a moral agent. In this way, the leader enables to create or restore goals and roles for the public. Charismatic leaders make national identity more meaningful for the people, and followers feel a belonging to the country and the leader. Also, charismatic leadership constructs a particular place and purpose for the national community in the international society (Wivel and Howard Grøn 2021, 370–72). Therefore, charismatic leadership answers the questions of who we are and where we are going as people. Also, to understand charismatic leadership in foreign policy, one should understand the relationship between the leader and followers (Wivel and Howard Grøn 2021, 366–68). Therefore, analyzing the leader's and followers' relationship is essential to understanding domestic and foreign policies.

These factors are intertwined in terms of affecting each other. In the following sections, the relationship between the leader and followers will be examined.

2.2. Reasons for the Emergence of Charismatic Leadership and Its Followers

Distress and Hero/Savior

Weber answers why people follow a leader with "distress." He claims that people seek inspiration or a savior when there is psychic, physical, economic, ethical, religious, or political distress (Tucker 1968, 742). If a leader gives them hope and people believe it, they can follow him. People become loyal to the leader because they believe only he can save them from all trouble. In history, it can be seen that many such leaders arise from problematic situations, so distress and conflict in countries can create charismatic leaders. There were problems before the 1952 coup because the 1948 Arab-Israeli War was a defeat in the Egyptian case. It affected Egyptians negatively regarding the economy and trust in the government. Therefore, there was a suitable scene for Free Officers. Gamal Abdel-Nasser became a hero of the Arab world because charismatic leadership is specifically salvationist or messianic. He became a "savior." Also, post-colonial dynamics were necessary because the existing regime was related to the old colonial period. Nationalists were not as influential as before, so people needed this revolution. Also, Abdel-Nasser was a strong supporter of anti-imperialism and did not obey the rules and orders of superpowers. He became a symbol of countries that gave a war of independence against imperialism. Therefore, people became more and more supporters of Nasser, especially during the post-colonial context in Egypt and the Middle East.

Willners also indicates that charismatic leadership can emerge in today's newer states formerly under colonial rule. Authors divide the old orders in post-colonial countries into two: (i) the traditional pre-colonial system, many of whose elements survived during colonial rule, and (ii) the colonial system, which was superimposed upon but did not wholly efface the traditional system. However, the basis of traditional authority was eroded by colonialism and indigenous nationalism, and the foundation of legal authority was undermined by indigenous nationalism. Traditional social systems

tended to disintegrate or be transformed under the colonial power imposed by institutions. Even the colonial administration supported or tolerated some maintenance of traditional authority, which was restricted to traditional contexts (Willner and Willner 1965, 80).

In a country and society, there can be some tendencies such as anti-imperialism, anti-colonialism, nationalism, Islamism, socialism, liberalism, etc. A leader takes care of some conflicts and problems; he can become the "hero of the community," "hero of the country," or even "the hero of the region." His image becomes heroic and invincible, creating loyalty, commitment, and a bond between the leader and the people. When people believe in an ideology and the person who is behind that, the ideology and leader become sacred to the people. Therefore, it can be said that the situation of a country and society is essential for creating charismatic leadership. So, Tucker talks about the term "situationism" in his study and links a leader's emergence to the nature of the existing situation in the country and society. The situation in the country, such as economic, political, social, etc., is called "situationism." He claims that the situation leads to the predetermination of the traits of a possible leader (Tucker 1977, 383). Also, he uses the term "creative leadership," indicating that it makes leaders different from the previous ones (Tucker 1977, 385). Nasser was different because there was a king before him, and he was from the bottom of the people, contrary to the king. He implemented new reforms that benefitted society. For example, he implemented land reforms, and landless peasants benefited the most. On the other hand, landlords were weakened because of this reform and became highly critical of Nasser.

Like Tucker's situationism, Lu and Soboleva use the "charismatic situation" term for social and historical conditions in their study, *Personality Cults in Modern Politics: Cases from Russia and China*. They define a charismatic situation as a "perception of crisis accompanied by the perceived inability of current political institutions to overcome it." (Lu and Soboleva 2014, 4). They also use the definition of Tucker, and like him, they argue that the leader has to be qualified to attract followers to join his movement for change. A leader's charisma is not enough to create strong leadership,

and there should be certain mental conditions for both the leader and the followers. Lu and Soboleva again quote Tucker and claim that charismatic authority starts with accepting the leader's authority by the people. It combines two directions: a leader-follower direction of charisma displaying and adherents gathering and a follower-leader direction of charisma perception, acknowledgment, and devotion. Followers must accept the leader as supremely authoritative. Lu and Soboleva examine the leader-follower relation and how it can be possible. They use Tucker's societal conditions and social feelings and indicate "distress" as Weber did. Social injustice, economic difficulty, a threat to national integrity or other forms of group identity, modernity, rural-urban conflict, etc., can be the reasons for such a relationship. In this perspective, if a person comes up with an identity, creates belonging to society, and leads the people to a new life, that leader would have many followers (Lu and Soboleva 2014, 5).

In the case of Nasser, he used situations and events well for his benefit. He began to use influential ideologies such as Arab socialism, Arab nationalism, and anti-imperialism. He gave the people an identity and something to believe in and got the support of the people by doing this, not just in his country but in other Arab countries as well. Arab nationalism became a cult ideology and later created an identity belonging to Egyptian society and others. These enabled Nasser to develop and have charismatic leadership.

Establishing Legitimacy

Sometimes, there can be power vacuums in states, which can happen after a war, crisis, revolution, etc. Therefore, people cannot immediately trust a leader or a government/administration/ruler. In that case, the leader must legitimize his rule to stay in power because, generally, the will and support of the people are necessary. So, the leader should give people something to believe in, which can be an ideology, a cause, a reason to support the leader, etc. In this way, if people believe in the leader and follow and support him, the leader can legitimize his rule. Therefore, creating charismatic leadership can help provide legitimacy.

In their study, Carol Strong and Matt Killingsworth use Weber's definition of legitimacy and Weber's view on why some people should control others and obey others' rules and orders. According to Weber, the leader's influence doesn't come from only the position obtained but from a sense of 'personal, idiosyncratic power, which is a crucial aspect of the charismatic legitimation process (Strong and Killingsworth 2011, 394). Reinhard Bendix claims that whether the leader is a thief, a hero, a criminal, or a saint doesn't matter as long as the people believe that he is among the people. Abdel-Nasser's background is crucial because he came from low-level people. Until the alterations in the military, he could not join the army as an officer because of his position in society. He understood people and acted according to them. Strong and Killingsworth claims that charismatic authority can only emerge and be legitimated if a leader gains committed followers (Strong and Killingsworth 2011, 395). For Abdel-Nasser, Suez Crisis in 1956 can be a good example because he became a national hero after that incident, not only for Egypt but for many people in the Arab world. He gained committed followers for his cause, and his followers supported him in many things.

Also, Strong and Killingsworth claim that leaders can have power and legitimacy if they convince people that there is an acceptable reason why their natural rights are curtailed by government policies (Strong and Killingsworth 2011, 410). Nasser was loved but also feared because he made many changes in the law and became the only man who could control Egypt. He controlled and limited people's lives in a sense, but many people were happy and supported Nasser. People saw limitations because they thought there were acceptable reasons and trusted Nasser. After 1952, all political parties were banned, and non-governmental organizations were closed. Legislation and the executive were under the control of one person, but the judiciary was independent. However, some regulations were for the judiciary not to intervene in politics (Bozbaş 2018, 97–98).

Also, Willners indicate that when other bases of authority are diminished, charismatic leadership can emerge automatically because it is necessary. The charismatic leader is charismatic because, in the breakdown of other means of legitimizing rule, the leader can evoke and associate with himself the sacred symbols of his culture. Charisma

provides the source of legitimacy and consolidates the leader's authority (Willner and Willner 1965, 81–84). There can be chaos and disorder when no source can rule and manage things in a country. Therefore, a charismatic leader can solve all the problems by being the only source of authority. Abdel Nasser made this possible for himself and became the only man in the country to rule. So, when Nasser became a charismatic leader and an indispensable part of the Egyptian government, Egyptians believed that only he could save them from poor situations.

Charismatic leaders can use their features to create central stable government institutions to modernize society. Therefore, a strong central government can appeal to create a community they dream of. A charismatic leader can symbolize unity and build consensus on objectives even if society has diversity. Charismatic leadership can help centralize authority, but there is also a disadvantage in the long term. For instance, the leader can create a society according to his wish and a centralized government. Still, if the institutionalization of the government is based on the leader, this would be up to only the leader's symbolic rule. He can become or be viewed as an indispensable part of the rule. Also, people can see this in the same way; only this leader can be trusted or rule this country well. Therefore, charismatic leadership can become problematic when this leader is needed to go or dies (Willner and Willner 1965, 86–87).

2.3.Ways of Creating Charismatic Leadership

Propaganda and Ritual

In terms of charismatic authority's features, to have charisma, leaders should be talented in oratory, they can attract and influence people easily, but that's not the only feature. It doesn't mean anything if the leader fails in his missions, ideals, or promises to the people. So, leaders must succeed in things that people admire and believe. Ideology, goals, and a sense of belonging are essential for the supporters and followers of the charismatic leader. But whatever the situation is, a leader needs propaganda to achieve goals because there should be something to believe in for people. Leaders use different tools to make propaganda, with technological development options widened.

Governments use television, social media, advertisements, newspapers, radio, and many other ways. Also, propaganda is not used only for people inside the country but also for other countries, their people, and the international community because leaders can influence people and nations and people abroad by having charismatic leadership.

Leaders use propaganda and ritual techniques to consolidate their power, image, and authority. Propaganda tools and ceremonies are the main grounds for making an image. Leaders use events on domestic and foreign issues to consolidate their power inside and outside. Some strategies that leaders use for their propaganda include creating an enemy, oppressing an enemy or an opposition group, making them targeted by people, and using events to benefit a leader.

So, what makes charismatic leadership possible? How do leaders inspire people and look like a savior to them? Xavier Márquez indicates two models of political leader cults: propaganda and ritual. Propaganda consists of constructing images of the leader, the saturation of public space with these images, and the hyperbolic praise of the leader in official print or broadcast media (Márquez 2018, 2). Leaders use these strategies to create an attachment with the people. While propaganda is a top-down way of creating an image for the leader, in ritual, people become a part of the leadership cult's construction (Márquez 2018, 3). For propaganda, public space should be dominated to an unusual extent. A leader should be given a high and positive status that will portray the leader with qualities supposed to grant him charisma (Márquez 2018, 4–5).

On the other hand, ritual consists of many different and informal practices such as mass gatherings, regular ceremonies, and occasional small-scale rituals (Márquez 2018, 11–12). Participation in these events could be voluntary, or authority could force people. Propaganda and ritual can be mixed or increase the effect of each other. Propaganda can be used in many fields, and practices are more like public or formal events organized by the government or leader.

The leadership can be created by propaganda tools such as radio, film, music, the press, and posters, but these are part of broader propaganda, political, and societal culture. Propaganda should not be empty words; there should be some truths and actual

achievements in it (Apor et al. 2004, 12–13). Besides Marquez, Apor, Behrends, Jones, and Rees also emphasize the importance of propaganda in their book, *The leader cult in communist dictatorships: Stalin and the eastern bloc*.

All political systems have national symbolism, which can be considered cultic. Flag, national anthem, ceremonies, national holidays, ceremonies for those who died in wars, rewards to heroes, renaming the streets, and institutions can be examples. Leaders can be glorified in a more open political system, but it is not the same as a leader cult because their political systems are more relaxed and competitive. In such systems, the development of cults is more challenging as it is under scrutiny and challenged by rival leaders. In revolutionary regimes, people have a belief and faith to fight and die for their country and leader (Apor et al. 2004, 7–8).

Thus, leaders use different techniques to create and sustain their charisma through propaganda. There are various tools to strengthen leaders' image in the eyes of the people. There is a glorification of history and successes, creating a threat perception inside and outside the country, establishing an ideology and the leader's personality. In the following sections, these issues will be touched upon.

2.4. Tools for Creating Charismatic Leadership

Glorification of the History and Successes

Regimes use triumphs and successes to strengthen the people's symbolic attachment to the government and its leader. The purpose of solid leadership is binding people and leaders in complex ways. People should feel honor, allegiance, and duty to their leader (Apor et al. 2004, 14–15). Leaders try to make people think about the honor of being a citizen of that country and having such a leader, but for this, there should be something to believe in and be proud of. Therefore, regimes use history and successes, natural or manufactured, as a tool. Like every leader, Nasser also used situations to glorify himself and Egypt, and propaganda tools were commonly used. So, glory and victory can be a driving force for charismatic leadership. This could be the case for Abdel Nasser because his sphere of influence or ideology was everywhere.

As an example of the glorification of Egyptian history, there were signs and symbols of the Ancient Egyptian regime in some Egyptian movies during the Nasser period. Also, Nasser touched upon the glory of Egypt, being Egyptian and Arab, in his speeches. So, creating a sense of historical belonging and honor to be an Egyptian is crucial. People can follow the leader when the charismatic leader represents glorious history. Also, Nasser used victories and even defeats for his benefit and glorification, such as the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the war afterward. Nasser and the Egyptians considered the Suez Crisis a triumph, but the US and the Soviet Union succeeded in ending the invasion by Britain, France, and Israel. Egypt could have been defeated totally if they did not intervene. Therefore, Nasser used situations and successes even if it was not his success. He was good at making things positive for himself.

Constructing Threats

Creating inside and outside enemies is a way of propaganda to construct charismatic authority. A paranoid culture can occur when people with propaganda internalize a threat perception. In this case, people can feel weak and helpless, enabling the leader to maintain his charismatic leadership. Regarding internal politics, Nasser eliminated or weakened opposition groups and had victories outside. Defeating enemies inside and outside caused the creation of an image for Nasser because when he created or targeted an enemy, he showed that he was the only one who could take care of it.

By eliminating other power sources, a charismatic leader can consolidate his legitimacy and become the only power. Therefore, leaders should not only be heroes or charismatic leaders, but they have to be the source of authority in the state. Nasser made it possible for himself. Almost everything was under his control, and he was the center of that political system. For example, during his term, Abdel Nasser closed parliament and banned political parties, social movements, and religious or secular opposition movements. Nasser tried to prevent every alternative ideology, person, or group for himself. He even decided on the appointment of Al-Azhar sheikhs by the president directly (Bozbaş 2018, 43–45). All unions, trade associations, universities,

student groups, religious groups, etc., were under Nasser's rule (Bozbaş 2018, 197–286).

Therefore, he eliminates enemies inside and outside, becomes a hero of the nation, and uses conflicted situations to achieve his goal. After becoming his people's leader and hero, he made his charismatic leadership solid and sustainable. All of these contributed to his rule's legitimacy, and people thought that only Nasser could leave behind the distress in Egypt.

Ideology and Personality

In the book *Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships*, the authors claim that leaders create legitimacy by investing ideas, events, institutions, particular offices, and personalities with charisma. Charismatic leadership establishes a bond between leaders and society (Apor et al. 2004, 3). Leaders create an ideology for people to believe, and over time, this ideology becomes more important than the leader, but it creates more loyalty. Because people think that this ideology is crucial and the leader is the creator and ruler of this ideology. The authors link rising modern leaderships to the revolutionary regimes in the twentieth century. Leaders seek to strengthen symbolic legitimation when there is economic stagnation or a social conflict. Also, by reinforcing symbolic attachment, leaders try to appeal to citizens to be loyal. It is common in ideological, mobilizing regimes and war times (Apor et al. 2004, 4). The authors' opinion is similar to Tucker's arguments. They claim that economic and societal problems make leaders rise and promote their position and legitimation because leaders make people believe in something that could change everything for the better. People think that this leader will solve all the problems, and the idea of people will promote the leader's position and legitimacy.

In the relations between the leader and the followers, the leader's presentation of himself as their predestined leader, his definitions of their world as it is and as it ought to be, and the conviction of his mission and their duty to reshape it. Willners also address particular grievances and special interests of each group. Charismatic leaders mobilized the population in opposition to a prevailing order and asserted the possibility

of a new order. A charismatic leader can be attributed to his ability to focus and channel diverse grievances and interests in a joint appeal, unifying a segmented population to pursue a familiar good (Willner and Willner 1965, 81–82).

Another critical point is the personality of the leader. For leaders, societal situations, administration structure, ruling style, etc., can be essential for their rule. However, for people to believe in leaders, personality is a crucial feature, too. People consider the leader's appearance, speech, behavior, background, promises, plans, way of rule, etc. All of them matter to people, and the leader's personality can be a step in creating charisma.

Willners indicate in their study that the charismatic leader can inspire loyalty as the source of authority, apart from an established status. They suggest that the leader's ability to draw upon and manipulate the body of myth in a given culture and the actions and values associated with these myths are crucial. The charismatic leader associates himself with the culture's sacred symbols, enabling him to legitimize his claims. In a country, nationalist unity can disintegrate after independence, and for political development, the state needs to consolidate and grow the central government's capacity to modernize. For this goal, charisma can be necessary to achieve national cohesion (Willner and Willner 1965, 77).

Some scholars also discuss whether the followers are impressed by the leader's charisma or the ideology that the leader represents. They claim that a combination of the two is the most logical one. Without an ideology, it is hard to establish a charismatic authority; even if done, it would be vulnerable. Ideology and mission are essential for the bond between the leader and followers. The mission or ideology should serve the needs of society and be the solution to modern problems or society's difficulties. A well-prepared mission can improve the leader's charisma and transform it into a religious mass movement (Lu and Soboleva 2014, 5).

2.5.Reasons for Followers' Loyalty to the Charismatic Leader

In terms of the relationship between the leader and followers, Parry touched upon the study of House. House emphasizes the direct influence of charisma on followers in his study. The immediate impact includes trust, unquestioned acceptance and obedience to the leader's ideas, and affection for the leader. So, he claims an emotional connection between the leader and the followers (Parry et al. 2019, 400). Also, House claims that charismatic leaders challenge the status quo and try to accomplish significant social changes. House accepts charisma as an ideologically based term, and from his point of view, charismatic leaders focus on image management. Also, House indicates that charismatic leaders set high expectations and have communicated confidence in goal attainment and role-modeled desired behaviors. In addition, House does not see charisma as a gift but as a complex interaction between the leader, the situation, and the followers (Antonakis et al. 2016, 9). Also, in *Charisma: An Ill-Defined and Ill-Measured Gift*, the authors touch upon the definition of leadership by Aristotle. Aristotle indicates that leaders can persuade followers by demonstrating character and defending values, stoking followers' emotions, and using solid arguments (Antonakis et al. 2016, 4).

A study entitled *The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership: A Self-Concept Based Theory* suggests that charismatic leadership transforms the needs, values, preferences, and aspirations of followers from self-interest to collective interests (Shamir, Boas; House, Robert J.; Arthur 1993, 577). Therefore, followers can become more committed to the leader's mission and be able to make sacrifices in the name of the interests of the leader, the task, and the duty. So charismatic leaders raise followers' motivation and create an emotional attachment, trust, and confidence in the leader (Shamir, Boas; House, Robert J.; Arthur 1993, 577–79). However, it is crucial to indicate that charismatic leadership may cause trust in a leader, and simultaneously trust in a leader may cause perceptions of charismatic leadership (Banks et al. 2017, 511). Charismatic leaders use values, symbols, and emotions to communicate and attach to their followers.

Consequently, followers expect the leader to adopt and imply those values. Charismatic leaders should live according to the values they communicate. Otherwise,

they will lose credibility (Reh, Van Quaquebeke, and Giessner 2017, 488). For instance, in the case of Nasser, he continued to live in terms of the values that he advocated, and he was still credible even after the defeats in the eyes of the people. Also, followers can support a leader when a leader does a good job. However, if there is a poor job and the leader is responsible, the leader can be replaced by (Jacquart and Antonakis 2015, 1052). However, in the case of Nasser, there were good and bad jobs, but he was not blamed so much. It can be said that there were other actors and external factors to blame, and Nasser was innocent, in a sense, in the eyes of many Egyptians. Therefore, it can be one of the reasons that enabled Nasser to continue his rule.

Charismatic leaders have specific ways to influence followers and build strategies for what they say and how they say it. Leaders establish moral convictions and make high and ambitious goals to create emotional links with followers. These charismatic tactics can be manipulated and strongly affect many outcomes (Jacquart and Antonakis 2015, 1054). Also, it is claimed that followers' charismatic effect and acceptance depend on the leader's ability to appeal to followers with values and a mission (Antonakis et al. 2016, 17).

Leader behavior can be very influential on the motivation of followers. Therefore, Shamir, House, and Arthur develop a theory explaining how leader behavior can affect followers' actions. When the leader's behaviors are examined, it can be seen that they provide ideological explanations. Also, there are emphasizing collective identity, reference to history and followers' worth and collective efficacy, and expressing confidence in followers. These leadership behaviors create self-consistency, self-worth, self-esteem, and hope. Therefore, it makes a personal commitment to the leader and mission. Followers can even sacrifice many things and have organizational citizenship behavior and meaning (Shamir, Boas; House, Robert J.; Arthur 1993, 581). Overall, leader behaviors affect followers' self-concepts deeply and the motivational processes by which the leader's behavior produces charismatic effects.

Therefore, the authors indicate that charismatic leaders should strengthen followers' beliefs with heroic motives and moral statements. Followers' self-esteem should be

raised by the leader's expression of high societal expectations. So followers can be more confident. The leader can touch on the collective identity and reference history. Followers need more positive references to feel worthy as individuals and collectively. A charismatic leader should have a goal with a vision and mission, and this goal should influence followers and be adopted by them. Followers should believe in a better future. Then, people can follow and support the leader. Therefore, charismatic leaders create a personal and high level of commitment (Shamir, Boas; House, Robert J.; Arthur 1993, 582–83).

Charismatic leadership is an internal identity process involving dialogue between the leader and followers. So, while leaders are the architects of identity, followers are the architects of charismatic leadership. However, leaders' ability to influence and motivate followers depends on their capacity to profoundly understand the workings of followers' identities and inner-self constructs and their power to touch on these multiple identities in meaningful and compelling ways. According to Shamir, charismatic leadership and identity are two intermeshing processes wherein identity is linked to followers having agency and taking an active role in shaping the leader's charisma and the charismatic relationship. When the followers respect, accept and show admiration and collaboration, they can provide resources that will empower the leader. Therefore, leaders can have more charismatic behaviors and self-confidence. Leadership and followership influence is a network of multiple identities intertwined and linked in complex and dynamic relationships (Eilam-Shamir, Kark, and Popper 2017, 568–71). Therefore, charismatic leadership is an essential element of leaders' image building. As mentioned above, leaders construct charisma through impression-management techniques and efficiently communicating with the target audience. Leaders who are good at communicating use framing and scripting techniques to project vision (Jacquart and Antonakis 2015, 1054).

In building charismatic leadership, followers have some roles, such as susceptibility, social construction, and leader empowerment. The relationship between the leader and followers mostly depends on their self-concepts and identification with the leader. Shamir explains the seven ways in which followers affect the leadership process such

as (i) followers' expectations, values, and attitudes determine the latitude of leader behavior, (ii) followers' expectations of the leader act as a self-fulfilling prophecy and affect the leader's motivation and performance, (iii) followers' attitudes and characteristics affect leader behavior (Eilam-Shamir, Kark, and Popper 2017, 564–65).

In another study of charismatic leadership, authors indicate that charisma is not only the characteristic of an individual leader but a property that is bestowed by the followers (Parry et al. 2019, 399). Additionally, William H. Friedland uses modern African leadership in Tanganyika as an example of the emergence of charismatic leaders and followers. He indicates three situations for the appearance of charisma: (i) leaders formulate inchoate sentiments deeply held by the masses, (ii) the expression of such sentiments is seen as hazardous, and (iii) success as defined by the relevant social groups is registered (Friedland 1964, 18). Therefore, the author indicates that charisma is not superior or supernatural but is up to people's acts and attitudes. People do not follow leaders for their outstanding qualities but for what they said, promised, and did.

Friedland points out that charisma has to be socially validated and does not require external confirmation; however, without social validation, charisma does not exist. Also, Weber argues that the charismatic figure does not require external proof of his gift but demands obedience regardless of the attitudes of others. On the other hand, Weber indicated that not just "great men" make history. If the charisma of unique people is not socially validated, it is insignificant (Friedland 1964, 20). So, Friedland uses different explanations and gives an example of Weber. People who have charisma do not need external confirmation. Still, they need social validation because leaders don't need any external support but to continue being the leader of a society, they need support and obedience.

2.6. Abdel-Nasser and Charismatic Leadership

Gamal Abdel-Nasser was an inspirational leader for his country and many Arabs. He could impress people according to his wishes and interests, but this does not mean he was not loved and supported voluntarily. Despite his autocratic rule, Egyptian society

strongly supported Nasser, resulting in his success in creating charismatic leadership. First, he was from the bottom of Egyptian society and understood what the Egyptian people wanted from the Egyptian administration. When he got power, he launched various reforms and changed the structure of Egyptian society. He used oratory skills well and events to his advantage. He created ideology-driven leadership, and people believed in this ideology. The Egyptians and many Arabs believed in Abdel-Nasser's Arab nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-imperialism ideas. This made him more robust as a leader, and by referencing all of these, he used situations well for propaganda and became successful.

Another essential point for charismatic leadership was foreign policy because it was a source to use for the leaders and helped create charismatic leadership. For instance, Nasser did not want to sign the Baghdad Pact, and he prevented Syria and Jordan from signing it by using their societies and his influence. His charisma was crucial in influencing people in those countries. His effect, Arab nationalism, and anti-imperialism made people rise against their regimes not signing the agreement in Jordan. Another event that made Nasser more popular and charismatic was Suez Crisis in 1956. He did not win the war by fighting, but he effectively used the result to his advantage. Then, the emergence of the United Arab Republic in 1958 was significant because people wanted Nasser to become their leader. Also, republicans in Yemen demanded the help of Abdel Nasser against their regime, and Nasser accepted it. Therefore, the charismatic leadership of Abdel Nasser was highly influential in Egypt and other Arab countries. His personality, ideology, policies, and propaganda made this possible.

However, aside from the features and events that led to the emergence of Nasser's charismatic leadership, the dissolution of the UAE, the Yemeni civil war, and the 1967 Six-Day War were the adverse events of Nasser's rule. Despite the Suez Crisis being accepted as a positive result, Egypt had many negative implications for others. Although many negativities, Abdel Nasser managed to continue to rule Egypt with the support of the people.

In the following chapters, I will discuss Nasser's leadership in Egypt using the framework I outlined above. In the next chapter, I will talk about the history of Egypt and the background of Gamal Abdel Nasser. I will focus on Egypt before and during Nasser, how colonialism and nationalism were influential in the country, what Nasser did to create charismatic leadership, and how and why people believed in it. So, how Nasser's charismatic leadership emerged, especially with foreign policy events, will be understood. Then, the events that negatively affected Egypt and the region will be touched upon.

In the fourth chapter, I will analyze Nasser's ideology, control of the media, and speeches to deduce the relationship between Nasser's charismatic leadership and the Egyptians. In his speeches, there are some aspects to look into deeply, such as the implications of being the leader of all political systems, ideology-driven actions and discourses, propaganda, a situation of distress and the leader's solution, creating targets inside and outside, being a savior, glorification of history and victories, etc. Finally, I will try to answer how Nasser managed to have people's support even after the 1967 defeat with his charismatic leadership by analyzing his speeches. The following chapters will answer these questions by looking into the events and discourses of Abdel-Nasser.

CHAPTER 3

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP OF ABDEL NASSER

The situation and rule in Egypt will be explained first to understand how Abdel-Nasser's charismatic leadership was established. Colonialism and nationalism were influential in Egyptian society, and these helped Nasser to create charismatic leadership. After explaining Egypt before Nasser, there will be a section for Free Officers and Nasser's rule. In Nasser's regime, Egyptian foreign policy under the authority of Nasser, Nasser's reforms, and his background and charismatic leadership of Nasser will be examined. Finally, there will be a section on Nasser's failures and their results.

3.1. Colonial Rule in Egypt during the pre-Nasser Period

Throughout its history, Egypt has been ruled by many different actors, such as Mamluks, the Ottoman Empire, descendants of Muhammad Ali, etc. Also, French and British colonialism was influential in Egypt. France and Britain competed for Egypt, and Britain continued what France started in the country. Egypt was under colonial control for many years, and this led to the emergence of Egyptian patriotism and Arab nationalism in the end. There were nationalist demonstrations against colonial rule and its puppet regime in Egypt. At some point, *khedives* in Egypt relied on a foreign power, which was unacceptable for the Egyptians (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:96–99).

The colonial rule of Britain focused on Egypt's agricultural production and increased revenue. Also, Britain's colonial administrators decreased the education and health budget because they did not want to train Egyptian elites but servants. There was a vast difference between the rich and the poor, and Egyptians blamed Britain in this period. Finance and trade were at the hand of Italians, Syrians, and Armenians, not Egyptians. Egyptians believed they couldn't control anything in their territory, which

was unacceptable. Therefore, after Lord Cromer, when Sir Edon Gorst, who was more moderate than Lord Cromer, became administrator, it led to the emergence of some moderate nationalists as well (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:103–7).

3.2. Emergence of Nationalism

Nationalism emerged in Egypt as a response to colonial rule and the regime. There were some groups and different factions in terms of nationalism. Ahmad Urabi's revolt was crucial in terms of rising nationalism. Urabi was a colonel in the army and had peasant origins. After an impending law that would prevent Egyptian peasants from rising in military ranks, Urabi and a group of people demonstrated this situation in 1881. Urabi had more support, and this protest movement grew, but he was appointed minister of war in 1882. However, Khedive Tawfiq was dependent on foreign powers at that time. Britain did not like the idea of a government that included more Urabi supporters. British forces defeated the army of Urabi at the battle of Tel al-Kebir on September 13, 1882. British forces captured Urabi, and his movement was ended (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:99–101).

In 1911, Lord Kitchener, the new administrator, arrived and pressured the nationalist movement, establishing Executive Council and General Assembly with the 1913 constitution. However, World War I led to the suspension of the reform process, and Egypt became a British protectorate in 1914. Egyptians were more ambitious after the First World War, and elites had more anti-British sentiments. In this atmosphere, Saad Zaghlul emerged as a leader of the nationalist movement. He came from a farmer/villager background and was the minister of education during the Cromer period (Mansfield 1967, 16–19). Therefore, all the things colonialists or foreign interventions do contribute to the emergence and development of nationalism. Nationalism, which became one of the crucial tools for Egyptians to reach independence, was used by Abdel-Nasser as a pillar of his ideology and was a driving force for the Egyptians to support Nasser. For the charismatic leadership of Abdel-Nasser, nationalism was one of the critical aspects, and it was always there in Egypt

in the context of anti-imperialism. Still, Nasser was the leader who encouraged and gave rise to it.

Lord Cromer's policies influenced Egypt's economy and led to the emergence of patriotism among Egyptians. People started to think about why they could not control the Egyptian economy or the budget, and they questioned. One example was the nationalism that developed during the British occupation and took an important place in Egypt. There were daily newspapers such as *al-Muqattam* and *al-Ahram* (The Pyramids) and the monthly magazine *al-Hilal* (The Crescent). However, the most influential newspaper was *al-Liwa* (The Standard), founded in 1900 and published by Mustafa Kamil. Its main aim was to end the British occupation. Mustafa Kamil claimed that the prosperity brought by the British occupation was not valuable. He said, "The chains of slavery are still chains, whether forged of gold or iron." He claimed Egypt was still part of the Islamic world (Goldschmidt 2004, 55–62).

Besides the newspapers mentioned above, a nationalist newspaper, *al-Liwa*, was supported during the Abbas II (1892-1914) period because the khedive was also a nationalist. Unfortunately, the British administration's policies and Abbas II's approvals caused an international recession between 1907 and 1911 because cotton prices decreased. This sparked an anti-British sentiment among the Egyptians with the Dinshaway incident¹ in 1906, which led to the resignation of Cromer in 1907. Egyptians were shocked and outraged by the verdict, and Kamil's *al-Liwa* condemned the ruling. Dinshaway was crucial because it led to a common ground between the villagers and the urban nationalists against British rule (Goldschmidt 2004, 61).

Egyptians were not obeying, and continuing to increase the demand for independence. After Cromer, Sir Eldon Gorst (1907-1911) and Kitchener (1911-1914) tried to re-establish relations with Egyptians by opening some public jobs to the Egyptians and

¹ Five British officers went pigeon shooting in Dinshaway, but villagers raised pigeons for meat and eggs. Officers wounded villagers and set fire to the village. This event led to villagers' protests; two British officers were injured, and one died later. Britain wanted to teach the Egyptians and prepared a tribunal for villagers. Four people were publicly hanged in the village. Others received flogging, and some were sentenced to prison for hard labor (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:131–32).

announcing the Five Feddan Law (1912) for protecting small landholders by prohibiting the seizure of properties of five feddans or less for debt. However, nothing worked, and they couldn't stop the growth of Egyptian opposition against British rule. Resistance against the British government led to the emergence of three organizations in 1907. The Constitutional Reform Party was established by Shaykh Ali Yusuf, an al-Azhar graduate. He had *al-Muayyad* newspaper that supported Egyptian independence in the form of Islam. Another group was the People's Party, and its pioneer was Lutfi al-Sayyid, who graduated from the Cairo School of Law and was editor of *al-Jaridah*. The third group was the National Party which Mustafa Kamil led and was an official organ *al-Liwa*. Kamil advocated the British withdrawal from Egypt and the territorial integrity of their lands (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:108–9).

Britain declared Egypt a protectorate during World War I and began implementing martial law in 1914. Egypt entered the war by force and had to fight against the Ottomans unwillingly throughout the war. Egypt's strategic geopolitical area protected Britain's interests and helped break down the Ottomans. Especially, Cairo was essential to defend Suez Canal and British interests, so Britain was determined not to leave Egypt quickly. After the First World War, there were three power sources: the King, Wafd, and the British. Until 1952, Wafd was the only mass party, but they did not deal with people's problems, such as land reform, basic needs, etc. They focused on getting out the British from Egypt (Mansfield 1967, 20).

In November 1918, a group of people established the *Wafd*, which focused on the independence of Egypt, and their leader was Sa'd Zaghlul. The Wafd demanded to join the Paris Peace Conference from the British high commissioner for representing Egypt, but their demand was rejected. Wafd declared their intention to the Egyptians, and they were highly supported. British authorities arrested Sa'd Zaghlul and three other leaders and exiled them to Malta in 1919. After the arrest and exile, the Egyptian people rose and started protesting British rule, which became a revolution in 1919. Britain had to negotiate with the Wafd and Zaghlul; in the end, Zaghlul and his team participated in the Paris Peace Conference. They did not have much representation,

but Britain decided to include the Wafd and its leaders in the Anglo-Egyptian discussions in the future (Goldschmidt 2004, 69–71).

Negotiations between Britain and Egypt continued for two years because they couldn't compromise. Zaghlul demanded complete independence from Egypt; on the other hand, Britain wanted to put some restrictions to control Egypt. Finally, in 1922, the British Protectorate of Egypt was abolished, and Egypt became independent. There were four conditions for Britain; (i) continuation of British control over communication networks, (ii) preservation of Britain's right to defend Egypt against a foreign attack, (iii) Egypt's following of British interest in foreign affairs, (iv) determination of Sudan issue by Britain (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:196). Mainly, British forces were still in Egypt, and Egypt had to comply with British interests in foreign affairs. Capitulations also continued, and Egypt could not control its economy. Therefore, Egypt was still dependent country on Britain.

Wafd Party won the parliamentary elections in 1924, and Zaghlul became Egypt's first elected prime minister. In 1936, independence negotiations between Britain and Egypt started again, and Britain accepted Egypt's complete independence. However, Britain had the rights defined in the 1922 declaration. Also, Britain had the right to have a military presence in Suez Canal and protect Egypt from foreign attacks. In 1936, King Fuad died, and his son, Farouq, became Egypt's king. In 1927, Zaghlul died, and under the new leader of Wafd, Mustafa al-Nahhas, the party became more factionalized and corrupted (Goldschmidt 2004, 75–77).

During World War II, Britain used Egypt to defend the Mediterranean Sea and the Middle East and North Africa. Because of the importance of Egypt to Britain, Egypt became a target by the Axis power. For the establishment of the defense system, Britain tried to industrialize Egypt. This caused growth in Egyptian enterprise, and new jobs emerged. It helped to decrease unemployment, but it caused high inflation and grain shortages. Also, Egypt imposed martial law and cut diplomatic relations with Germany because of the treaty obligations. Cairo was the headquarter in the Middle

East for Britain, and it was used as a supply center (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:202).

Mustafa Al-Nahas Pasha, appointed as prime minister by Wafd Party, abrogated the 1936 treaty in 1951. After the abrogation, British and Egyptian forces collided, and British forces destroyed police stations in Egypt, which led to demonstrations and riots. Many Egyptians were killed, and on January 26, 1952, it started to be called Black Saturday (Goldschmidt 2004, 102–7).

Therefore, the Egyptian history of colonization and the fight for independence led to the emergence of Egyptian patriotism and nationalism. At first, it was just Egyptian nationalism that sought independence, but later it expanded to the region and became famous as Arab Nationalism with Abdel-Nasser. Arab nationalism did not start only in Egypt but grew and expanded with Egypt under Abdel-Nasser. So, colonialism and the fight for independence were in the heart of people. Abdel-Nasser used this very well to attract people and to have their hearts.

3.3.Free Officers

On May 12, 1948, Nasser was appointed to the primary units and went to Gaza to fight in the Arab-Israeli War. He became famous after the war because of his success. The 1948 Arab-Israeli War made General Mohammed Najib and Gamal Abdel Nasser heroes in people's eyes. After the Arab-Israeli War, Abdel Nasser established a secret political group with his friends. Free Officers was extended afterward the first meeting in 1949. Until Black Saturday, Free Officers' purpose was fighting against British imperialism. However, Free Officers began discussing overthrowing King Farouq after the incident (Rogan 2017, 331–32). Free Officers had different divisions: economic problems, attack units, security, and terrorism. Thanks to the organization's structure, no one knew that Nasser was the leader. Najib's active participation in the Arab-Israeli War and support for the Free Officers were positive in the eyes of Abdel Nasser. Also, Abdel Nasser thought only General Najib was close to his ideas among high-ranked military officers (El-Feth 1965, 29).

The king's palace was corrupt, and he knew that some people wanted to take him down. After the War, Free Officers gathered and established Revolutionary Command Council and chose Nasser as the leader in 1950. Nasser thought they needed a senior officer for the revolution, and Mohammed Najib joined the organization. He was selected as the committee president but did not participate in the meetings and plans. They did not communicate with Wafd, and the secret police force had information about Free Officers. Revolution took place on 22-23 July 1952, and King Farouq left the country with his family to Napoli (Mansfield 1967, 31–36). On September 7, 1952, a military government was established first in Egyptian history (El-Feth 1965, 69).

Later, Najib started to see himself as the savior, becoming popular, but Free Officers did not like this situation. Najib was older than his colleagues, and consulting them was hard for him. He was honest and conservative, but he was not good at politics. Politicians and experts used his goodwill. General Najib and Abdel-Nasser had many differences in terms of thinking and ideology. Nasser preferred an authoritarian rule to reach his goals with the army quickly.

On the other hand, Najib demanded establishing a parliamentary system to ensure the rights of the people. People loved Najib, who was seen as a leader; however, people saw Nasser negatively (El-Feth 1965, 135). They prepared a land reform, and it was agreed that people could not have landed more than 200 feddans. With the 1952 land reform, the political influence of landlords decreased. On October 10, 1953, the political party law took place, and all parties, political programs, and organizations had to inform the Ministry of Interior about their activities. In January 1953, it was decided that all closed parties had to transfer their financial assets to the treasury. On January 23, National Salvation Party was established, and on June 18, the 1953 Republic of Egypt was declared. Najib became president and prime minister, and Nasser was deputy prime minister and minister of the interior. To eliminate different ideologies and opponents, Nasser closed the Muslim Brotherhood organization after student protests in February 1954. Najib resigned after this event because Nasser did not consult with him on February 23. Another event was the treaty signed on October 19, 1954, between Britain and Egypt, which led to the evacuation of British forces

from the Suez Canal. But Britain retained the right to interfere when an attack emerged against Egypt (Mansfield 1967, 37–43).

3.4. Nasser and his rule

Nasser was one of the leaders with charismatic authority. Adeed Dawisha (Dawisha 1976) also indicated that his charisma was not limited to Egyptian domestic politics because his charismatic authority or charismatic leadership was influential all around the Arab world. At the beginning of the 1952 coup, Free Officers' primary foreign policy goal was Britain and Sudan (Dawisha 1976, 9–10). Therefore, Egypt first focused on British and Egyptian relations instead of Arab politics. However, when Nasser could create legitimacy for his rule and consolidate his power, Egyptian patriotism or nationalism turned into Arab nationalism under his authority.

Another critical aspect of Nasser's rule was that Egypt was against communism but was reluctant to fight with the West against the Soviet Union because the alliance or agreements with Western powers were seen as imperialist. Therefore, under Nasser's rule, Egypt was against any initiative of Western countries and Arab states that would join the Western powers. Nasser successfully prevented some countries from entering the Western alliance, proving his charismatic authority. Therefore, he began to emphasize Arab unity and Arab brotherhood concepts. For instance, Nasser indicated that "the aim of the revolutionary government is for the Arabs to become one nation." Still, at first, it was for the independence of Egypt, and it was against British imperialism (Dawisha 1976, 11). Therefore, Nasser used terms, ideas, and propaganda well to reach his goals.

3.5. Nasser's Background

Nasser was born on January 15, 1918, in Alexandria, originally from Upper Egypt, province of Assiyu's Beri Mur village. His grandfather was a farmer, and his father worked at the postal authority. His father, Hussein, married Fehime, a daughter of a wealthy coal trader Mohammed Hamid. His father went to different places because of his job, and Nasser went to Cairo to live with his uncle, Halil Hüseyin, a bank officer.

Nasser's mother died when he was eight, and he was affected so much because he loved his mother. Abdel-Nasser went to El Nahassin primary school. He was interested in politics and significantly read Rousseau, Voltaire, Hugo, and Dickens. He admired the lives of Julius Caesar, Alexander, Napoleon, and Gandhi (Mansfield 1967, 26–27).

Nasser was interested in Wafd Party, but after Sa'd Zaghlul, the leaders disappointed him. He inclined to the Socialist Party of Ahmet Hüseyin. It is not evident that he joined the party, but he believed in party purposes despite not seeing Ahmet Hüseyin as a leader. Nasser participated in the student protests during the 1935-1936 period. When the 1936 Agreement was signed between Britain and Egypt, the Egyptian army became an ally of Britain, and Britain wished to train the Egyptian army. To maintain the support of the people, for the first time, young people from ordinary people, besides people from landlords or aristocracy, were accepted into Military Academy. Nasser and the others who had a role in future governments could become military officers with this new reform. Nasser failed on his first try in 1936 and started to study law at Cairo University, but in 1937, he was accepted to the military school. He graduated as a lieutenant in 1938 and became a captain and teacher at Military Academy (Mansfield 1967, 28–29).

In the book of Ahmet Abu El-Feth (El-Feth 1965), it is indicated that Nasser interacted with different political groups to reach his purposes and prepared to benefit from other politicians. He was clever, trustful, and convincing to other people. He was a good listener, calm and cold-blooded. He was good at using people for his benefit without being so transparent and open in terms of his purposes (El-Feth 1965, 232–40). Therefore, Abdel-Nasser's background and personality initially enabled him to become a charismatic leader. Then, his charismatic and strong authority turned into charismatic leadership. This led to the emergence of Nasser's influence on Arab society.

Some events advocated Nasser's charisma in Egyptian politics. On October 26, 1954, a Muslim Brotherhood member named Mahmoud Abdullatif attempted to assassinate Nasser during his speech about the agreement with Britain. Abdullatif couldn't target

Nasser well, and Nasser did not even move while he was shooting. This was regarded as heroic in the eyes of the Egyptians. After the attempt, Nasser addressed the people and said that his blood would spill for Egypt and the Egyptians, and he lived for them and died in the name of freedom and honor for Egyptians. Also, he emphasized that he could die if the Egyptians were free and with dignity. Nasser said that when he died, everyone could be Gamal Abdel Nasser (Rogan 2017, 338). After this event and speech, he became more popular and took over the revolution's success. Then, Nasser's decision about foreign policy matters strengthened his charisma.

3.6. Foreign Policy Events Enabled the Creation of Charismatic Leadership

During the era of Abdel-Nasser, Egypt became one of the leading countries in the Arab world because the Cold War led people to choose a side by force. However, Nasser and some other countries created the Non-Alignment Movement. Therefore, Abdel-Nasser used every tool to attract Egyptians, Arabs, and other countries. His charismatic leadership, policies, ideology, and plans made this result possible. In this part, the crucial foreign policy events under Nasser will be examined.

3.6.1. Development of Egyptian Prestige in the Arab World

As a regional and global actor, the prestige of Egypt developed during the Abdel Nasser period. Three main events led to prestige development at first: Baghdad Pact, Bandung Conference, and the Czech arms deal. These events' critical and common point is that they were considered a challenge against imperialism and Western powers. Therefore, anti-imperialism and not being committed to the options of Western powers were crucial for the Arab World. Abdel-Nasser used these situations well for his benefit because, as the leader of Egypt, he became popular among Arabs, and his charismatic leadership began to emerge and evolve.

3.6.1.1. Baghdad Pact

When Baghdad Pact, which included Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain, was signed in January 1955, Arab countries divided into two groups, but most supported Nasser. Nasser claimed that Baghdad Pact was the work of Western imperialism, and

by challenging Baghdad Pact countries, he declared that he sought to be the leader of the Arab world. Abdel-Nasser believed that Baghdad Pact aimed to divide the Arab world and isolate Egypt so Egypt would be alone against Israel and the idea of Arab unity would be harmed (Heykel 1974, 57–58). Nasser used every tool to attack countries that were included in the pact. The Voice of Arabs was challenging against Baghdad Pact, especially in Iraq (El-Feth 1965, 270–76). Abdel-Nasser started the counter-attack on Baghdad Pact with radio programs and media. He used oppositional discourse against the Western alliance and the pact. Nasser's discourses drove Arab nationalism in other Muslim countries, which was against Britain's interest in the region (Heykel 1974, 48).

Abdel Nasser established a partnership with Syria in early March, and Saudi Arabia and Yemen supported it. This move was a step toward the unification of the Arab world. The Egyptian-Syrian Mutual Defence Pact was signed on October 27. Saudi Arabia and Yemen signed a pact with Egypt, too. These pacts were not crucial militarily, but they showed Arabs that they were independent. Also, they emphasized Egypt's central and leading role in the Arab world (Dawisha 1976, 12). Jordan sought to join Baghdad Pact; however, when the British ambassador Gerald Templer came to Amman on November 16 to discuss the membership, Egypt launched a violent propaganda campaign against the Templer mission. Strikes, demonstrations, and riots took place in Jordan, and Templer failed. Jordan did not join the Baghdad Pact, and Lebanon followed Jordan's steps (Dawisha 1976, 14). Therefore, Abdel-Nasser was an influential figure in terms of pushing his agenda to other countries. His ability to impact other countries' politics and the public was on another level with his ideology, propaganda, and charismatic leadership.

3.6.1.2. Bandung Conference

Abdel Nasser was the leader of Egypt during the Cold War period, and he believed Egypt had to maintain independence and not rely on other countries by applying positive neutralism. So, he aimed not to be involved in any Cold War blocs. In April 1955, Abdel Nasser participated Bandung Conference in Indonesia. Before the

conference, Nasser met with primary supporters of non-alignment, such as Indian leader Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and Yugoslavian leader Josef Tito. His and other leaders' ideas convinced Nasser. He believed communism was a threat, but imperialism was still there, so he supported the non-alignment movement and became an essential representative of the movement (Podeh and Winckler 2004a, 235). Also, Nasser was accepted as the leader of the Arabs rather than only the Egyptian leader during the meetings and conferences. He became famous among third-world countries, leading other Arab countries to follow Egypt because of Nasser. Cairo Station read the situation well and made successful propaganda (Dawisha 1976, 12). As one of the leaders who applied neutral policies during the Cold War, Nasser increased his fame and prestige outside Egypt (El-Feth 1965, 277). Abdel-Nasser became a flag and symbol of third-world countries (underdeveloped or developing countries) thanks to his war against imperialism.

Therefore, Nasser first boosted his anti-Western image with Baghdad Pact by joining the Bandung Conference (Podeh and Winckler 2004a, 78). By doing that, Nasser became more popular in the Arab world and started to be seen as a leader. The Arab world was still very biased and angry against the Western world. Also, they did not wish to bind with the Soviet Union as they did with the West. So, third-world countries' non-alignment movement and Nasser's role in it were very influential among Arabs. They thought that the day Arabs could finally go their way and choose. Nasser's leadership and people's views of him were strengthened after these events, primarily because of the sentiment of anti-imperialism and anti-Western tendency. Egyptian society was pleased because the world accepted their young and charismatic leader, Abdel Nasser (Rogan 2017, 348). Nasser used and managed this situation well in terms of consolidating his rule.

3.6.1.3. Czech Arms Deal

When Israel attacked Egyptian headquarters and Gaza, Nasser was under pressure from people and other officials. He had to make a deal and demand weapons from Britain and the US. However, they declined the request, and Nasser declared that if

Western countries continued to decline Egypt's demands, he could agree with other countries. Then, on September 27, 1955, Egypt and the Czech signed an arms deal. This step was considered crucial because it proved independence from Western influence. The Arab world was divided between anti/pro-Nasser, and propaganda was still influential for Abdel-Nasser. Since the Baghdad Pact, propaganda has been one of the Egyptian foreign policy dynamics, and radio was used to influence people (Dawisha 1976, 12–13). Czech Arms Deal was crucial for the domestic politics of Egypt and Nasser. Because he was under pressure from the Egyptians, he was considered a dictator and violent. However, with this arms deal, he became famous among the Arabs. Arabs were not fans of Western countries, and if the West challenged someone, they could become the perfect leader choice for them. All the things Nasser did could be forgotten because of this move. Therefore, Western countries made Nasser more famous with their own hands. European and US media attacked Abdel-Nasser because of this deal, but this was even better because Nasser had more respect from Arabs. Arab world started to believe that Nasser was not under Western influence and earned more prestige than before (El-Feth 1965, 279–81).

3.6.2. The Rise of Nasser in the Arab World

Abdel-Nasser was initially not ideal to Egyptians because of his authoritarian policies and decisions. However, Nasser became a warrior for anti-imperialism with the events of the Baghdad Pact, Bandung Conference, and Czech Arms Deal. Arabs began to see him as the leader of the Arab world. Especially two events led to the development of Arab nationalism and the charismatic leadership of Nasser (It has a two-sided relationship because these events improved Nasser's charismatic leadership and led by Nasser's actions and behaviors): the 1956 Suez Crisis and the 1958 United Arab Republic. The important thing here is that these events led to the development of Arab nationalism. However, these were necessary steps for Nasser's improvement too. Nasser did not want to join the Western alliance and follow them as a small state and chose a different policy. He indicated that if there is an alliance, it should be among the regional countries. Nasser prevented regional actors from joining the Baghdad Pact. Besides his excellent oratory skills, he used radio propaganda well, and other

states couldn't join the pact. He joined Bandung Conference in April 1955 and became one of the pioneer names of the Non-alignment movement (Dawisha 2003, 160–66). With these steps, Nasser prepared the ground for his rule, and especially Suez Crisis was crucial after these moments.

3.6.2.1.Suez Crisis

Free Officers and Abdel-Nasser planned the construction of the Aswan High Dam for the development of Egypt and to gain people's support. Aswan Dam could symbolize the new, dynamic, industrialized Egypt. For the dam's construction, Egypt needed budget support, and the United States, Britain, and the World Bank offered support for Egypt. However, they put some conditions, such as control over Egypt's budget and balance of payments. First, World Bank demanded control over Egypt's debts because of the high amount of money they would provide. Secondly, the organization indicated an interest rate of 5,5%, but Nasser found it very high for a long-term project. Later, the interest rate was decreased to 5% with negotiations, and the two sides agreed. However, the United States asked not to buy weapons from the Soviet Union and maintain peace in the Arab-Israeli conflict by using the leadership of Nasser. The US put these terms to help the construction of the Aswan Dam (Heykel 1974, 46–47).

After these terms, Nasser hesitated to accept the offer and support because of the requirements, and the Western side interpreted this hesitation and Nasser's reaction as a negative sign. They thought that Nasser could not be suitable for the Western alliance and that he could want to reach a separate agreement with the Soviet Union. Therefore, the US declared that the project's success was unclear and could not support it until the right time. Abdel Nasser couldn't come up with an agreement with the Eastern bloc, and the West did not offer another deal. Also, there was a wave of propaganda by Britain and the US against Nasser because of his reluctance toward the West and his possible relationship with the Soviet Union (Heykel 1974, 68).

However, propaganda of the Western powers, especially of "imperial" forces, was more influential for the Arab societies than anything because people thought that if those imperialist powers were against Nasser, they should support him. Therefore,

Western powers did a ‘favor’ for Nasser by making propaganda against him. Afterward, on September 28, 1956, Nasser declared in a major speech that Egypt would have its own money to build Aswan High Dam and to have the budget, Suez Canal Company would be nationalized (Dawisha 1976, 14–15).

After the nationalization decision, France, Britain, and Israel decided to attack Egypt and restore the international status of the Suez Canal on October 29, 1956. However, the US and the USSR did not want a war and a balance change in the Middle East. In the end, UN support declared the ceasefire on November 6, 1956. Britain and France withdrew in December, and Israel withdrew in March 1957. Nasser couldn’t win the war militarily, but he won the battle politically and became a national hero for the Arab people after this crisis (Dawisha 2003, 175–81).

Egyptians fought against the Western powers during the war, and people resisted in Port Said against Britain. Attackers thought that people would rebel against Nasser and topple him, but on the contrary, Egyptian society supported Nasser more. Beyond Egypt, Nasser became a more incredible hero in the Arab world (Mansfield 1967, 49). For instance, Nasser addressed his people by saying they would continue to war until the occupiers left and would not surrender. His strong stance influenced many people who volunteered to help their country (Rogan 2017, 355). Therefore, it can be understood that Nasser was very influential as an Egyptian leader.

After this event, Egyptian leaders lost a lot of military forces and revenues from the canal and oil in Sinai. However, the British and French troops failed to topple Nasser, and Suez Canal remained under the control of Egypt. This crisis gave Nasser unlimited credit in this country and throughout the Arab world (Dawisha 2003, 15). Western powers undermined the hatred of Egyptian people towards colonial powers. Therefore, people stood with Abdel-Nasser and made him more robust than before. Abdel Nasser may not have had the power and will of the people until the Suez Crisis because of his authoritarian policies. However, this event led people to embrace him and his ideas more (El-Feth 1965, 284). In the end, while Western powers sought to weaken Abdel-Nasser, on the contrary, they made him more powerful.

The Suez Crisis influenced the Arab world in politics because Nasser could control and manipulate Arab affairs. For instance, at that time, the Iraqi government was pro-British; however, the government had to condemn the British and French attacks on Israel and Egypt because of the pressure of public opinion. Iraq refused to meet with Britain about Baghdad Pact during that period. Also, Iraq minimized its diplomatic relations with France. Syria and Saudi Arabia cut their relationship with Britain and France; Jordan seized some British army stores in Amman. Another example of Nasser's influence over the Arab world was the election of the nationalist government in Jordan on October 21, 1956. The government, which Suleiman Nabulsi headed, joined a military pact with Syria and Egypt that led to the unity of Jordanian and Syrian forces under the Egyptian commandry. In 1957, the Treaty of Arab Solidarity was signed between Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia for ten years (Dawisha 2003, 16).

3.6.2.2. Establishment of the UAR

After the successes of Nasser in Egypt and the Arab world, countries in the region were disturbed by Nasser's dominance. In January 1957, Saudi Arabia King Saud bin Abdulaziz visited the United States and became a leading actor in anti-Nasser and anti-neutralist countries. Until then, Saudi Arabia was considered as friend of Nasser in conflicts of the Baghdad Pact, the Czech arms deal, and the Suez crisis. Later, Nasser supported pro-Nasser and nationalist Suleiman Nabulsi against King Hussein of Jordan in 1957. At first nationalist policies of Nabulsi were supported by King Hussein; however, Nabulsi's popularity became a threat to Jordan in terms of intervention in Jordanian politics by Nasser. King Hussein dismissed Nabulsi and requested military aid from Iraq and Saudi Arabia. Nabulsi's followers tried to topple King Hussein, but they failed. Egyptian radio encouraged people to protest and accuse King Hussein of being with the imperialist forces. King Hussein blamed Egypt because of riots and coup attempts. Egypt continued propaganda against the rule of King Hussein. Later, Jordan and Egypt cut their diplomatic relations (Dawisha 1976, 16–17).

After all these developments, there was only one ally for Egypt in 1957: Syria. Saudi Arabia was not supporting Nasser anymore; Jordan cut diplomatic relations with Egypt; Lebanese Prime Minister Camille Chamoun accepted the Eisenhower Doctrine, and Iraq was going against the propaganda of Egypt with counterpropaganda. Therefore, Syria was the only ally standing aside from Egypt in the summer of 1957. The US was taking action with other partners because of the possibility of a communist regime in Syria. Therefore, Nasser blamed the Eisenhower administration for plotting against Syria, and this propaganda of Egypt made Arabs more anti-American and put pressure on the Arab regimes who wished to ally with the U.S. (Dawisha 1976, 18).

Baath Party, led by Michel Aflaq, Salah Bitar, and Akram Hourani, called for the unity of Arabs in terms of liberation of the Arab nation from political interference and pseudo-national divisions. On January 12, 1958, a Syrian delegation visited Cairo and tried to convince Nasser to accept the unity of Syria and Egypt. Baathist Foreign Minister Salah Bitar joined the negotiations with Nasser later, too. Nasser refused to have a federal union because it wouldn't be influential enough to counter Communists and conservatives. Syrian side declared the role of Nasser as the leader of Arab nationalism. Baathists wished to formulate the ideology of their rule and for Nasser to be the speaker. Under pressure, Nasser decided that a total union should be implemented if the federal union was not possible; Syria and Egypt would be united, and Syria would follow the Egyptian political system. Briefly, Nasser demanded the dissolution of all political parties, withdrawal of the Syrian army from politics; unification of Syrian and Egyptian economies; implementation of state control, and agricultural reform in Syria. Baathists had to accept this offer despite the sudden demands of their commitment to the goal (Dawisha 1976, 19–20).

On February 1, 1958, United Arab Republic was established under the presidency of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Syria has been demanding unity since the establishment of the Baghdad Pact. However, Nasser believed that any unity attempt could trigger the opposition of Britain, the US, and the Soviet Union. Also, Nasser had the support of many Arab countries, such as Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, in the region after the Suez crisis. Yet, Nasser was cautious about not frightening these countries with the

idea of Arab unity. However, Jordan and Saudi Arabia were not already on the same page with Nasser, and despite Nasser's reluctance to accept the idea of unity at that time, unity was established, and it was by Nasser's terms (Dawisha 2003, 186–87). The unification of the two countries was welcomed well by Syrians. They were tired of ongoing coups, internal problems, revolutions, assassinations, etc. Therefore, unifying Egypt was a hope and salvation for the Syrians. Also, the unity of Arab states was a dream of Syrian Arabs. Especially as a leader of Arab nationalism, Nasser was the perfect choice for the unity of Syria. Communists lost the chance to seize the government in Syria because of the unification (El-Feth 1965, 295). Baath Party thought that Nasser was someone they wanted and believed they could rule over Syria through him. However, Nasser did not want to rule Syria through them, and he closed the Baath Party in early 1960 (Mansfield 1967, 52).

3.7. Reforms of Nasser

3.7.1. Land Reforms

When the Free Officers took power in Egypt, some of the primary purposes of the revolution were eliminating feudalism and establishing social justice. Therefore, General Naguib passed an agrarian reform on September 9, 1952, and Gamal Abdel Nasser modified and implemented the law in 1953 and 1954. The government distrained up the lands which belonged to the royal family and provided temporary homes and aid. Confiscated lands were bought and rented by peasants, and this money was used for developments in education and health fields (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:305). One of the reasons for this reform was inequality among people in terms of land ownership because 70 percent of the population had less than one-half acre each for cultivation, and 94 percent of the population had 34 percent of the land. On the other hand, 6 percent of the population had 66 percent of the land (Margold 1957, 9). The inequality of land distribution made rich people richer and poor people poorer.

The new land law provided 200 feddan limitations to large landowners, and after five years, they could transfer 100 feddans to their sons but not more than 50 feddans for each son. Landowners must obey confiscated land at ten times the annual rate.

Confiscated lands would be distributed to the peasants according to quality, from a minimum of two feddans to five feddans. As an exception, orchards could be distributed in plots as large as twenty feddans. Purchasers must pay 30 annual installments. The wages of agricultural workers would be fixed, and all farmers and agricultural workers would be gathered around the cooperative farming association in each village (Shaw 1954, 232–33).

Additionally, the redistribution program applied to the royal family and their lands and properties. The main reason for this reform was to be beneficial to peasants. Still, the regime aimed to decrease the landholding elite's political and economic power and influence (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:307). Therefore, Abdel Nasser earned the love of the Egyptians and decreased the impact of landlords, which could damage Nasser's rule (El-Feth 1965, 57).

Besides land distribution, there were attempts to make land reclamation, converting desert areas to agricultural land and rural settlements in the Egyptian context. The new regime established after the 1952 revolution committed itself to helping the rural poor. Therefore, the government tried to expand agricultural lands, primarily because of the increasing population of Egyptians, unemployment rate, congestion, and housing shortage in the current lands. After the revolution, the first reclaimed desert land was the creation of Tahrir province in 1954 (Adriansen 2009, 665–66). However, these initiatives were unsuccessful, and the government used vast amounts of money from the budget. Therefore, this initiative was not helpful for Abdel Nasser in the long term.

On the other hand, some laws that came with the land reform abolished the titles like pasha and bey. These laws created an image of anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism for the new regime. People believed in them and their ability to establish a strong nation and army, social justice, and democratic society (Cleveland and Bunton 2009, 42:307–8). Therefore, Abdel Nasser used this situation to build up his image and rule.

3.7.2. *Cultural and Societal Changes*

Egyptian government defined culture as a critical phase of the nationalist and socialist revolution. The state put much effort into increasing society's cultural level, enhancing Egypt's prestige, and using radio, television, theatres, cinema, and art to spread Egypt's propaganda. Nasser used the power of the press as a propaganda weapon. Therefore, all press agencies' editors were appointed by Nasser as almost an officer. The government indicated all pressing policies, becoming a national mobilization and propaganda tool (Bozbaş 2018, 174–75). Egypt developed itself in terms of radio propaganda. In 1952, the broadcast time was 33 hours daily, but when it came to 1964, it increased to 394 hours. Cairo radio targeted Asia, Africa, Europe, and the US, and there were broadcasts in 20 different languages (Mansfield 1967, 83).

Voice of Arabs started its broadcast life in 1953, but it began after Nasser declined the offer of the Western alliance. In just one year, the broadcasting time of the program tripled. Nasser established the Voice of Arabs because he thought it was fruitful for Arab politics, not because of his commitment to the Arab ideology. It is indicated that the radio channel was speaking and fighting for Arabs and showing the unity of Arabs. Radio became a propaganda tool for Nasser to spread his ideas. In radio programs, there were many anthems belonging to the military. During the suitable and available day hours for villagers, radio programs focused on land reforms and the military's role in abolishing the landlords' system. For the children, programs focused on the strength of the "mighty" Egyptian army (El-Feth 1965, 87). Also, the cultural hegemony of Egypt attracted Arabs to the Voice of Arabs. Egypt was accepted as the best in music, artists, and concerts. Artists praised Nasser, especially Umm Kulthum, one of the names close to Nasser. She had at least 31 songs that emphasized homeland and truly Nasser.

Additionally, Arab countries were not aware of the power of radio except Egypt. Also, radio propaganda was successful, but one of the reasons was the power of Nasser's address. After Nasser maintained cultural superiority, he wished to keep the authority in the military field (Dawisha 2003, 147–50).

Egypt was a leading country in the region in terms of press, radio, university, big cities, high population, artists, and movie sector during the period of Nasser. After the Baghdad Pact and Suez Crisis, Nasser began a propaganda campaign against Britain in the Middle East and Africa. Even in Africa, people listened to the Egyptian radio, and Nasser influenced them. The Voice of Arabs was influential, and there were speeches and programs against Baghdad Pact. Nasser blamed Nuri Said Pasha for treason in Iraq, and he almost toppled King Hussein in Jordan with his propaganda attacks (El-Feth 1965, 286–87).

Also, Egyptian cinema was used as a propaganda tool for the regime of Abdel Nasser. There were short films about the military and its movement in every cinema session, Revolutionary Command Council's actions, and the army's victory. In the big cities, posters were worldwide about the military's power and mightiness. Also, these emphasized the army's sacrifices for the public (El-Feth 1965, 87).

3.8. Charismatic Leadership of Nasser

The first chapter indicated that propaganda and ritual could help to create charismatic leadership. Abdel Nasser used both ways to develop his leadership and loyalty among people. At first, he declared that there would be a democratic political system. Democracy and the rule of people were the dreams of some Egyptians. After King Farouq's overthrow, many festivals and ceremonies, and propaganda tools were working to criticize the old regime. The military was involved in every step of these events. Newspapers and other sources of information were used for stories about the old regime and King Farouq. Therefore, people started to make fun of the old government and were proud of the new one. Also, Nasser's policies and reforms regarding land distribution, names, and titles were influential for the Egyptians (El-Feth 1965, 97–104).

Regarding foreign policy, Abdel-Nasser used his charisma and charismatic leadership to prevent Jordan and Syria from signing Baghdad Pact in 1955. Especially as indicated above, the Suez Crisis in 1956 was a turning point for Nasser because his popularity increased significantly among Arabs after this event. The establishment of

the United Arab Republic was the top because people's belief in Arab nationalism and unity was displayed. Also, when Yemen Civil War broke out, republicans came to Nasser to ask for his support. Therefore, foreign policy is dynamic regarding charismatic leadership but has a mutual and interactive relationship. More importantly, Nasser saw himself as the leader of the Arabs, so most Arabs in other countries should see him as Egyptians do, according to Nasser. Because of this, foreign policy was crucial for him.

Ideology was one of the essential ingredients of charismatic leadership. For Abdel Nasser, it can be said that Arab unity and Arab nationalism idea were the driving force among the Egyptians and other Arab countries. It can be said that Nasser institutionalized Arab nationalism, but it was for a short time because after the Six Days War and the death of Nasser, Arab nationalism started to lose popularity. Camp David Accords, signed between Israel and Egypt by Anwar Sadat, was another critical step in the fall of Arab nationalism. Therefore, it can be said that Nasser's ideology commuted with him, and once he failed and died, his ideology also started to fade. However, during the rule of Nasser, his ideology and Arab nationalism were crucial in creating charismatic leadership.

Besides ideologies, myths and stories are crucial in creating unity among people. Therefore, myths can apply to Egypt because Abdel-Nasser emphasized the ancient history of Egyptians and their cultures. To make a nation, nationalism and a sense of unity, roots, and history of the people were important. So, Abdel Nasser underlined Egypt's ancient history and made people feel belonging to Egypt. Also, he focused on Israel, anti-imperialism, and monarchies as enemies and directed people to feel that way. He tried to create Arab solidarity, spread Arab nationalism, and the Golden Age of Arabs and Egypt. People need an enemy, an image of a savior, and a promised future to create charismatic leadership. Abdel-Nasser made it all possible for Egyptians. He was the savior for them, at least for a while. Also, some people believe that Nasser used Arab nationalism for anti-imperialism because it was seen as a tool to fight against the West and imperialism (Dawisha 2003, 139).

Also, Nasser used some strategies in internal affairs to consolidate his power. For instance, Nasser appointed his friends and close allies to governmental positions. However, he always prepared rivalries for positions among people and did not let people stay long in important and high positions. Nasser adopted a “divide and rule” policy. For example, he used the Muslim Brotherhood to eliminate Wafd Party. Then, Nasser used duality in the Muslim Brotherhood to eliminate the organization. He created groups within organizations or administrations to use someday. Therefore, it can be said that Nasser’s strategy was based on three aspects of internal affairs: (i) eliminating rivals, (ii) creating competitiveness for positions, and (iii) creating opponents by using conflicts and then eliminating them (El-Feth 1965, 248–49).

All aspects and foreign policy events that are discussed above can be divided into three groups as the sources of charismatic leadership: (i) local, (ii) regional, and (iii) global. As for local, Egyptian patriotism/nationalism was crucial because an Egyptian identity was emerging and becoming more visible and stronger. The nationalization process in the country and anti-colonial policies were really influential. Nasser’s policies, attitudes, and discourses about these topics impressed people, too. Also, the idea of Arab unity, Arab nationalism, the glory of being an Egyptian, and the glorification of Ancient Egypt and its history was crucial. As an enemy of Arabs in the region, the existence of Israel was important for Nasser’s discourses and the establishment of charismatic leadership.

Regionally, Arab nationalism and anti-colonial views were crucial, too, because many countries witnessed the colonial period. Also, Israel was considered as a threat in the region, and Nasser’s discourses were against the existence of Israel. He was sure that when Arabs got stronger and united, Israel could be defeated. Thus, this idea gave Arabs a belief, and Nasser got more popular. Also, the idea of the Arab world’s leader for Egypt was crucial because Egypt was seen as a cultural and social center of Arabs. Therefore, Nasser was seen as the leader of the Arab world, especially with his powerful leadership image. Additionally, Egypt and Nasser’s advocacy of revolution and republic in the region was crucial because they favored people’s rule, which was influential among Arabs. There were monarchies and one-man rule in the region, and

Nasser's ideas were affecting people positively regarding the support they gave to Nasser.

As global, Nasser's views on anti-colonialism, the Cold War, and Non-Alignment Movement were crucial. He stood against colonial and superpowers and got supporters and friends from different regions and countries. He had good relationships with non-aligned countries and ones that had colonial histories. Also, Nasser's support for revolutions and republics was crucial because being the defender of republics and democracy was important for the leader's image.

3.9. Three Foreign Policy Cases During the Rule of Nasser

3.9.1. The Dissolution of the UAR

When UAR was established in 1958, the Baath party and the Egyptian government stayed as allies. When the Baath party was discharged, Baath believed a new state would be built upon them, and the party did not rebel. Some Baath members were in the cabinet, but Egyptians took important positions in the government. In the cabinet, 14 of 34 members were Syrians. Later, Baath became the most critical organization of Nasser's administration in Syria, and they resigned. General 'Afif Al-Bizri, a member of the Syrian army, told Iraqi General Qasim not to join UAR because Syria lost its independence by doing that. Syrian businesspeople were not pleased with Nasser's economic limitations. Also, landowners were displeased by Nasser's wish to apply land reform in Syria (Dawisha 2003, 222–27).

Many Syrian ministers were in the central government, but authority was at the hand of Nasser. Therefore, Syrians felt humiliated, especially the Syrian army. Despite all these, people saw Nasser as the leader, but the middle class, traders, military officers, and intellectuals were against Nasser's socialist policies (Mansfield 1967, 52–53). When Syria decided to leave the UAR, Abdel-Nasser declared that he would not intervene. It was seen as a hit on Arab nationalism. Jordan and Iraq hid their please, but they recognized the Syrian regime immediately. However, this did not mean that Arab nationalism was over (Dawisha 2003, 231)

After the United Arab Republic's dissolution with a small group's coup in September 1961, Nasser focused on exporting Egypt's revolution to Arab rivals and deepening the revolution in Egypt. Because of this situation, nationalization, expropriations, and arrests of the opposition started. Also, Abdel Nasser focused more on foreign policy than domestic politics during the UAR period. Therefore, after the UAR dissolution, Abdel Nasser could focus more on domestic politics and the political structure of Egypt. In May 1962, a new national charter was promulgated, expounding the socialist principles of Egypt's domestic revolution (Ferris 2012, 28). This declaration became the central pillar of modern Egypt. Besides Nasser's focus on domestic politics, he did not leave foreign policy. Press of Cairo and radio couldn't be active in Damascus, Amman, Riyadh, and Baghdad (Mansfield 1967, 54). By declaring the National Charter, Egypt's new political tendency became Islam, Arab nationalism, and socialism (Rogan 2017, 374).

Nasser tried to convince King Hussein of Jordan to be part of the United Arab Republic. However, he refused the offer from Nasser. There was a coup attempt against King Hussein, and it was claimed that Nasser was the one who encouraged it, but King Hussein was able to keep his throne. Also, Nasser invited the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) to the UAR, but KSA refused the offer. Later, Nasser focused on Lebanon and blamed Camille Chamoun for his dictatorship. It could be a false claim; however, Egypt's propaganda led to severe conflicts between parties in Lebanon. Nasser expected the resignation of Chamoun, but he did not resign and tried to solve the conflict (El-Feth 1965, 298–99).

Abdel-Nasser failed to affect Jordanian and Lebanese politics successfully, but he was able to encourage a coup in Iraq on July 14, 1958. Iraqi King Faisal, his family, and Nuri Said Pasha were killed in the bloody coup. Many politicians and foreigners in Baghdad were liquidated, and people screamed and walked for Nasser in the streets. Egypt offered unification to Iraq with the terms of (i) Iraqi acceptance of Nasser as the president, (ii) control of all military forces by Abdulhakim Amr, and (iii) dissolution of all Iraqi political parties. However, Iraqi officials indicated that it was impossible to accept these terms. Also, communists in Iraq were against the unification of Egypt.

Therefore, a campaign against Egyptian unification began in Iraq (El-Feth 1965, 300–302). Abdel-Nasser made propaganda against Qasim in Iraq and claimed that he was anti-Arab. However, Qasim had the support of villagers and workers in Iraq because he was the enemy of imperialism and a friend of the Soviets. (Dawisha 2003, 217–19).

On the other hand, in Iraq, Qasim was eventually toppled by a military coup and executed after the trial on February 9, 1963. General Arif became Iraq's president, and Baghdad's radio sang the Egyptian anthems after the coup. Revolutionary Command Council declared anti-communist and wished for good relations with Cairo (Mansfield 1967, 55). In February-March 1963, there were coups of Baath in Syria and Iraq, and they demanded to discuss unification with Nasser. Egyptians were distrustful because of what happened with Syria in the past. Because of this reason, they decided to halt their cooperation for two years on April 17. According to their understanding, they would consider the federation idea after the observation process. Nasser did not wish to rush for unification because there were instabilities in Iraq and Syria. For instance, Nasser believed that Iraq should have solved the Kurdish issue first because he indicated that governments that did not have their people's support could change quickly. Therefore, it isn't significant to unite Egypt and these states. Nasser believed that Syrian, Iraqi, and Yemeni regimes should have the support of their people first and prove it to the Egyptian administration,(Mansfield 1967, 60).

Nasser's predictions came true, and because of the countries' different policies, people protested in Jordan, Damascus, and Aleppo, but the regimes suppressed them. Later, a pro-Nasser coup in Syria was prevented, and then Nasser and Baath's regime completely disintegrated (Dawisha 2003, 237–41). On May 11, Baath regimes in Syria and Iraq consolidated and established new governments. The editor of Al-Ahram, Mohammed Hasaneyn Heykel, indicated that the UAR would not cooperate with Syrian Baath leaders anymore on May 17. Nasser did not initially say anything against the Baath regimes in public, but on July 22, he described the Syrian Baath Party as separationist, inhumane and immoral. Also, Nasser indicated that there should be only an Arab nationalist movement to guarantee the union,(Mansfield 1967, 57–58).

Also, Nasser became more critical of conservatives who put their interest above national interests after the dissolution of the UAR. For Nasser, Morocco, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Lebanon were conservatives. However, Egypt and Nasser got more isolated by that time (Rogan 2017, 275). After Algeria's independence, Egypt had a new ally, and Nasser continued to use the name of the United Arab Republic even after the dissolution. Nasser focused on revolution and necessary reforms, and beyond Arab nationalism, he tried to become the hero of revolutionary ideals. After that, Egypt and Nasser began to support the revolutionary movements of Arabs (Rogan 2017, 385).

Until 1961, Egypt had soft power in the Arab world because the main threat from Nasser was not military capabilities but the power of propaganda. However, after the dissolution of UAR, Egypt's status and Nasser's appeal of call were weakened. The diminution of Egyptian soft power made coercion an attractive alternative (Ferris 2012, 57). Therefore, Egypt's soft power decreased after the UAR's dissolution, leading to the usage of hard power and negative results in Yemen.

3.9.2. Yemen Intervention

Toward 1962, it was claimed that Egypt funded a lot of coups and conspiracies and made revolutionary campaigns, especially from the Cairo radio. In that sense, other Arab leaders feared Nasser and Egypt (Ferris 2012, 8). The dissolution of the United Arab Republic was a turning point in Egyptian-Yemeni relations and caused a change in Egyptian attitudes toward using force. Until 1961, Egypt hid its revolutionary intentions in Yemen and established a friendly relationship. Even the Egyptian military and police missions were sent to Yemen to train the Yemeni armed forces to fight against the British. So, Yemen was one of Egypt's targets for retribution for Syria's withdrawal from the UAR (Ferris 2012, 33–34).

After Yemen's ruler, Imam Ahmad bin Yahya died on September 19, 1962, Mohammad al-Badr, his son, succeeded him. However, Yemeni army officers attacked the Royal Palace, and on September 26, 1962, they declared a republic with a coup in Yemen. Abdallah Al-Sallal was the movement leader, and he communicated with

Nasser. He said that his movement was a social movement against a tyrant. He indicated that they devoted themselves to Arab nationalism. Revolution in Yemen was a significant threat to Saudi Arabia, and Riyadh supported the son of Imam Ahmad, Imam Badr. This revolution was a vast development for Nasser and Egypt, and when the republican regime demanded help from Nasser, he accepted. On September 29, the new Presidential Council met and recognized the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) (Ferris 2012, 50). However, Nasser said the Yemeni case was falsely calculated and caused unexpected results. Primarily, the support for the revolution came from the urban side, and people who lived in rural areas were loyal to the Imam. Yemenis saw the Egyptian regime as authoritative and did not think in the way of Arab nationalism. Until 1967, the war weakened Egypt and Egyptians started to digress from Arab nationalism. They began to be abstracted from Arab politics and demanded isolation. At the beginning of the war, in 1963, they were motivated and passionate, but later it changed (Dawisha 2003, 234–36).

After the coup, Mohammad al-Badr escaped, and the revolutionaries focused on consolidating their power. Some tribal forces opposed the republic and the presence of Egypt in Yemen. Egyptian military support came afterward the coup, and many foreign observers were suspicious about the possible connection of Egypt with the revolution. Some thought that coup was a conspiracy hatched in Cairo. However, Egypt and Yemeni revolutionary forces claimed that the coup was the business of Yemen, and Cairo was responding to Yemeni requests for protection from Saudi Arabia. In the end, people considered that Egypt was aware of the coup preparations and prepared to aid, but they did not take any active role in the coup (Ferris 2012, 30–31).

The overthrow of the Imamate in Yemen was an achievement of Yemenis, but there were also joint Egyptian-Yemeni efforts for ten years. The government of Nasser was not responsible for the events of 1962. However, Egypt's agents were in contact with all the main actors of the revolution. Most of them studied in Egyptian military institutions and operated under assurances of Egyptian support (Ferris 2012, 32). So, there was massive intelligence from the ground to advantage Egypt. Also, a Yemeni

revolutionary representative was in Cairo before the revolution to ascertain Egyptian support. Nasser gave authority to the intelligence chief to tell the Yemenis that they could rely on any quantity of arms and ammunition for the revolution's success. However, nothing pointed to war, and no evidence suggests that Egypt gave Yemenis the deployment of troops before the coup (Ferris 2012, 35–36).

Egypt and Saudi Arabia began a bloody struggle for control because of the Yemeni civil war between October 1962 and December 1967. In the case of Egypt, the battle between two regional powers became more costly in lives, treasure, and squandered influence than any of its wars with Israel. For instance, Egypt's expedition forces were 70,000 in 1965. Because of the tension between Egypt and Saudi Arabia, US-Egyptian relations were strained. Egypt had more burden of military expenditure after the US suspended aid to Egypt, and Cairo became more dependent on the Soviet Union (Ferris 2012, 2–3).

Before Egypt's intervention in Yemen, Nasser had a good relationship with Algeria, but with Iraq, Jordan, Tunisia, Morocco, Syria, and Saudi Arabia, things were not like wished. Egypt and Nasser had unprecedented regional isolation (Ferris 2012, 28). Egypt's relations and conflicts with other Arab regimes were influential in Nasser's decision to intervene in the civil war on behalf of the republic (Ferris 2012, 36).

Every goal of Nasser depended on navigating neutralism well. However, he lost his balanced policy between blocks after the Yemen civil war (Ferris 2012, 5). Also, the war showed the Egyptian leadership's interest in regional hegemony at the expense of the more popular struggle against Israel and the more important struggle for Egypt's development (Ferris 2012, 18).

Egyptian intelligence failed to portray the situation on the battlefield well. They exacerbated the miscalculations, leading to the intervention's decision. They were optimistic about Egypt's role in Yemen (Ferris 2012, 57). At first, the number of troops Egypt sent was insufficient because of the false and deficient information. Intelligence could not understand and interpret the ground, leading to the failure in Yemen.

Journalist Muhammad Haykal portrayed the decision of Yemen intervention as a defensive response to Saudi meddling and adopted because of Anwar Sadat's insistence and against his judgment. A group headed by Sadat called for a direct intervention to support the revolution, and he was blamed for this. Sadat indicated that the civil war in Yemen was an excellent opportunity to teach Saudi Arabia a lesson. Sadat and the Egyptian government believed that Saudi Arabia financed the union's breakup with Syria and led the campaign against Egypt (Ferris 2012, 60). But the lesson was not provided, and it cost Egypt a lot.

On the other hand, other groups only supported the provision of arms and ammunition. Nasser opted for the dangerous middle option, and the decision to send a token deterrent force underestimated the revolution's effect on Yemen's neighbors. Saudi Arabia responded to Egypt by supporting the monarch. Nasser could send a small armed presence to Yemen, but he miscalculated the consequences. Nasser couldn't deter neighbors but made them fear, leading to more conflict. So, Nasser miscalculated the neighbors' reactions. He wanted to prevent them, but on the contrary, they feared and came together to stand against Nasser and Egypt. It was accepted as foreign intervention, and Egypt should have been against it first because of its colonial history. Haykal tried to portray the revolution as a surprise to Egypt, and he took the blame from Nasser and put it on the Saudis and a little Sadat (Ferris 2012, 51–55). Therefore, the blame for the Yemen intervention and conflict was put on Saudi Arabia as an external enemy; inside, the responsibility was Sadat's. So, Nasser was exonerated thanks to the propaganda and his charismatic leadership. Many people believed that Nasser was innocent, and they continued to support him.

Yemen intervention resulted from the commitment to the export of Egypt's revolution, the competition with Saudi Arabia, and the internal contest for power within the Egyptian regime. The intervention decision ignored the proper balance of forces on the ground in Yemen and underestimated the Saudi response to an Egyptian armed presence on the peninsula. Even Nasser admitted that the Yemen intervention was a miscalculation, and they never thought that would lead to what it did (Ferris 2012, 69). Also, Nasser believed that withdrawing from Yemen would be pointless for the

revolution, and he accepted that it was a political operation rather than a military (Rogan 2017, 387).

After the Yemen intervention, other former officials were generally chosen to exonerate Nasser's responsibility and minimize costs. Some journalists at that time claimed the intervention was just and necessary. It was seen just because they believed that Egypt was given a historic opportunity to transform Yemeni society and eliminate its feudal and tribal characteristics (Ferris 2012, 19). Therefore, Nasser was clean after failures because there were always others to blame, internal and external actors. This and Nasser's charismatic leadership combined allowed him to continue his rule with the people's support because many Egyptians also believed that those were not the fault of Nasser.

3.9.3. The Defeat of the 1967 Six-Day War

The Arab-Israel conflict was crucial for the Arabs then, and Nasser started a positive movement in the Arab world to discuss and solve problems. On December 23, 1963, Nasser invited all Arab kings and leaders to Cairo to discuss the problem of the Jordan River. Israel changed the way of the Jordan River from Tiberiya Lake to the Negev desert in 1964. All Arab states vowed to prevent this action. The conflict on the Jordan River led to Nasser's peace with Arab states after the dissolution of UAR and problems with other countries because when the topic was Israel and the Jordan River, no Arab states could overturn the invitation. Egypt, under Nasser, was able to develop relations with Arab states again in 1964. (Mansfield 1967, 59).

However, Egypt's relations with other countries worsened when the Arab states were divided into revolutionaries and reactionaries. Egypt had wicked ties with Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Relations with Syria were relatively better, but Damascus had an unpredictable regime. Also, 40,000 troops of the Egyptian army were wasted in Yemen. Egypt has a massive debt to the Soviet Union in the international arena and has no good relationship with the US. Egypt needed aid, but the US was not responding correctly to the Egyptian government (Ferris 2012, 262–63).

On November 4, 1966, Egypt signed a defense alliance with Syria to fight against imperialist conspiracies. On November 13, 1966, the Israeli air force attacked a Jordanian village named Samu, and 18 Jordanians died. It is claimed that Israel wished to deter King Hussein not to join the alliance of Egypt and Syria. These events led to polarization in the Arab world, which was fruitful for Israel. When Syria-backed guerrillas committed attacks in Israel, the air force of Israel targeted Damascus. A chain of events caused the Israeli air force to continue to target Egyptian, Syrian, Jordanian, and Iraqi airfields on June 5, 1967. On June 8, 1967, Egypt lost 10,000 men, 1500 officers, 600 tanks, and 340 combat aircraft in four days of the war. Also, the Israeli army took 5000 men and 500 officers hostage. Also, Israel occupied the Sinai Peninsula, Golan Heights, and West Bank. Israeli army forces came to the edge of the Suez Canal (Dawisha 1976, 47–50).

Also, Egypt sent troops to the Sinai Peninsula on May 14, 1967. Besides the tensions between Israel and other Arab countries, it was because of the relationship between Cairo, Washington, and Riyadh. There was an existential crisis in Egypt in addition to the conflict with Saudi Arabia and the effects of the Yemeni civil war. The Egyptian government was struggling with an economic crisis and foreign policy problems. Therefore, Nasser wanted to fix and consolidate his international relations position by sending the troops to the Sinai. Nasser aimed to earn prestige in the eyes of Arab states by going offensive against Israel. Also, he tried to get out of Yemen to challenge Israel. Some people claimed that Nasser created the conflict with Israel because he wanted to craft an honorable withdrawal from Yemen. Finally, Nasser wanted the attention of the USA by using Palestine. Most importantly, he needed a victory like Suez in 1956 (Ferris 2012, 268–70).

Nasser acted like he was about to declare war against Israel, but he wanted to create a deterrence because Egyptians needed this enthusiasm after Yemen. Also, he wanted the military to look mighty. So, the Egyptian army took the streets of Cairo before going to the Sinai Peninsula. Egyptians and allies of Nasser believed that they could win against Israel. All Arab countries were unprepared for the war, but Nasser had to go to war by mistake, and others followed Egypt. Nasser did not wish to fight with

Israel, but he was captivated by his previous accomplishments. He made Arabs believe in him and his propaganda and they were sure about the win. During the war, Egypt and other countries spread lies about the destruction of Israeli forces, and many Arabs celebrated it and thought Arabs could win against Israel. After the defeat of Arab countries' air forces, Nasser advised that they could talk about the US and British air forces' help to Israel. By blaming Britain and the USA, Nasser made the war look like a continuation of imperialist hegemony in the region. This belief spread in the region, and people began to see the US as the new imperialist power in the Middle East. Also, Israel was seen as a tool of the US in terms of imperialist ambitions (Rogan 2017, 388–97).

On June 9, Nasser declared his resignation. Still, he emphasized that the fight against Israeli aggression and imperialism would continue, and they would continue to advocate the values of the Egyptian Revolution. However, Egyptians had tremendous loyalty to Nasser, and they took to the streets, and Nasser gave up the idea of resignation. Since 1952, Nasser became an indispensable part of Egyptian society, symbolizing Egypt's national dignity, regional leadership, and international prestige in the eyes of the people. People believed that Nasser's resignation would end Egyptian socialism, Arab nationalism, and the victory of imperialism and international Zionism (Dawisha 1976, 50–51). However, there are some claims about people who took streets for Nasser not to resign, which was that the Egyptian government gathered them to consolidate and empower Nasser's rule after the 1967 defeat.

After the defeat of the Six-Day War, Nasser's image was damaged despite being the most popular Arab leader. Egypt's economy was harmed, and diplomatic relations with the United States were at the lowest since 1952. Egypt became more dependent on the Soviet Union. After the defeat, Egypt partially lost its regional leadership, its independence from the Cold War, and its truce with Israel (Ferris 2012, 1–2). Suez Canal was closed, and the Sinai Peninsula oilfields were under Israel's control. Also, there was massive immigration to Cairo from Suez, Ismailia, etc. As indicated above, Nasser had to leave the policy of non-alignment and rely on the Soviet Union in terms of military and economic aid (Dawisha 1976, 51).

After the Yemen intervention, other former officials were generally chosen to exonerate Nasser's responsibility and minimize costs. Some journalists at that time claimed the intervention was just and necessary. It was seen just because they believed that Egypt was given a historic opportunity to transform Yemeni society and eliminate its feudal and tribal characteristics (Ferris 2012, 19). Therefore, Nasser was clean after failures because there were always others to blame, internal and external actors. This allowed him to continue his rule with the people's support because many Egyptians also believed that those were not the fault of Nasser.

3.10. Implications of Foreign Policy Cases on Nasser and the Egyptians

Gamal Abdel Nasser, a charismatic leader, built a crucial ideology that enabled people to gather around. He created his charismatic leadership and strengthened it with his policies inside and outside over time. As a supporter of Arab nationalism, Nasser's top moment was the establishment of the United Arab Republic with Syria in 1958. However, the dream of Arab unity and nationalism faded after the UAR's dissolution in 1961. This event affected Nasser, Egyptians, and Arabs so much because it eradicated the reputation of Egypt and Nasser as the creator of a united Arab nation. After that, Nasser had to focus on exporting and consolidating the revolution in Egypt. Until the dissolution, Egypt used soft power with propaganda, but after the withdrawal of Syria from the UAR, Egypt began to use hard power. Nasser had to use coercion because Egypt and his rule weakened.

After the dissolution of the UAR, Egypt's usage of hard power began in the case of Yemen. Nasser wanted retribution for the UAR, which led to more isolation for Egypt. The Egyptian government got into a severe conflict with Saudi Arabia. Typically, neutrality and non-alignment movements were crucial for Nasser, but he had to leave that policy because of what happened in Yemen. Also, regional and global actors understood that Egypt and Nasser had ambitions in terms of regional hegemony. In addition, the Yemeni case harmed Egypt's relations with the US because Saudi Arabia was an essential ally of the USA.

Lastly, one of the reasons for the 1967 Arab-Israeli War was the Yemeni civil war because Egypt was damaged so much after Yemen. There were economic, societal, and political problems in Egypt, and the government of Nasser was isolated. However, after the war, all problems got worse, and the only thing they could do was focus on taking back what they lost. The defeat devastated Nasser and the Egyptians because they significantly believed in Egypt and its military. They felt the loss of dignity, and it was hard to recover, but they continued to support Nasser because people thought he was the only thing left in the eyes of the Egyptians.

It can be seen that there were adverse outcomes, and Nasser was supported anyway. It was interesting to know that he was seen as the only choice to save Egypt even after the 1967 defeat. In the case of the UAR and Yemeni civil war dissolution, the blame for failures was put on different inside and outside actors other than Nasser. Especially media was involved in these initiatives, and Nasser was talking about it at events. For instance, Nasser blamed Syrians, Jordanians, Saudis, and Americans for the dissolution of the UAR. In addition, he accused Saudi Arabia of the Yemeni civil war. Egyptians were ready to believe in him because he was seen as Egypt's primary and necessary element at that time. Also, Egypt's foreign policy during the period of Nasser was based on an emphasis on national prestige. Adeed Dawisha indicates that this was related to Nasser's obsession with dignity. Nasser blurred the boundaries between the collective and personal with his charismatic leadership, and his personified state and sensitivities became Egypt's (Ferris 2012, 13). It can be said that Nasser's failure could be considered dignity or honor material. Because of this view, people could continue to support him.

Nasser used many concepts and events to create charismatic leadership and avoid some failures in his speeches. For instance, he used anti-imperialist discourses and targeted Western powers regarding colonialism. Also, Nasser tried to create a threat perception and give the Egyptians a goal. He emphasized the history and glory of Egyptians and Arabs so much. Therefore, his speeches were also influential in addition to the events that made Nasser a hero.

In the next chapter, how Nasser's rule continued will be examined, and the effects of ideology and media, his discourses, and his achievements will be touched upon. These helped to create Nasser's charismatic leadership and enabled Nasser to continue his rule even after the Arab-Israeli War. So, it will be claimed that Nasser's charismatic leadership contributed to the continuation of his rule. Also, his charismatic leadership was composed of his personality, ideology, goals, talent for oratory, and reasons and outcomes of domestic and foreign policy. Primarily, these will be examined in the coming chapter.

CHAPTER 4

CHARISMATIC LEADERSHIP: USAGE OF DISCOURSE, MEDIA, AND EVENTS

Leaders can create charismatic leadership using many tools, but they need propaganda first. For establishing charismatic leadership, the situation of society and country is crucial because the possible success of charismatic leadership depends on people as much as the leader. As indicated in previous chapters, the ideology and personality of the leader are essential aspects of charisma. Also, distress and legitimacy are other essentials in creating charismatic authority. Another critical factor is the relationship between the leader and the followers. However, even though there are some aspects, policies and a leader's successes are crucial indicators of charismatic leadership.

In Egypt, there was distress, and people were waiting for a hero, so the situation for Nasser was suitable. The only thing that Nasser needed to do, using the conditions, events, and outcomes for his benefit. Nasser used propaganda tools to do this, and he was successful in a sense for a while. His successful propaganda made him a hero and leader of the Arab world. He advocated his ideology well and made people adopt it. Also, he was good at putting goals and made people enthusiastic about them. He controlled the media for his purposes, becoming a propaganda tool. Most importantly, his speeches on the radio or at any other event were crucial in attracting people on his behalf.

Therefore, it can be said that Nasser created a solid charismatic leadership by using events, establishing an attractive ideology, using media and other tools well, and delivering powerful speeches with ultimate purposes. The following sections will touch on the effects of Nasser's ideology, how he controlled the media, his important speeches, and how these elements combined.

4.1.Ideology and Media

Ideology and media were crucial in Nasser's way of creating charismatic leadership and attracting people. Nasser established his own ideology, which would be called "Nasserism." Nasserism is considered in many different ways, but some scholars accept Nasserism as an ideological movement that consists of anti-imperialism, pan-Arabism or nationalism, and Arab socialism. To understand Nasserist ideology, Nasser's *Philosophy of the Revolution*, the Suez Crisis, the National Charter, the March 1968 Manifesto, Nasser's speeches, and interviews are important indicators. Another view sees Nasserism as a psychological phenomenon shared by an entire Arab generation, focusing on Nasser's personality and style of rule (Podeh and Winckler 2004a, 2). It can be said that the charismatic leadership of Nasser, his autocratic rule, direct connection with the masses, and use of rhetoric constitute the essence of Nasserism. Another view accepts Nasserism as a modernization movement and Nasser as a modernizing leader (Podeh and Winckler 2004a, 2).

On the other hand, Marxists see Nasserism as a product of Egypt's national struggle against imperialism and dependency. Some consider Nasserism as a protest movement against Western colonialism and imperialism that appeared during the crisis. Also, some believe that Nasserism is part of a populist leader and movement idea (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 1–4).

Nasserism was an Egyptian ambition for regional hegemony in terms of foreign policy. There was an ancient Egyptian impulse, and pan-Arab sentiments were on the rise; the wave of decolonization coursing through the developing world in the post-war period; the waning of British imperial power; the ensuing power vacuum in the Middle East; the Cold War competition between the Soviet Union, the United States, and their respective allies; and the immense personal charisma of Gamal Abdel Nasser. Abdel Nasser visualized Egypt as a preeminent power in the region with a strong military and advanced weapons, a healthy and independent economy, an ideology of international appeal, and a reliable source of leverage on the world stage. Therefore, the Cold War provided Nasser with those opportunities and chances. Egypt was a

cultural and political center in the region. Nasser's skillful management during the Cold War made Arab nationalism a production of the golden age of Nasserism. Egypt did not sign a defense pact or foreign host bases. Nasser did not apply any capitalism or communism policies in Egypt (Ferris 2012, 4–5).

In order to understand Nasser's vision of revolution and ideology, his book, *The Philosophy of the Revolution*, can be examined. In his book, Nasser indicated that struggle and the most significant battle were for the liberation of Egypt (Abdel Nasser 1956, 5). Therefore, he underlined that all the things they had done were for the liberation of the country and its people. Nasser considered the 1952 revolution a hope for the people to govern themselves and decide their fate (Abdel Nasser 1956, 10). So, the revolution was supported by the people who wanted a republic and democracy. Nasser indicated that the seeds of revolution were in the hearts of Egyptians, and it was a legacy of their ancestors who fought for their freedom during the time of the Urabi revolt or in 1919 (Abdel Nasser 1956, 16).

Generally, it was believed that the Arab-Israeli War in 1948 influenced and urged Egyptians to march along the road to revolution. However, in his book, Nasser underlined that the beginning of the revolution was not only because of the war in Palestine. He indicated that Free Officers would still take the road of revolution without the Palestinian fight. Thus, the Palestinian war was not the only reason for the revolution in the eyes of Nasser. In the book, he discussed that they were fighting for Palestine, but their dreams were in Egypt. Also, Nasser thought that what was happening in Palestine was a miniature version of Egypt (Abdel Nasser 1956, 11–13). So, Palestine had a symbolic meaning for the Egyptians (at least for Nasser and his companions) because they believed that when they fought in Palestine, they were fighting for their dreams and the independence of Egypt. Also, as a militarist, Nasser thought that the army could play a crucial role in transforming society and the country. Therefore, he felt that “if the army does not move, who else will?” and indicated that if they did not revolt, it would betray the sacred trust in their charge (Abdel Nasser 1956, 18–19).

Regarding the Palestinian issue, Nasser explains that his Arab consciousness emerged strongly during his secondary school years. He went out with other students on strike on December 2nd of every year as a protest against the Balfour Declaration. Later, he studied Palestinian issues during his Military College years and learned about the Palestinian region's history and conditions. When the Palestinian crisis emerged, Nasser indicated that he was convinced that the fighting in Palestine was not fighting on foreign territory but a duty imposed by self-defense. Therefore, he made the Palestinian issue an internal and national security matter by saying that (Abdel Nasser 1956, 56–57). And it was easy to make Israel a threat by focusing on Palestine and saying that fighting for Palestine is the same as fighting for Egypt. He continued to use this way of thinking.

Nasser indicated that Israel was a product and outcome of imperialism. Also, he touched upon the first president of Israel, Chaim Weizmann, and he quoted him, as “a big power needed to assist us.” which are Germany and Britain (Abdel Nasser 1956, 62). Therefore, Nasser provides a basis for his claim of Israel being a product of imperialism by referencing Britain’s support. From Nasser’s point of view, it can be seen that Palestinian and Israeli issues were important for Nasser to set over his ideology. Nasser needed a threat and purpose, so Israel and Palestinian issues gave Nasser those. Also, Nasser needed success and something that would attract Egyptians and make them feel honored. Therefore, Nasser indicated that the Free Officers dream of a glorious Egypt, and this glory should be built up. Also, he emphasized the history of Egypt under the Pharaohs, the reaction between the Greek spirit and Egyptians, the Roman invasion and Muslim conquest, and the waves of Arab Migrations. His views on Egyptian history show that he tried to create an Egyptian identity with ancient history and glory (Abdel Nasser 1956, 36–39).

In the book, Nasser mentioned a Jewish officer named Yerdan Cohen who wrote about Nasser. Cohen indicated that when he met with Nasser during the war, Nasser was curious about Israel’s struggle against the British and how Israel succeeded in mobilizing world public opinion against them (Abdel Nasser 1956, 14). In a way, Nasser wanted to discuss tactics that Israel had used because he wished to plan Egypt’s

struggle against Britain and colonialism by learning about Israel's strategies. Thus, it can be seen that his purpose was developing even at that time.

When Nasser talks about revolutions, he defines two kinds of revolution in his book: political and social. He indicated that political revolution is against an imposed despot or an army of aggression occupying its territory. For Nasser, the social revolution maintains justice for all citizens without class. He claims that for a political revolution, there needs to be unity of all national elements and mutual support. In social revolution, there should not be corruption, hatred, selfishness, and suspicion; people should love and respect each other. Therefore, he underlines that there needs to be a revolution from and within people, and he claims that the 1952 revolution was from the people's hearts. He emphasized that the structure or groups, except the army, could not provide these conditions. Events and their evolution made it possible for the military to struggle for the country's independence. The political revolution overthrew King Farouq, and land reform made the social revolution possible (Abdel Nasser 1956, 24–25).

The Egyptian leadership under Nasser made many changes and applied nationalization policies during the early 1960s. Many institutions were becoming public property by nationalization, and these policies need to be legitimized by an ideological foundation. For instance, Nasser and his close environment interacted with Marxist intellectuals to attract them and provide consolidation to their policies (Beattie 1985, 290). Thus, it can be seen that Nasser consolidated his rule and power with ideological foundations for his policies. Nasser gained public support by doing that and stayed in power because people believed in his policies and ideology.

Abdel Nasser glorified the values and ways of the line of common people, and he used populist discourse. Primarily he was careful about using their language when he addressed the masses because he was creating an image of "one of us." Also, he communicated directly with the groups, which was not common before in the eyes of the people. Nasser promised to solve the political and social crisis and used the discourse of freedom, social justice, independence, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism,

and pan-Arabism so much. Also, he emphasized restoring national dignity, and it created emotion among the Egyptians and Arabs. Radios helped Nasser to spread his words in the region. Nasser was good at pointing the finger at the enemies such as reactionaries, imperialists, or pro-Zionists. He usually engaged in self-critique, which was helpful for him not to allow the opposition to criticize Nasser first. Also, he underlined the memory of historical heroes such as Salah al-Din al-Ayyubi, Ahmad Urabi, Mustafa Kamel, and Sa'd Zaghlul. He tried to continue the confrontation between East and West and to use cultural connections between Arab-Islamic tradition and modernity. He created new revolutionary symbols and attempted to destroy signs related to the colonial past. These strengthened the bond between Nasser and the people. However, charismatic leadership needs heroic performance and success. Therefore, Nasser's success in foreign policy was a necessity. After the defeat of June 1967, Nasser's charisma was hurt, but his real connection with the masses made people support Nasser in anyway (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 16–18).

As indicated in previous chapters, ideology is one of the crucial aspects of charismatic leadership. Nasser created a unique ideology with his name and, most importantly, composed it with Arab nationalism. People, who advocated nationalism, believed in Abdel Nasser as a leader, and supported him, embraced Nasserism. Arab nationalism and Nasserism as an ideology contributed to Nasser's charismatic leadership and people's ongoing support at the very end. Therefore, ideology was one of the main factors of charismatic leadership that enabled the continuation of Nasser's rule.

Secondly, the media was essential for Nasser to spread his ideology and consolidate his rule and charismatic leadership. He focused on ideologies such as pan-Arabism and anti-imperialism to attract people, and he used many ways such as mass media (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 26). Media, in general, was an essential element of his propaganda; its main pillars were newspapers, magazines, radio, music, and movies. Therefore, he diversified his propaganda tools, which was an achievement for him. The newspaper was crucial in terms of convincing and attracting Egyptians to something. Thus, Abdel Nasser established an authoritarian regime in the domestic policy. Media was under the control of the Egyptian government in a sense. Nasser

nationalized the press in 1960 and created a mobilization press. The nationalized press focused on curbing the activity of independent organs of public opinion because they did not want anything to threaten the regime's control (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 19–20). All editors and other vital positions in media outlets were selected and appointed by Nasser, and they could be considered state officials. Also, publication policies were decided by the authority. This way, media outlets became a national mobilization and propaganda tool (Bozbaş 2018, 174–75).

Nasser tried to control what newspapers wrote and not write. He ordered some news and articles by himself to achieve his goals. Ahmed Abu Al Feth, who was the editor-in-chief of *Al-Misri*, explained all of these in his book (El-Feth 1965). He was close with Abdel Nasser but distanced himself from Nasser and his ideology by that time. For instance, *Al-Misri* published a revolutionary declaration when the Free Officers revolted. However, other newspapers spared little room for the revolution news. Later, Nasser started to apply censorship to newspapers, and when Al Feth opposed the things Nasser said, Nasser turned to other newspapers. Nasser wanted them to publish negative things about the old regime and the kings. In *Al Akhbar* newspaper, some articles insulted the king, and *Al Gomhuria* (Republic) newspaper was responsible for spreading Nasser's political ideologies and propaganda. Also, *Al Akhbar* published biographies of members of the Revolutionary Council and talked about Nasser much more than others (El-Feth 1965, 41–54).

Al Feth touched upon why Nasser was interested in him and his newspaper so much in his book. He emphasized that Nasser was trying to please him not just because of his friendship but, *Al Misri* was crucial for the Egyptians and the entire Arab world. Therefore, Nasser wanted to use this newspaper to have influence and prestige among Arabs and make propaganda. Thus, Al Feth believed that Nasser was close to him because of these reasons (El-Feth 1965, 182–83). When Nasser could not control Al Feth and *Al Misri* just like he wanted, he decided to raid the headquarter, and the newspaper was shut down on 4 May 1954. Al Feth defined this situation as Nasser's achievement of establishing a dictatorship (El-Feth 1965, 199).

Regarding censorship, Nasser did not trust governmental institutions, and military officers working under Anwar Sadat were appointed to control and approve news articles. There was censorship of political information and news in the past, but censorship was applied to even movies during this period. When some newspapers did not want to comply with Nasser's terms, military officers raided headquarters, and then, Nasser successfully used newspapers for his political purposes. However, he was not satisfied with only newspapers and took control of radios. Radio was under control, and there were military anthems in programs. There were programs about villagers and land reforms, the military's glory, and the military's strength for children. In theatres, there were small videos about the military, their efforts, and victory before the movies. There were also posters about the military's power and the sacrifices made by the army for the welfare of the community (El-Feth 1965, 81–87).

In these tools, Nasser emphasized Egypt's past, such as elements of Pharaonic, Islamic, Egyptian, and Arab culture, because it could create a certain amount of belonging to the country (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 23). Thus, it was essential to create a self-identity and nationalism among the Egyptians. Also, the Higher Council of Arts, Letters, and Social Sciences was established in January 1956. In 1957, it became a part of the Ministry of Culture and aimed to promote music, cinema, theatre, dance, and other popular art programs. These activities primarily focused on popularizing and glorifying Nasser and the revolution. Umm Kulthum, Abd al-Halim Hafiz, and Muhammed Abd al-Wahhab were influential singers that influenced Egyptians through patriotic songs and Nasser (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 23).

Additionally, when Al Feth wrote about the new regime's doings and constitution, he criticized Nasser's policies. Then, Nasser intervened in the situation and conditioned that his article could be published if the response of the censorship officer, Salah Salem published next to Al Feth's article (El-Feth 1965, 115). This shows how Nasser's administration was controlling, and he used every way to make propaganda for himself. Also, this situation is one of the examples of Nasser's authoritarian regime. Another example was the competition and conflicts between Nasser and General Naguib. Salah Salem started a campaign to defame Naguib on radio and newspaper

(El-Feth 1965, 151). Salah Salem used many media outlets for Nasser and his propaganda. There was something on the radio or newspaper in every event or incident. Nasser believed that false news could be accepted as truth with propaganda. According to him, it can be considered truth when something is repeated so much. He established Al Gomhuria, nationalized all newspapers, and took care of radios. If Nasser wanted to blame any political actor or other states, newspapers and radios were under his command. For instance, the Voice of Arabs was used against Iraqi leaders during Baghdad Pact (El-Feth 1965, 260–75). The Voice of Arabs was listened to by many countries and even villages. Egypt became the second in terms of radio programming in the world (El-Feth 1965, 354–60).

Leaders need to be heard well and often to attract people and have a credible audience. Thus, they need to make propaganda to explain their goals and perspectives on matters. Media is an essential tool from this point of view, and there are various ways for it. As mentioned above, Nasser used many methods, such as radio, newspaper, music, and even movies, to propagate. It was crucial how Nasser reflected his ideas and goals to his people; these tools were helpful and influential in that respect. Especially at first, direct speeches sometimes do not work, and leaders need such things to impress the public. Therefore, media tools were essential because they contributed to charismatic leadership in terms of presenting a way. Other aspects, such as ideology or victories, are concrete, but the media was the one that made it possible for these aspects impressed people.

4.2.Discourse

Charismatic leaders can frame and create a vision during their speeches by using (i) metaphors to trigger an image or aid recall, (ii) rhetorical questions to create intrigue and an interest in knowing the answer, and (iii) stories and anecdotes by eliciting an image, creating identification with the protagonists, (iv) contrasts and comparison, (v) providing proofs for the arguments, focusing attention, and showing completeness, (vi) expressing moral conviction by highlighting value systems and providing justification for the missions, (vii) expressing the sentiments of the collective by

showing the leader-followers' similarity, (viii) setting high and ambitious goals and (ix) creating confidence goals can be achieved (Jacquart and Antonakis 2015, 1059). Abdel Nasser used many of these as a strategy because he was creating metaphors with his ideology. He created some enemies and protagonists, showed proof, and underlined what he wanted most. He justified his ideology and doings, set a purpose, and emphasized collectivity. These were important in terms of attracting people to believe in him.

Nasser's speeches are essential in terms of propaganda and their contribution to creating his charismatic leadership. Therefore, the importance of Nasser's ideology, his control over the media, Nasser's essential speeches, and his concrete achievements will be examined in the following sections. Focusing on these, how charismatic leadership helped Nasser's continuation to rule Egypt will be understood because these methods were influential in creating charismatic leadership, as indicated above. In terms of speeches, Nasser's strategies for consolidating his power will be categorized as (i) creating a threat perception and an eternal enemy, (ii) anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism, (iii) Arab nationalism and history, (iv) glorification and (v) creating a purpose for Egypt and the Egyptians.

4.2.1. Nasser's Speech on the Nationalization of the Suez Canal

The speech of Nasser made on 26 July 1956 was crucial because it was the revolution's fifth anniversary, and he declared the nationalization of the Suez Canal in that speech. In his remarks, he focused on anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism so much. He emphasized that they struggled against the colonial rule for a long time. He pointed out that they would fight for their freedom. He said, "We will move forward, support freedom and liberation, and resist colonialism and its agents. Ahead of us - brothers -, there are long battles that will continue to achieve the principles in which we believed and in which each of the sons of this country believed." ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956).

Additionally, Nasser pointed out a target and an enemy, enabling him to consolidate his power inside. In his speech, he said, "Colonialism used every tool to undermine

our nationalism, weaken our Arabism and divide us. The creation of Israel is a product of colonialism." ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956) In this sentence, Nasser touched upon the colonial past of Egypt and made people angrier against Western powers, especially Britain. He targeted Israel with colonialism because colonial powers created it. However, more importantly, he made Israel an enemy of Arabs. He talked about martyrdom in the battle against Israel, and with his oratory abilities, he said that all Egyptians could be ready to replace when one died. This thinking style was crucial because Egyptian and Arab nationalism were fired up with this ideology. Nasser said that "We all work for our nationalism and Arabism. We work to protect ourselves from colonialism and the products of colonialism, such as Israel. We will struggle and sacrifice our lives and blood." ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956). In this speech, he focused on colonialism and Israel a lot, but it is vital for consolidating his power.

To create a personality cult and consolidate power, Nasser used an ideology, Arab nationalism, in his speech. He talked about Syria's principles of freedom, pride, and dignity to gather support and create unity for them to back him. He emphasized Arab unity more than once. Also, Nasser gave Egyptians and Arab nationalists a purpose. He said, "We will defend nationalism and Arabism until the Arab world extends from the Atlantic Ocean to the Persian Gulf." ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956). It was crucial because the Arab unity that Nasser talked about was the dream of many Arabs. Nasser made people think that this goal was reachable and possible, especially with Nasser's leadership. People believed in Nasser more and more. Also, Nasser talked about the non-alignment movement and Bandung Conference. He indicated his meetings and visits with countries such as Yugoslavia and India. Nasser's important role in the non-alignment movement was crucial for Arabs and Egyptians because Nasser became an essential person in the world, and Arabs believed that he could be the leader that would unite Arabs. Nasser criticized the hegemony of powerful states with the principles of the Bandung Conference.

Nasser's speech discussed Egypt's struggle against colonialism and emphasized economic and political independence. He pointed out that economic and political independence complete each other and need both. Also, he underlined that Egypt had an independent policy rather than following London, Washington, or Moscow's footsteps. Nasser emphasized cooperation with everyone but Egypt would not capitulate on nationalism and Arabism ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956). Also, he focused on creating a solid national Egyptian army and stressed that the national army shouldn't be under the control or influence of foreign officers or units. Also, he called for the evacuation of British forces and the Egyptians' struggle for it. Egyptians believed in independence, and Nasser, too. Nasser said, " Egyptians are woken up because they have committed themselves to achieve freedom and sovereignty." Nasser was proud of the Egyptians, and they were proud of Nasser.

Nasser indicated that there are different forms of colonialism besides armed and occupation, such as agents, alliances, and agreements ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956). In this context, Nasser touched upon especially Baghdad Pact, making it possible for Egyptians and Arabs to believe in Nasser and go against their governments for not supporting participation in Baghdad Pact. Also, Nasser stressed that Arab nationalism defeated colonialism. Therefore, he gained the support of many people with the idea of Arab nationalism. Nasser talked about the situation in Algeria, Jordan, and Palestine and indicated that those challenges and battles were theirs, too. They said that Nasser was the leader of Arab nationalists in the region. Nasser told everything about the construction of the Aswan Dam, considering the process of the World Bank, the US, and Britain's support and how they gave up in his speech. Nasser talked about Suez Canal and its construction process deeply in his remarks and said that Aswan Dam would be built with pride, dignity, and freedom. Nasser declared the Suez Canal's nationalization for the Aswan Dam's construction and read the articles about this achievement. He said they would not allow and accept history repeating itself and build a solid Egypt with political and economic independence. He underlined that Suez

Canal was a state within the state. Therefore, he made the Suez Canal, which was under the control of a foreign power, a symbol of colonialism, and by nationalizing it, he gained independence (“The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1956).

4.2.2. Nasser’s Speech on the Declaration of the Czech Arms Deal

Another essential speech of Nasser was the declaration of the Czech arms deal on 27 September 1955. Abdel Nasser started his speech with the strength of the Egyptian army. He talked about how members of the Egyptian military work for the homeland's security with pride. Nasser underlined that Egypt believed in the revolution and its goals. He said that they lifted the occupation, tyranny, and enslavement. Especially, Nasser indicated that one of the revolution's goals was establishing a strong national army and that they achieved it together. Also, he emphasized that Egypt needed to be free to have a strong national army. He indicated that their foreign policy needed to be free, too.

Additionally, he said that they rejected some offers of heavy weapons by great nations because of their conditions. For this reason, Nasser underlined that they wouldn't accept any form of colonialism, occupation, or attempt to attack Egypt's freedom. It can be seen that Nasser used this situation to show that colonialism was still a threat. Also, the Egyptian army was essential and a source of societal pride. Therefore, the power of the military and its ability to strengthen were crucial for Egyptians. Nasser emphasized that they wanted to enhance their army to secure their homeland, nationalism, and Arab identity. He said they did not wish to use weapons to follow aggressive policies but to secure themselves. He indicated they met with Britain, France, and the US, but none provided weapons without harming Egypt's freedom of movement. He said that because of the conditions, they did not accept these countries' offers (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Armed Forces Exhibiton at Al Guizira in Which He Announced the Czech Arms Deal” 1955). In this part of the speech, it can be said that Nasser wanted to target Western countries by indicating that they could still harm Egypt's freedom and independence. This made people feel

insecure, and Nasser also emphasized that the Egyptian army should be robust to protect Egypt, its nationalism, and its Arab identity. At that time, these words were powerful, and Nasser knew it. Also, Nasser discussed the meetings with France, the US, and Britain. Other than these countries, Nasser talked with Russia and Czechoslovakia. However, only Czechoslovakia returned to the needs of Egypt. This trade between Czechoslovakia and Egypt was only for commercial purposes, and Egypt accepted it immediately. Nasser indicated these developments and said that they would be able to establish a strong army and improve it daily. Especially, Nasser underlined that this deal was not the beginning of Russian influence in the Middle East and Egypt because there were no conditions for the deal, and it was only a commercial agreement. Even Nasser indicated this development as an end to long influence (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Armed Forces Exhibiton at Al Guizira in Which He Announced the Czech Arms Deal” 1955).

4.2.3. Nasser’s Speech at the Opening of the Bandung Conference

Gamal Abdel Nasser made a speech on 19 April 1955 at the opening of the Asian African Conference, and he talked about the common points of participant countries. Nasser touched upon the 1952 Revolution and said that the revolution aimed to liberate Egyptians from tyranny and corruption. He indicated that freedom, dignity, independence, and pride were given to the Egyptians with the revolution. Especially, Nasser underlined that Egypt had been under foreign control for a long time. Still, he indicated that this situation was changed, and now Egypt has become the defender of freedom and prosperity. In addition, he touched upon the unfairness in the system of the United Nations because of some colonial power’s immunity from the UN Charter. He indicated that Egypt is a supporter of international law, and they support the cooperation between African and Asian countries. Nasser emphasized the importance of world peace and Egypt’s support of it. He also talked about Palestine and how the UN watched all the conflicts. He warned great powers not to use small states as a tool for their excellent purposes. He indicated that these policies made small states differentiate and isolate each other. Nasser stressed that countries lost cooperation and quickly got under foreign control when this was done. Also, he emphasized the

importance of nationalism in terms of fighting against colonialism all over the world. Finally, Nasser indicated that every country should respect others' political independence and right to choose how to rule domestic politics and economy ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Opening of the Asian African Conference in Bandung" 1955).

When Nasser returned to Egypt and spoke in the cabinet, he indicated that for the freedom of the people, eradication of colonialism, and establishment of independent states all over the world, those states would not be puppet countries in the hands of great powers ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Cabinet on His Return from the Bandung Conference" 1955). Therefore, he emphasized freedom and not obeying or taking sides with the great powers. His speeches show that being neutral, fighting against colonialism, and not being a puppet for the great forces were the main points of his speeches. Thus, Nasser's speeches at Bandung Conference could be considered in the category of anti-colonialism. It was important for the other countries that participated in the conference, and Egypt, under the rule of Nasser, was one of the important leading figures in these events.

4.2.4. Nasser's Speech on the Declaration and the Dissolution of the United Arab Republic

On 1 February 1958, Abdel Nasser declared the establishment of the United Arab Republic. In his speech, he said it was the day the Republic of Egypt united with the Republic of Syria. He indicated that they established a new, great, and strong state. Also, he underlined that the Egyptian and Syrian people believed they could establish a state with freedom, justice, and peace. Nasser touched upon Arab nationalism and unity as well in his speech. He said that they talked about Arab nationalism all the time, but it became a reality. Nasser emphasized that enemies wanted to divide Arabs, but they failed, and Arabs were in solidarity and united. He stressed that a tyrant and a foreigner would not control them. Also, Abdel Nasser emphasized that UAR would fight for Arab unity and Arab nationalism ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Presidential Palace Announcing the United Arab Republic" 1958).

After the UAR declaration, Nasser addressed the UAR's youth on 22 February 1958. He emphasized the importance of Arab unity and nationalism. Nasser indicated that the youth of the UAR was crucial because they were the future. He especially underlined that the unity achieved could be considered a powerful weapon. He said this weapon would be a powerful tool against the common enemy, indicated as the one who attacked Port Said and defeated him. He expressed that this common enemy couldn't fight with them directly but could use every means to fight with Arabs indirectly. He emphasized that there is no regionalism or sectarianism but union, solidarity, and joint work in the UAR. Finally, he indicated that UAR would always support Arabs against colonialism and aggression ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from Gomhouriya Square to the Youth of the United Arab Republic" 1958).

Additionally, in the third-anniversary speech of the UAR, Nasser indicated that colonialism was trying to spread regionalism and break the union. However, he underlined that this was impossible ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from Al Diafa Palace Celebrating the 3rd Year of the United Arab Republic" 1961). Also, Nasser talked about economic freedom and social democracy in his fourth-anniversary speech of the UAR. He touched upon other countries' and colonialists' doings in colonized states and compared them to now. Also, he gave the example of the nationalization of the Suez Canal ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the 4th Anniversary of the United Arab Republic in Gomhouriya Square" 1962). Thus, it is clear that Nasser targeted a common enemy such as Israel in this speech and also colonialism. He emphasized the fight against colonialism and the importance of Arab unity and nationalism. Also, it was essential to address the youth because their support for him was crucial too in the long term.

After Syria's withdrawal from the United Arab Republic, Nasser gave the first statement from Radio House in Cairo on 28 September 1961. He indicated that a small force from the army surrounded and took over headquarters and radio stations. He underlined that the aggression of British-French-Israeli in 1956 was essential, but he considered Syria's withdrawal more crucial than the 1956 events. He explained this

with the division of external and internal threats. He emphasized nationalism and Arab unity. However, he underlined that he could not announce the dissolution because he did not consider its dissolution. Nasser touched upon every voice -mostly colonial- that called for the dissolution of the United Arab Republic and said that he could not do that. He stressed that he was responsible for every Arab, Syrian, and Egyptian. Nasser indicated that every member of the UAR was responsible for protecting the republic and its goals. He underlined that he still believed in Arab nationalism and unity, and all these distresses could not make him give up on his goals (“The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Broadcasting House in Cairo (the First Statement on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria)” 1961). Therefore, it can be seen that Nasser was disappointed but did not show it during his speech. He underlined that they needed to be united, which was more important than external threats. By doing that, Nasser was also trying to encourage his people to continue to believe in Arab nationalism and unity.

Nasser continued to create a threat perception of Israel and “colonial” powers as the enemy during his speech. Also, he considered any action against Arab unity and the United Arab Republic as an attack against its people. In addition, he criticized the speech of the small group in Syria by pointing out how they talked about Arab unity and nationalism and then colonialism. Also, he indicated that so-called “revolutionaries” in Syria were talking about socialism, etc.; these were not different from what he thought and tried to implement. He considered this movement a threat to the republic's integrity, Arab nationalism, and Arab unity. He underlined that he was responsible for all the people from Qamishli to Aswan, and he did not accept the dissolution of the disintegration of the United Arab Republic. He stressed that he did not want to shed Arab blood and emphasized Arab unity many times (“The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Broadcasting House in Cairo (the First Statement on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria)” 1961). Thus, he was still focusing on his goal of Arab unity and nationalism. He continued to believe in revolution and was determined to achieve his aims. He made the rebel army group in Syria look like traitors who harmed Arab unity. Although his case was hurt, he could

address and try to put things together again. Also, he blamed a small army group and the Syrian side, not himself or Egypt in general. It was important because people did not see Nasser as responsible for this disintegration. Therefore, they continued to support Nasser while they started to feel less motivated and hopeless about Arab unity.

Additionally, Nasser indicated that the rebellion in Syria was a denial of Arab unity, sacrifices of Arab people, and their struggle during his second speech about the disintegration. He emphasized that they could not leave people who believed in Arab unity and nationalism and decided to grow and develop together. Nasser touched upon how rebellious army officers took control of Damascus but could not control the people. He underlined the people's willingness to take streets and revolt against the contrary rule. Nasser stressed that people were not afraid of tanks, guns, and threats. He asked his people to follow their duties in the United Arab Republic. He indicated that those who believe in Arab unity and Arab nationalism would not bargain or negotiate with rebels ("The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Broadcasting House in Cairo (the Second Statement on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria)" 1961). Later, on 5 October, Nasser indicated that he was refusing war before, and now he rejected civil war because he advocated unity in his speech. In this speech, Nasser talked about nation-building plans for Syria, such as agriculture, tourism, national income, etc. Also, he demanded Arab unity and indicated that the rebels' movement was not successful as they expected before, ("The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria" 1961).

As mentioned above, Nasser considered what was going on in Syria as a rebellion and blamed small army groups for it. He was exculpating Syrian people who demonstrated the uprising in the streets, and he accepted them as his supporters. So, he created an army group as an enemy in people's minds and continued to advocate Arab unity and nationalism at home and in the Arab world. He considered this situation and events an internal threat and thought it much more dangerous than external threats. He resembled this threat with colonialism as an enemy, which was harsh for a colonized nation such as Syria. Therefore, it can be seen that Nasser was able to exculpate himself from the failure of the United Arab Republic and blamed and pointed at the Syrian rebel group

for this situation. Although Arab nationalism and Nasser's influence harmed them, Nasser still had the people's support.

4.2.5. Nasser's Speech on the presentation of the National Charter

On 21 May 1962, Nasser presented the National Charter, and he underlined the Egyptian people's devotion to the revolution and their struggle for freedom for years. He touched upon the fact that foreigners occupied Egyptian territory and were being terrorized. Nasser emphasized national struggle, and when the revolution took place in 1952, he indicated that Egyptians became part of it during his speech. He touched upon what reforms they had done, such as land reform. He underlined the Egyptians' struggle against colonialism, and it can be seen that colonialism was used a lot to create a threat perception and glorify Egyptians by Nasser. During his speech, Nasser explained what revolution brought to Egyptians and talked about the rights of the people, a just and democratic regime ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University" 1962). It was necessary because the atmosphere was not so good after the dissolution of the UAR. In this speech, he talked about all the glories, including the nationalization of the Suez Canal.

In his speech, Nasser emphasized the need for revolution for a better future in Egypt and the Arab world. He insisted that revolution was necessary and pointed out their revolution and regime. He mentioned three capabilities that would let Arab nations rise: awareness, free movement, and clear goals. Nasser touched upon terms of freedom and socialism during his speech and underlined that they should fit into new circumstances ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University" 1962). Thus, he was pointing out the dissolution of the UAR and what they would do next with the National Charter.

Also, Nasser talked about Egypt's ancient past and Pharaonic history. This discourse was critical in creating and consolidating Egyptian history and identity. He explained some events in Egyptian history, especially those related to colonialism. He read all the names who joined the struggle against colonialism, such as Ahmad Urabi and Mustafa Kamil. Nasser claimed that there could not be revolutionary action without

popularity and progression. Also, he considered democracy as the correct translation of revolution. He indicated that revolution is a progressive work, but socialism is about establishing a good and just society. Therefore, Nasser claimed that democracy and socialism were extensions of revolutionary action. While democracy is political freedom, socialism is about social freedom, and he believed these could not be split up. In this speech, Nasser talked about press releases and journalism. He claimed that there was no freedom in these areas before the revolution (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University” 1962). After the dissolution of the UAR, Nasser wanted to focus and direct people to democracy, socialism, freedom, and equality, and not to Arab nationalism specifically. Because the dissolution harmed Arab unity, and it shouldn’t have impacted Nasser’s policies and prestige.

In this speech, Nasser touched upon colonialism again and indicated that the cotton and textile industry had been under Britain's control before, preventing Egypt from growing. He claimed that all the funds were used for French and British colonialists’ living in Egypt rather than the development of the living conditions of Egyptians. Also, he talked about the economy, socialism, development, agriculture, and labor because he was trying to make people believe in socialism as a state ideology (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University” 1962). After the dissolution of the UAR, Nasser continued to use “United Arab Republic” as the country name without Syria. Therefore, he indicated that the army of the United Arab Republic would continue to fight against colonialism. He emphasized that this army was ready and had supremacy in every field: air, sea, and land. Again, he defined Israel as a tool of colonialism and called for a national army capable of deterring “Zionist colonial plans.” Nasser indicated that there should be a national economy and social strength for a strong national army. Also, he underlined the need for scientific progress and development (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University” 1962). It can be seen that Nasser was trying to legitimize the fight against colonialism and glorify the army in front of the Egyptians and the Arab world.

Additionally, Nasser indicated that leaders could not achieve anything with coercion and oppression. He emphasized that real leadership is about responding people's needs. He claimed to be that leader with these words, and his charismatic leadership was essential to impress the public. Also, he emphasized that the revolution is not a process of demolishing the past's ruins but building the future. He considered science as the real weapon of the revolution. Thus, he was pointing out the purpose of the revolution and still emphasizing the importance of Arab unity. He considered that there was a need for solidarity and unity among the Arab nations ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University" 1962).

Nasser indicated some foreign policy and unity purposes in his speech about the National Charter. He listed the national principles as; war against colonialism, working for peace, and international cooperation for prosperity. He talked about the revolution, his struggle against colonialism and Baghdad Pact, the Suez Crisis, Non-Alignment Movement, and how these were related to the three national principles ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University" 1962).

Thus, Nasser aimed to clear the atmosphere after Syria's break from the UAR with the declaration of the National Charter. It was important to remind people of the purpose of the revolution, such as the fight against colonialism and the tools against Arab unity. Nasser could unite people and address them with his excellent oratory skills. National Charter was crucial in giving people hope because Syria's withdrawal from the UAR disappointed the Arabs and Arab nationalism. Nasser touched upon socialism, democracy, Arab unity, foreign policy, and Islam in the National Charter. The charter reflected the populist nature of the regime and Nasser (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 28). It can be seen that Nasser was focusing on Arab nations' development and socialism. He was talking about Arab unity but not about Arab nationalism. From then on, he focused on more domestic policies and tried to bolster Arab unity and Egypt's prestige in the region.

4.2.6. Nasser's Speeches on Yemen Intervention

In 1963, forces in Yemen returned to Egypt, and Nasser addressed them. He indicated that an army went to another country for the first time, not for occupation or colonization. However, he emphasized that the military went to Yemen on a critical mission because Yemen was under the influence of colonialism. He underlined that they did not want to shed Arab blood, but they did not have a choice in Yemen. Nasser expressed that the decision to be involved in Yemen was brutal and cruel, but it was necessary. He said that Arab states struggle with colonialism, opportunities, and Israel at the same time. He touched upon the UAR's dissolution and considered it a plot. He talked about the situation in Yemen at that time as a victory because of the revolutionary regime (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Forces Returning from Yemen with President Ahmed Bin Bela” 1963).

In another speech of Nasser toward the military, he said, "When you went to Yemen, there was a violent battle all over the Arab nation targeting the revolution in Egypt. The revolution that worked for the freedom of the homeland and the citizens... There were separatist movements in Syria last year, and now there are in Yemen." (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen” 1963). Thus, Nasser made the situation and conflict in Yemen look like a problem and a national security threat for Egypt. This was important because he also legitimized Egypt’s role in Yemen by pointing out and creating a danger. Also, in this speech, he indicated that “Egypt is facing reactionary separatism in Damascus; deviant populist isolationism in Baghdad and reactionary allied with colonialism in Saudi Arabia. The battle of Arab nationalism is going through the most severe and cruel conditions. Therefore, the Yemeni revolution faced reactionary attacks and colonial aggression because of these conditions (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen” 1963). By pointing out other Arab states and Egypt’s competitors, Nasser targeted other countries, making Egypt look fair and being a side of the truth. Also, he emphasized Arab nationalism and underlined that other countries were not supporting it. Also, he criticized British comments about the Egyptian military’s use of Yemeni gas and emphasized that Egypt and Yemen were celebrating the victory against reactionary cooperation with

colonialism. He also talked about Palestine and emphasized that the 1948 War was a disgrace for the Arabs. Nasser underlined that Arab states should be ready to confront Israel (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen” 1963). So, Nasser was targeting an enemy and directing people according to it.

In a speech about soldiers returning from Yemen, Nasser indicated that their solid national army protected revolution and people, fought against colonialism and occupation, and built socialism. He emphasized that soldiers were heroes, and some died while fulfilling their duty (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Port Said Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen” 1963). Another speech was in Taiz, where Nasser participated in a conference in 1964. He emphasized Britain’s colonialism and its policies to divide Yemenis. He indicated that the revolution in Yemen was a success, and it eliminated British attempts. At that time, Aden was “occupied,” Nasser tried to make people enthusiastic about “liberating” Yemenis in Aden. Also, Britain criticized the Egyptian presence in Yemen, but Nasser indicated that Yemenis and Egyptians are the same and one Arab nation. He blamed colonialism for wishing to divide Arab countries (“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the People’s Conference at Taz in Yemen” 1964). So, it can be seen that Nasser created a threatening perception of colonialism and Britain during the Yemeni civil war. Also, he emphasized the importance of Arab nationalism and unity by referencing Yemen and Egypt as one nation.

4.2.7. Nasser’s interviews and speeches after June 1967

On 4 March 1968, the editor-in-chief of Look Magazine, William Atwood, interviewed Nasser. Atwood asked why USA and Egypt couldn’t normalize relations, and Nasser indicated that USA’s support for Israel was an obstacle. In this interview, Nasser and Atwood focused on the 1967 war and the relationship between the USA, Israel, and Egypt. Also, they talked about Egypt’s relations with the Soviet Union, and Nasser indicated that they had a close relationship with the Soviets, but they did not turn to them completely. Additionally, Atwood asked about the Egyptian people’s

loyalty and love towards Nasser despite hardships. Nasser did not expect such a response when he resigned and said, “Our people are an authentic, with a long civilized history, broad hope for revolution and confidence in the future.” When Atwood asked Nasser whether he was the symbol of the revolution, he answered that people insisted on his survival. Nasser indicated that people thought they lost an army but shouldn’t have lost their resolve (“The Interview given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to William Atwood the Editor in Chief of Look Magazine” 1968). Therefore, Nasser emphasized that Egyptians saw him as a resolution even after the defeat of 1967. As mentioned before, Nasser was seen as a hero; people thought only he could save them and take back what they had lost.

Also, Atwood asked about Nasser’s book, *The Philosophy of The Revolution*, and he was curious whether Nasser still had the purpose of “building the Arab world into a united family” or not, as indicated in his book. Nasser responded to that as, “Yes, but it is not a constitutional unity. Unity is still our goal, and the things that unite us are more than what divides us, but it takes time” (“The Interview given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to William Atwood the Editor in Chief of Look Magazine” 1968). It can be seen that Nasser was aware that unity in all fields could not be possible, and he had lessons from the unity with Syria. He dreamed of unity, but his joy and ambition were not precisely contrary to before.

After the 1967 defeat, Nasser made a speech about his retirement and indicated that there could be good and bad times, but his people could manage to face difficult times. Nasser emphasized that his decisions about Syria and Israel were made because of national interests. Also, he underlined that the Egyptian army could deter enemy forces with their equipment and training. Nasser explained the surprises about the attack and the defeat. He indicated that the enemy attacked from an unexpected side, the west. Secondly, enemy forces surrounded the UAR’s civil and military airports. Third, Nasser claimed that the colonial troops, such as the US and Britain, supported the enemy. After this defeat, Nasser talked about the nations’ task to eliminate the effects of aggression and maintain solidarity. Also, he encouraged his people to take lessons about colonialism and its impact. After that, he underlined the responsibility of the

Egyptian government and declared his resignation. He indicated that colonial powers considered him an enemy, but Arab nations were the enemy of colonialism. Additionally, Nasser touched upon the continuation of the Arab unity idea and how it would continue after Nasser, just like before Nasser. He emphasized that a nation would not rely on a man like him, and he talked about their victories and glories (“The Statement Issued by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Egyptian Television & Broadcasting Building Announcing His Retirement from the Presidency of the Republic to the People and the Nation” 1967).

Another speech of Nasser was on 23 July 1967, which was about the 15th anniversary of the revolution. In this speech, Nasser underlined the hardships they faced in the process and talked about colonialism, Britain, and the US dominance. He used the Suez Crisis as a horror for the Egyptians and continued to create and emphasize a threat perception. His speech touched upon socialism, justice, Arab unity, and nationalism. Nasser said, “Our work has never been easy. The path of struggle is dangerous, the path of victory is sacrificed, and the path of great hopes is a great effort.” (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967). Therefore, he emphasized that all the hardships and sacrifices were necessary because it was a struggle for a great cause. He was legitimizing the conflicts and negativities. Also, he said, “This crisis that we are facing, although it is not the most dangerous and most difficult thing we have faced, is certainly one of the vilest and meanest we have encountered because colonialism benefited - and we must admit that - from all its confrontations with other peoples who were most exposed to its raids and with us.” (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967). Here, it is also clear that Nasser classified the 1967 defeat as a complex problematic crisis but not the most difficult one.

Additionally, he emphasized that colonialism benefitted from this crisis, and again, he was pointing at an enemy and creating a threat perception. Therefore, he was trying to minimize costs and create something to blame. Still, he took responsibility for it, too: “I do not want to bring you back to the circumstances that paved the way for this crisis

and that I created...we overcome the setback and rise above it and continue our path with victory to our hopes.” (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967). It can be seen that he was trying to encourage Egyptians to move on and get back stronger by giving them some hope. He also said, “The struggle of the Egyptian people began before Abdel Nasser and will continue after Abdel Nasser, and the Arab nation sought its unity before Abdel Nasser and will seek after Abdel Nasser.” (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967). It was vital because he emphasized that Egypt and Egyptians were more important than him. The crucial thing was not him or his success but the Egyptian people, their future, and their unity. His words were influential for the Egyptians in any case. He underlined that they had a long way to become, as before, rebuilding the nation and the Egyptian army. In his speech, there were many remarks about colonialism and Zionism as the enemy and that they need to come back stronger for this reason. Also, he touched upon the propaganda war and how they would challenge. He indicated multiple times that their road would be long and not easy (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967). Therefore, he was trying to comfort his people and give them hope for a bright future. Also, he was making sure that people would not think it could be an easy way.

4.3. Combination of Ideology, Propaganda, and Events

Leaders’ values, images, information processing, personality characteristics, and ability to choose leadership style and strategy are the main variables of leaders’ influence on foreign policy and the strength of charismatic leadership. Also, there are some strategies of leaders in terms of foreign policy. The first is to provide material rewards or promises to opponent agents to co-opt them. Secondly, leaders can broaden audiences by involving citizens in foreign policy. Therefore, the leader can communicate being united and having a shared identity. Thirdly, leaders can initiate political acts by making the public adopt one’s framing of threats and proposals. Lastly, leaders can attract attention somewhere else. For instance, a leader can divert attention from severe economic problems at home by initiating a war or a foreign

conflict (Duman 2020, 372–74). In the case of Nasser, it can be seen that Egyptians were involved in foreign policy and had a shared identity. Nasser was choosing threats and goals in the name of the Egyptians. Also, there were a lot of different agendas in Egypt, and Nasser was able to influence and direct people through these events. Abdel Nasser's foreign policy strategies were based on the destruction of colonialism and its Egyptian collaborators and the construction of a strong national army (Duman 2020, 374). For Abdel Nasser, there were four values in terms of foreign policy; (i) anti-imperialism, (ii) Arabism, (iii) leadership, and (iv) prestige (Dawisha 1976, 125).

As indicated above, Nasser focused on some values in foreign policy events, which contributed to establishing his charismatic leadership. Because charismatic leadership was beyond his personality, circumstances, discourse, and promises. People needed to see some success and things that were promised and happened. Nasser gave these to his people with such events. As mentioned in the second chapter, Nasser's struggle against the Baghdad Pact, the Czech arms deal, the Suez Crisis, the establishment of the UAR, and Nasser's contribution to the Non-Alignment Movement were crucial in terms of shaping his policies and charismatic leadership. These achievements led people to think Nasser was the only leader who could rule them justly and present a better future for the Arab world.

Also, Nasser was able to influence other states' public with propaganda, and states had to comply with Nasser's policies in the region in a sense. This shows how Nasser's charismatic leadership was influential in the Arab world. Therefore, the establishment and consolidation of Nasser's charismatic leadership were crucial regarding people's continuous support and loyalty toward him. Ideology, propaganda, and domestic and foreign policy events were essential for charismatic leadership. Especially, Nasser's speeches and usage of media tools were important in terms of propaganda.

Also, domestic and foreign policy events were more powerful and effective with Nasser's speeches and media coverage. People sometimes cannot see what is beyond the event, but Nasser presented what was going on plainly and compatibly with his wishes in his speeches. Therefore, the important achievements of Nasser, his

personality and charisma, and his influence with speeches made possible the establishment of charismatic leadership. A combination of ideology, propaganda and actual events contributed to his charismatic leadership, which led to the Egyptians' loyalty to Nasser. This enabled Nasser to continue his rule even after some failures in foreign policy, especially against 'colonial puppets,' as Nasser said.

The defeat of the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 was crucial as Nasser's most significant loss because until then, he could carry on. However, when he decided to resign, most people did not want to accept Nasser's withdrawal because they could not see someone else as a leader other than him. On that day, the Egyptian Ministry of National Guidance reported that "Thousands of Egyptians surged through the streets during the warnings about the blackout and air raid. There were 50,000 Egyptians gathered, and they were shouting in favor of Nasser's leadership." (Sharnoff 2017, 35). This was possible with the charismatic leadership built up by Nasser since 1952. Also, many essential world leaders did not support Nasser's resignation, such as the Soviet Union. After these events, Nasser declared that he would remain the Egyptian leader.

The charismatic leadership of Nasser made possible continuation of his rule in any condition because people saw him as the ultimate leader, savior, and hero of Egypt and the Arab world. For them, it was necessary to stand against an unfair situation, colonialism, the gap between the poor and rich, etc. Nasser made all of these and put an ideology for them to follow. When Egypt was defeated in 1967 and Nasser declared his resignation, people took streets and protested against this decision. People trusted him to regain what they lost because they believed only Nasser could do this. When Nasser died, Egyptians and people in other Arab countries mourned. People were devastated because Nasser was seen as the father of the nation, and when he died, millions of people came to say farewell to him (Podeh and Winckler 2004b, 31).

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

Egypt has a long colonial history, and there were many fights for independence during this period. After years of French and British colonialism, Egyptians were demanding independence. As mentioned in previous chapters, there were many struggles during the Urabi revolt and in 1919. Because of this process, Egyptian patriotism/nationalism was on the rise, and then, it turned into Arab nationalism in general with other countries that had colonial history, especially Arab countries. Therefore, nationalism and anti-colonialism were essential aspects of Egypt's political and social life.

Prior to the coup in 1952, Gamal Abdel Nasser was aware of this situation, and he was not satisfied with the current situation of Egypt in the region and world. Nasser embraced and advocated Arab nationalism and anti-colonial views, and many nationalists and Egyptians supported him. However, people did not just support Nasser because of his influential ideological claims. He made this possible with his policies, views, propaganda skills, and charismatic leadership because all other things contributed to his charisma.

In the creation of charismatic leadership, the situation in a country is crucial because if there is political, social, and economic distress, it is possible that people can look for a savior or hero. Therefore, what was going on in a country is essential in establishing charismatic leadership. Charismatic leaders generally have revolutionary roles because they tend to change the status quo. If it is necessary for the eyes of the people, they can support the leader. Thus, the perception of people is crucial because

charismatic leadership relies on the relationship between the leader and followers. It is a mutual relationship, and both need to influence the other to establish charisma.

Aside from the country's situation and the people's perception, a leader should have a strong ideology for people to believe in because a leader should present something to people to think about and support. There should be an ideology, a purpose, and a social movement if it is necessary. In the case of Nasser, Arab nationalism and socialism, anti-imperialism, and in a sense, Nasserism was crucial because they were the solid essential parts for the Egyptians and Arabs at that time. They wanted to fight against colonialism and for independence. They were in favor of Arab unity and solidarity. Nasser made them believe that he could be the only one that would provide this scenario.

Also, propaganda was crucial in creating charismatic leadership, and Nasser used this excellently. For propaganda, Nasser applied various ways such as media, music, movie, radio, and discourses. Additionally, foreign policy events were crucial in charismatic leadership building because Nasser was on the front side, and he used these events to his benefit. However, after positive outcomes, events with negative consequences took place. Although these events affected Nasser negatively, Nasser could confront and take care of the situation from his perspective. But this was possible with his propaganda skills and, most importantly, his charismatic leadership.

Thus, this thesis focused on how Nasser created this image and charismatic leadership. By answering this question, this study aimed to explain how Nasser continued his rule even after some defeats. It is claimed that Nasser could continue his rule after some failures because of his charismatic leadership. To prove that point, the literature on charismatic leadership is examined. This study focused on (i) what are the situations that enable the establishment of charismatic leadership, (ii) which tools are helpful for the establishment of charismatic leadership, (iii) how the relationship between a leader and followers affects charismatic leadership, (iv) how charismatic leadership occurs and affects actors, and (v) how Nasser's charismatic leadership contributed to the continuation of his rule.

In the study, the third chapter focused on the colonial past of Egypt first. Then, it focused on the emergence of Egyptian patriotism/nationalism and anti-imperial tendencies during this period. Later, the chapter touched upon the process that paved the way for Nasser's revolution/coup in 1952. After that, the chapter explained how Nasser's rule continued and what reforms and policies he applied during his administration. Later, it focused on foreign policy events that contributed to Nasser's charismatic leadership because of positive outcomes. In this respect, the chapter explained the Baghdad Pact, the Czech Arms Deal, the Bandung Conference, the nationalization of the Suez Canal and Suez Crisis, and the establishment of the United Arab Republic. These events had positive outcomes in terms of improving Nasser's prestige, image, and charisma in the Arab world.

With the Baghdad Pact and the Czech Arms Deal, Nasser proved that he was the enemy of colonialism and its tools because he did not want Egypt and other countries in the region to join Baghdad Pact, which he saw as a colonial tool. Later, he could not buy weapons from the Western countries and turned to the East with Czech Arms Deal. Nasser became a supported and powerful leader with these moves in the Arab world because people advocated for him when they realized that he was the enemy of colonialism which people had fought against for years.

On the other hand, the nationalization of the Suez Canal and the establishment of the UAR were more crucial than previous ones in terms of consolidating Nasser's image and charismatic leadership. The nationalization of the Suez was a turning point because it presented a strong message of challenging colonialism. It was something that came with Egyptian history, and Egyptians were proud of it because the Suez Canal belonged to them, and they should be able to use it as they wished. Later, the dream of Arab nationalism came true, and the United Arab Republic was established by Egypt and Syria. This was the most important step towards Arab unity, and Nasser was the one who benefited most as the leader because people supported him as they never did before.

After these events, Nasser's charisma was on the rise, and the process of establishing charismatic leadership was completed in a sense. However, the disintegration of the United Arab Republic, the Yemen intervention of Egypt, and the defeat of 1967 had adverse outcomes. It led to a decrease in Nasser's reputation and prestige in the Arab world. Therefore, these events caused many problems. The dream of Arab unity with the UAR was an important part of Nasser's policies and ideology. However, the "disintegration" of the UAR was a setback in the way of Nasser because he advocated for unity among many people. When this dream was harmed, his reputation, image, and prestige were damaged too. Nasser and his administration thought that Yemen intervention could be a solution to the damage, but it created the opposite result. Finally, the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 disappointed the Egyptians and all Arabs in the region because they were convinced they could defeat Israel. After this event, Nasser's popularity and image decreased, but somehow, he was able to elude and exculpate himself almost from all of them. Mainly, other internal and external actors could be blamed for relative failures. However, Nasser only took responsibility for the 1967 defeat, which was the most devastating. In the second chapter, these events and Nasser's charismatic leadership are examined and related to Nasser's propaganda skills, usage of events for his benefit, and the current situation in Egypt.

The fourth chapter focuses on ideology as essential in establishing Nasser's charismatic leadership. Ideology is one of the critical components because the leader and ideology are interconnected. People believe in them both simultaneously, and when they believe in an ideology, they cannot think of any other leader than its founder or central defender. Therefore, ideology is a crucial element for the establishment and the continuation of charismatic leadership. Additionally, media is the other source of charisma and, most importantly, propaganda. Nasser could show himself as the sole and only leader with his propaganda, especially in the media. Media comprises different aspects such as newspapers, radio, music, cinema, interviews, etc. These were Nasser's propaganda tools for the improvement and spread of charismatic leadership.

Secondly, the third chapter examines Nasser's speeches as propaganda material, which are evidence of Nasser's usage of oratory skills to get people's support and approval,

even after some adverse outcomes. He promoted nationalism and unity, calling for a struggle for independence, creating a threat perception, and emphasizing strong Egypt, national army, and pride. Therefore, it can be seen that Nasser's propaganda contributed to his charismatic leadership and, indirectly, Nasser's continuation of his rule.

Consequently, Nasser's personality, ideology, and propaganda capability led to the establishment of a strong charisma. Then, it evolved to a charismatic leadership with particular successes in foreign policy regarding Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism. These concepts were on the rise and people's minds at that time. Because of this situation, Nasser was able to improve people's views about him and his leadership. As mentioned above, the situation in Arab countries and the context at that time were crucial.

It can be indicated that Nasser was seen one and only leader that could be capable of redeeming Arab countries even after the 1967 defeat. This belief of people made it possible for Nasser's rule to continue. Egyptian people saw Nasser as the only leader who could manage the country's defeats. However, it was thanks to Nasser's success in making himself a charismatic leader. Therefore, all of the things in the second and third chapters contributed to Nasser's charismatic leadership, and these made people see Nasser as the only leader. Because of this situation, people could not think of anyone other than him. He was a hero of the Arab world and the father of their nation in the eyes of Egyptians. Therefore, it did not matter whether he lost the war or cost a lot to Egypt because he was either not blamed at all or accepted as the one who would save them again from any condition.

Nasser was one of the most important leaders in the Arab world, and it is crucial to understand why he was supported so much by Egyptians first and then Arabs in general. It can be seen that charismatic leadership can make a leader an indispensable part of a society and state. Leaders with their ideology, perception, victories and successful policies can create charismatic leadership, leading to people's ultimate loyalty. Therefore, even with some coercive policies and failures, leaders can continue

their rule thanks to charismatic leadership. In the case of Nasser, charismatic leadership was crucial, and it enabled Nasser to continue his rule and be supported still by his people.

Thus, this study shows that leaders can extend their rule with charismatic leadership. However, all leaders cannot have it because it is not limited to the leader's sole authority or personality. Charismatic leadership is based on the leader's personality, represented ideology, given purpose, current situation, the similarity between promises and outcomes, successes, and least failures. Also, it has many positive effects, enabling a leader's rule to extend. However, this ruling style had some adverse effects and limitations. For instance, as a limitation, all Egyptians did not support a charismatic leader like Nasser. There was some opposition to his rule and oppressive policies from the middle class, traders, military officers, and intellectuals, but it was not possible to stand against Nasser at that time. Also, as a leader, Nasser was considered powerful in Egypt and the region but capable of being a leader, and the country did not rely entirely on charisma. Therefore, Nasser's capability was restricted by local, regional, and global dynamics which specified what Egypt could do.

As adverse effects, generally, charisma can be routinized, but the effects of strong leadership can be difficult in terms of a successor. When the charismatic leader's effect continued, and his policies were still accepted as untouchable, the successor could be in a difficult position to rule the country. When Anwar Sadat became the president of Egypt in 1970, he applied many different policies, such as a liberal economy contrary to socialism which was applied during the leadership of Nasser. Also, especially after the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, Egypt tried to normalize relations with Israel to develop the country by maintaining stability and peace. Sadat had people with opposite ideas around him because of Nasser's strong and continuous effect even if he was dead.

The continuation of a leader's rule with charismatic leadership can be seen in cases other than Nasser. Methods that are used in this study can apply to those cases. In the region, Arab nationalism can also be used by other countries, but ideology is important in building charismatic leadership. Countries that have colonial histories, and

nationalist and anti-imperial movements, are suitable for a leader which charismatic leadership to show up. However, especially (i) the situation of distress and the perception of a hero, (ii) establishing legitimacy, (iii) propaganda, (iv) glorification of history and successes, (v) constructing threats, and (vi) foreign policy cases are the important aspect for the establishment of charismatic leadership besides ideology. These aspects can be seen in the cases of other countries and leaders because they are not unique to Egypt and Nasser, but there should be differences between leaders in these aspects in terms of planning, establishment, and implementation.

To sum up, this thesis focused on how Nasser could continue his rule even after some failures in foreign policy. Because his prestige and charisma in the Arab world were diminished after these events. To understand the events and answer this question, important events in the period of Nasser were used to understand and analyze crucial foreign policy cases. Also, Nasser's speeches were an essential source of information regarding understanding his standing on issues and how he could convince and direct people in specific directions. In the end of all of these, it is clear that Nasser's charismatic leadership, supported by his relationship with society and people's way of seeing Nasser, was the main reason for the continuation of his rule.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdel Nasser, Gamal. 1956. *The Philosophy of the Revolution*. Mondiale Press. Cairo. https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230613713_1.
- Adriansen, Hanne Kirstine. 2009. "Land Reclamation in Egypt: A Study of Life in the New Lands." *Geoforum* 40 (4): 664–74. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2009.05.006>.
- Anderson, Raymond H. 1970. "Nasser Funeral Is Disrupted by Frenzy of Millions." *The New York Times*, October 2, 1970. <https://www.nytimes.com/1970/10/02/archives/nasser-funeral-is-disrupted-by-frenzy-of-millions-throngs-swarm.html>.
- Antonakis, John, Nicolas Bastardo, Philippe Jacquart, and Boas Shamir. 2016. "Charisma: An Ill-Defined and Ill-Measured Gift." *Annual Review of Organizational Psychology and Organizational Behavior* 3 (April): 293–319. <https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev-orgpsych-041015-062305>.
- Apor, Balázs, Jan C. Behrends, Polly Jones, and E. A. Rees. 2004. *The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc*. British The Leader Cult in Communist Dictatorships: Stalin and the Eastern Bloc. <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230518216>.
- Banks, George C., Krista N. Engemann, Courtney E. Williams, Janaki Gooty, Kelly Davis McCauley, and Melissa R. Medaugh. 2017. "A Meta-Analytic Review and Future Research Agenda of Charismatic Leadership." *Leadership Quarterly* 28 (4): 508–29. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2016.12.003>.

- Beatties, Kirk James. 1985. "Egypt: The Struggle for Hegemony, 1952-1981."
University of Michigan.
- Bois, David Graham du. 1971. "The Death of Nasser." *Black Scholar* 2 (10): 45–47.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/00064246.1971.11431056>.
- Bozbař, Gökhan. 2018. *Mısır'da Toplum ve Siyaset: "Devrimden Darbeye Giden Sürecin Yapısal Analizi."* 1. Basım. İstanbul: Vadi Yayıncılık.
- Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. 2009. *A History of the Modern Middle East. Choice Reviews Online.* 4th ed. Vol. 42. Westview Press.
<https://doi.org/10.5860/choice.42-4817>.
- Dawisha, Adeed. 1976. *Egypt in the Arab World: The Elements of Foreign Policy.*
London: The Macmillan Press.
- . 2003. *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair.* New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Duman, Ahmed Hayri. 2020. "Liderler Ve Mısır Dıř Politikası: Nasır Ve Mursi Dönemlerinde Bireysel Etkenler." *Ortadoęu Etütleri* 12 (2): 369–90.
<https://doi.org/10.47932/ortetut.763640>.
- Eilam-Shamir, Galit, Ronit Kark, and Micha Popper. 2017. "Boas Shamir: The Person, His Impact and Legacy." *Leadership Quarterly* 28 (4): 563–77.
<https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2016.03.004>.
- El-Feth, Ahmet Abu. 1965. *Mısır İhtilalinin İçyüzü ve Nasır.* 1st ed. İstanbul: Rektür Kitap Servisi.

- Ferris, Jesse. 2012. *Nasser 's Gamble: How Intervention in Yemen Caused the Six-Day War and the Decline of Egyptian Power*. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
- Friedland, William H. 1964. "For a Sociological Concept of Charisma." *Social Forces* 43 (1): 18–26. <https://doi.org/10.1093/sf/43.1.18>.
- Goldschmidt, Arthur. 2004. *Modern Egypt*. Westview Press.
www.westviewpress.com.
- Heykel, Muhammed Hasaneyn. 1974. *Kahire Dosyası*. 1st ed. Ankara: Bilgi Yayınevi.
- Jacquart, Philippe, and John Antonakis. 2015. "When Does Charisma Matter for Top-Level Leaders? Effect of Attributional Ambiguity." *Academy of Management Journal* 58 (4): 1051–74. <https://doi.org/10.5465/amj.2012.0831>.
- Lu, Xin, and Elena Soboleva. 2014. "Personality Cults in Modern Politics : Cases from Russia and China." *CGP Working Paper Series*.
- Mansfield, Peter. 1967. *Mısır İhtilali ve Nasır*. 1st ed. İstanbul: Kitapçılık Ticaret Limited Şirketi Yayınları.
- Margold, Stella. 1957. "Agrarian Land Reform in Egypt." *American Journal of Economics and Sociology* 17 (1): 9–19. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1536-7150.1957.tb00212.x>.
- Márquez, Xavier. 2018. "Two Models of Political Leader Cults: Propaganda and Ritual." *Politics, Religion and Ideology* 19 (3): 265–84.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2018.1510392>.

- Parry, Ken, Michael Cohen, Sukanto Bhattacharya, Andrea North-Samardzic, and Gareth Edwards. 2019. "Charismatic Leadership: Beyond Love and Hate and toward a Sense of Belonging?" *Journal of Management and Organization* 25 (3): 398–413. <https://doi.org/10.1017/jmo.2019.28>.
- Podeh, Elie, and Onn Winckler. 2004a. *Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt*. Rethinking Nasserism: Revolution and Historical Memory in Modern Egypt. Gainesville: University Press of Florida.
- , eds. 2004b. *Rethinking Revolution and Historical Memory*. University Press of Florida.
- Reh, Susan, Niels Van Quaquebeke, and Steffen R. Giessner. 2017. "The Aura of Charisma: A Review on the Embodiment Perspective as Signaling." *Leadership Quarterly* 28 (4): 486–507. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.leaqua.2017.01.001>.
- Rogan, Eugene. 2017. *Araplar: Bir Halkın Tarihi*. 1st ed. İstanbul: Pegasus.
- Shamir, Boas; House, Robert J.; Arthur, Michael B. 1993. "The Motivational Effects of Charismatic Leadership : A Self-Concept Based Theory." *The Institute of Management Sciences* 4 (4): 577–94.
- Sharnoff, Michael. 2017. *Nasser's Peace: Egypt's Response to the 1967 War with Israel*. New York: Transaction Publishers.
- Shaw, Earl B. 1954. "Land Reform in Egypt." *Journal of Geography* 53 (6): 229–37. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00221345408982579>.
- Strong, Carol, and Matt Killingsworth. 2011. "Stalin the Charismatic Leader?: Explaining the 'Cult of Personality' as a Legitimation Technique." *Politics*,

Religion & Ideology 12 (4): 391–411.

<https://doi.org/10.1080/21567689.2011.624410>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the 4th Anniversary of the United Arab Republic in Gomhouriya Square.” 1962. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1962.

<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1013-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Armed Forces Exhibiton at Al Guizira in Which He Announced the Czech Arms Deal.” 1955. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. September 27, 1955.

<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-400-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the Opening of the Asian African Conference in Bandung.” 1955. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1955.

<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-339-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the People’s Conference at Taz in Yemen.” 1964. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1964.

<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1077-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from Al Diafa Palace Celebrating the 3rd Year of the United Arab Republic.” 1961. Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

1961. <http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-966-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from Gomhouriya Square to the Youth of the United Arab Republic.” 1958. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1958.

<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-579-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Presidential Palace Announcing the United Arab Republic.” 1958. Bibliotheca Alexandrina.

February 1, 1958. <http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-577-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen.” 1963. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1963.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1055-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Port Said Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen.” 1963. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1963.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1056-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in the Cabinet on His Return from the Bandung Conference.” 1955. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1955.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-344-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Presenting the National Charter from Cairo University.” 1962. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1962.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1015-en>.

“The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to the Forces Returning from Yemen with President Ahmed Bin Bela.” 1963. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1963.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1047-en>.

“The Interview given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser to William Atwood the Editor in Chief of Look Magazine.” 1968. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1968.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1227-en>.

“The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution.” 1956. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. July 26, 1956.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-495-en>.

“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution.” 1967. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1967.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1223-en>.

“The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Broadcasting House in Cairo (the First Statement on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria).” 1961. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1961.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-997-en>.

“The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Broadcasting House in Cairo (the Second Statement on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria).” 1961. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1961.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-998-en>.

“The Statement given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser on the Dissolution of the Union with Syria.” 1961. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1961.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/TextViewer.aspx?TextID=SPCH-1001-en>.

“The Statement Issued by President Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Egyptian Television & Broadcasting Building Announcing His Retirement from the Presidency of the Republic to the People and the Nation.” 1967. Bibliotheca Alexandrina. 1967.

“The Video of Nasser’s Funeral Dirges and Funeral of Gamal Abdel Nasser.” 1970. Bibliotheca Alexandria. October 1, 1970.
<http://nasser.bibalex.org/MediaViewer.aspx?VideoID=VID-VID-8202-en>.

Tucker, Robert C. 1968. “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership Author (s): Robert C . Tucker Source : *Daedalus* , Vol . 97 , No . 3 , Philosophers and Kings : Studies in Leadership (Summer , Published by : The MIT Press on Behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences Stable URL.” *Daedalus* 97 (3): 731–56.

Tucker, Robert C. 1977. "Personality and Political Leadership Author (s): Robert C . Tucker Source : Political Science Quarterly , Vol . 92 , No . 3 (Autumn , 1977), Pp . 383-393 Published by : The Academy of Political Science Stable URL : <https://www.jstor.org/stable/2148499>." *Political Science Quarterly* 92 (3): 383–93.

Weber, Max. 1947. "The Theory of Bureaucracy of Max Weber.," 13.

Willner, Ann Ruth, and Dorothy Willner. 1965. "The Rise and Role of Charismatic Leaders." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 358 (1): 77–88. <https://doi.org/10.1177/000271626535800109>.

Wivel, Anders, and Caroline Howard Grøn. 2021. "Charismatic Leadership in Foreign Policy." *International Affairs* 97 (2): 365–83. <https://doi.org/10.1093/ia/iiaa223>.

APPENDICES

A. TURKISH SUMMARY / TÜRKÇE ÖZET

Uzun bir sömürgecilik geçmişi olan Mısır'da bağımsızlık için pek çok mücadele verilmiştir. Yıllarca Fransız ve İngiliz sömürgesi altında Mısırlılar, Urabi isyanı ve 1919'daki isyanla bağımsızlık için mücadele etmiştir. Bu süreçte sömürgeciliğe bir yanıt olarak Mısır vatanseverliği/milliyetçiliği yükselişe geçmiş, bu akım bölgedeki bazı ülkelerin de savunduğu (sömürgecilik geçmişi olanlarla daha etkin bir şekilde) daha kapsayıcı Arap milliyetçiliğine dönüşmüştür. Bu bağlamda milliyetçilik ve sömürgecilik karşıtlığı Mısır'da siyasal ve sosyal hayatın temellerinden biri haline gelmiştir.

1952'de Cemal Abdülnasır'ın da bir parçası olduğu Hür Subaylar tarafından düzenlenen darbeyle, Mısır'daki yönetim değişmiş ve cumhuriyet ilan edilmiştir. Bunun yanı sıra Nasır yönetimi tarafından pek çok reform yapılmıştır. Nasır'ın 1952 ile 1970 arasındaki cumhurbaşkanlığı döneminde, tamamen siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal hayat ile ülkenin bağımsızlığına odaklanılmıştır. Nasır, pek çok reform girişiminde bulunarak zengin ve fakir arasındaki sınıf ve yaşam düzeyi farkını kapatmaya çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamdaki en önemli girişim ise 1953 ve 1954 yıllarında yapılan toprak reformu olmuştur. Reform kapsamında büyük toprak sahiplerinden topraklar alınmış ve dağıtılmıştır. Topraksız olan çiftçilere de toprak sağlanmış ve herkesin sahip olabileceği toprak 200 feddan ile sınırlandırılmıştır. Bu reformun ardından Nasır'a karşı özellikle büyük toprak sahipleri tepki göstermiştir. Çünkü reformla toprak sahiplerinin etkisi ve gücü azalmıştır.

Nasır, her fırsatta Arap milliyetçiliği ve birliği fikrini savunmuş, diğer ülkelerin sömürgeci güçlerle mücadelesini de desteklemiştir. Bu doğrultuda pek çok Mısırlı ve Arap da Nasır'ı desteklemeye başlamıştır. Ancak insanlar Nasır'ı yalnızca ideolojik savları sebebiyle değil, politikaları, propaganda becerileri ve karizmatik liderliği nedeniyle de desteklemiştir. Nasır pek çok insanı radyo ve gazete gibi çeşitli propaganda materyalleri ile etkilemeyi başarmıştır. Nasır, insanları etkilemek için nasıl konuşması gerektiğini bilen etkili bir lider olarak ön plana çıkmıştır. Bu doğrultuda Nasır, 1952 darbesiyle “devrimsel” nitelikte sayılan reformlarına ve yönetimine dair medyada söylenenleri de kontrol etmiştir. Nasır, “devrimi”, Arap dünyasında Mısır'ın rolünü ve ordusunun gücünü de savunarak yüceltmıştır. Ayrıca Nasır, Arap milliyetçiliğini ve Soğuk Savaş döneminde Bağlantısızlar Hareketi'ni de desteklemiştir. Özellikle Bağlantısızlar Hareketi dolayısıyla diğer ülkelere de destek almıştır.

Nasır, ideolojisi, politikaları ve propaganda becerisi sayesinde diğer Arap ülkelere ve halklarına da etki edebilmiştir. Nasır, Bağdat Paktı, Çek silah anlaşması, Süveyş Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesi ve Birleşik Arap Cumhuriyeti'nin kurulması gibi pek çok başarıya imza atmıştır. Bu gelişmelerin hepsi Nasır'ın Arap dünyasındaki itibarına katkıda bulunmuş, daha çok ün ve destek kazanmasına katkı sağlamıştır. Bu başarılar, Nasır'ın kişiliği, karizması ve propagandası ile birleşerek karizmatik liderliğinin oluşmasına yardımcı olmuştur.

Ülkede siyasi, sosyal veya ekonomik huzursuzluk ortamı olması karizmatik liderliğin oluşmasını kolaylaştırır çünkü böyle durumlarda insanlar bir kurtarıcı ya da kahraman ararlar. Genellikle statükoyu değiştirmeyi hedefleyen karizmatik liderler devrimci bir role sahip olarak görülür. İnsanların bu devrimci girişimleri gerekli görüp desteklemesi önemlidir çünkü karizmatik liderlik, destekçiler ve lider arasındaki ilişkiye ve insanların lider algısına dayanmaktadır. Bu bağlamda Nasır da tamamen statükoyu değiştirmeye ve farklı bir düzen kurmaya çalışan bir lider olmuştur.

İnsanların görüşü ve ülkedeki durumun yanı sıra liderin güçlü bir ideoloji ve hedef sunabilmesi de önem arz etmektedir. Nasır bağlamında Arap milliyetçiliği, Arap

sosyalizmi ve sömürgecilik karşıtlığı önemli ideolojik temeller olmuştur çünkü bu kavramlar o dönemde Mısırlıların ve Arapların görüşlerindeki en önemli parçası olarak görülmüştür. Diğer yandan, karizmatik liderlik oluşturulup güçlendirilirken propagandanın önemi de büyüktür. Bu bağlamda Nasır, medya, müzik, film, radyo ve söylemlerini etkili bir şekilde kullanmayı başarmıştır. Dış politika olayları da propaganda bağlamında etkili olmuştur. Ancak dış politikada olumlu ve Nasır açısından sonuçları iyi olan gelişmeler yaşansa da olumsuz sonuçlara sebep olan olaylar da Nasır'ı ve karizmatik liderliğini etkilemiştir.

Girişin ardından çalışmanın ikinci bölümünde karizmatik liderliğin ne olduğu, hangi araçların karizmatik liderlik oluşumuna katkı sağladığı ve hangi yöntemlerin kullanıldığı gibi konular ele alınmıştır. Karizmatik liderlik genel olarak Max Weber'in karizma tanımına dayanmaktadır. Weber'in tanımına göre karizma, bir insanın sıradan olmaması, doğaüstü ve farklı güçlerinin olması şeklinde tanımlanmaktadır. Weber, karizmanın duygusal bir düzeyi olduğunu ve devrimci olduğunu da belirtir. Karizmanın geçerliliği için yalnızca lider değil, liderin insanlar tarafından nasıl görüldüğü de önem arz etmektedir. Weber, karizmatik liderlerin sosyal bir hareket oluşturabileceklerini ya da bir parçası olabileceklerini de söyler. Bu bağlamda ideolojinin, sosyal hareketin veya amaçların lider ve halk arasındaki ilişkideki önemi görülmektedir. Karizmatik liderliğin oluşması için huzursuzluk ortamı ve kurtarıcı ihtiyacı ile meşruiyet sağlama gereksinimi ön plana çıkmaktadır. Bu bağlamda bir ülkedeki siyasi, ekonomik ve sosyal durum önem arz etmektedir. Liderler, karizmatik liderlik oluşturmak ve bahsi geçen durumlarda ön plana çıkmak için propaganda yöntemine başvurur. Bu bağlamda tarihin ve başarıların övüldüğü, tehdit algısı oluşturulduğu, ideoloji ve kişiliğin ön plana çıkarıldığı görülür.

Üçüncü bölümde de Mısır'ın sömürgecilik geçmişi ve milliyetçiliğin ortaya çıkışını ele alınmaktadır. Sonrasında ise 1952'de Hür Subaylar tarafından düzenlenen darbeye giden süreçten ve reformlardan bahsedilmektedir. Nasır'ın yönetiminde yaptığı girişimleri, reformları ve politikaları açıklanmaktadır. Bu bölümde Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliğine katkıda bulunan ve olumlu sonuçlar doğuran dış politika olayları da tek tek incelenmektedir: Bağdat Paktı, Çek silah anlaşması, Bandung Konferansı, Süveyş

Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesi ve Süveyş krizi ve Birleşik Arap Cumhuriyeti'nin (BAC) kurulması. Bu olaylar sayesinde Nasır'ın Arap dünyasındaki prestiji, imajı ve karizması güçlenmiştir.

Bağdat Paktı ve Çek silah anlaşmasıyla Nasır, kendisinin sömürgeciliğin ve sömürgecilik araçlarının düşmanı olduğunu insanların gözünde kanıtlamıştır. Çünkü Nasır, Mısır ve diğer ülkelerin Bağdat Paktı'na katılmasını, bunu sömürgeciliğin aracı olarak gördüğü için kabul etmemiş, Lübnan ve Ürdün'ün de pakta katılmasının engellemeye çalışmıştır. Bu konuda propaganda çabalarını sürdürmüş, o ülkelerin halklarına da etki etmeyi başarmıştır. Sonrasında ise Batılı ülkelere silah satın alamayan Nasır, Doğu'ya yönelerek Çek silah anlaşmasını imzalamıştır. Bu da halk tarafından sömürgecilik karşıtlığı olarak görülmüş ve desteklenmiştir. Nasır, bu kararlarıyla Arap dünyasında desteklenmeye başlamış ve güçlenmiştir. İnsanların Nasır'ı sömürgeciliğin düşmanı olarak görmeye başlamasının ardından Nasır, daha fazla desteklenmeye başlamıştır.

Süveyş Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesi ve BAC'nin kurulması, Nasır'ın imajını ve karizmatik liderliğini güçlendirmesi yönünden önceki olaylardan daha önemlidir. Süveyş Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesi bir dönüm noktası olmuş, sömürgecilikle mücadele anlamında güçlü bir mesaj niteliği taşımıştır. Süveyş'in millileştirilmesinin ardından Fransa, İngiltere ve İsrail'in Mısır'a saldırması, Mısırlılar içerisinde tekrar bir bağımsızlık mücadelesi oluşturmuştur. Bu mücadeleye Nasır'ın önderlik etmesi de Mısırlılar ve tüm Arap dünyası tarafından destek görmüştür. Nasır, bu olayla birlikte Arap dünyasında bir kahraman haline gelmiştir. Savaşta fiili olarak en çok kayıp yaşayan taraf olan Mısır, ABD ve Sovyetler Birliği'nin müdahalesiyle ciddi bir bedel olmaktan kurtulmuş ve Süveyş'te Mısır'ın olmuştur. Bu olay Nasır tarafından "zafer" olarak nitelendirilmiş ve lanse edilmiştir. Sonrasında ise Arap birliğinin hayali olan BAC, Mısır ve Suriye ile kurulmuştur. Bu Arap birliğinin sağlanması yönündeki en önemli adım olmuş ve Nasır, daha fazla insanın onu desteklemeye başlamasıyla en karlı çıkan lider olmuştur. Mısır ve Nasır'ın, Arap dünyasının lideri olarak görülmeye başladığı bir dönemde gerçekleşen birleşme, Nasır'ın itibarını iyice yükseltmiştir.

Nasır'da görüldüğü gibi karizmatik liderlik, özellikle kriz dönemlerinde halkın bir lidere verdiği desteğin en önemli faktörlerinden biri olarak kabul edilebilir. Nasır, ülkesi ve Arap halkları için ilham verici bir lider olarak görülmüş ve farklı kesimler tarafından desteklenmiştir. Nasır, dış politikadaki girişimleri sayesinde daha fazla takipçi kazanmış ve karizmatik liderliğini asıl güçlendiren olaylar da bunlar olmuştur. Karizmatik liderlik oluşumunda farklı dinamikler kullanılsa da ideoloji, hedef oluşturma ve zaferler karizmatik liderlik oluşturulurken etkilidir. Karizmatik liderlik, genel olarak liderler için olumlu bir ifade oluştursa da farklı bir yüzü de bulunmaktadır. Pek çok insan karizmatik liderleri politikaları, reformları, ideolojileri ve becerileri için destekleyebilir ancak bu liderler aynı zamanda kapsamlı propaganda girişimlerinde bulunur.

Bahsi geçen dış politika olayları ve propaganda girişimleri ardından, Nasır'ın karizması en üst seviyeye ulaşmıştır. Ancak BAC'nin dağılması, Mısır'ın Yemen'e müdahale etmesi ve 1967 savaşında İsrail'e yenilmesi olumsuz sonuçlar doğurmuştur. Bu olayların ardından Nasır'ın Arap dünyasındaki itibarı sarsılmış ve prestiji zarar görmüştür. Arap birliği hayali BAC'nin dağılmasıyla zayıflamış, Nasır'ın politikalarının ve ideolojisinin gücü azalmıştır. Yemen müdahalesinin bu soruna bir çözüm olabileceğini düşünen Nasır için bu karar da aksi bir sonuç doğurmuş, Mısır siyasi, ekonomik ve askerî açıdan büyük zarar görmüştür. 1967 savaşı ise son damla olmuş, İsrail'i yenebileceklerini düşünen Arap halkları için bu yenilgi büyük bir yıkım olmuştur.

Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliğine ve bunu oluşturan etmenlere bakıldığında, özellikle 1967'de Arap-İsrail Savaşı'nda yaşanan yenilginin ardından Nasır'ın imajının, zarar gördüğü; Mısır'ın da kısmen bölgesel liderliğini ve Soğuk Savaş'taki tarafsızlığını kaybetmeye başladığı görülmüştür. İsrail'e karşı yenilginin ardından sorumluluk üstlenip istifa eden Nasır için Mısır halkı protesto gösterisi düzenlemiştir. İstifasına karşı olan halkın talebi doğrultusunda Nasır, bu kararından vazgeçmiş, bu olayla birlikte yenilgiye ve Mısır'ın bulunduğu olumsuz duruma rağmen Mısırlıların Nasır'ı desteklemeye devam ettiği görülmüştür.

Nasır, 1967 sonrası prestijini kaybetmesine rağmen Mısırlılar, ona kaybettiklerini geri alması, Mısır ordusunu ve onurunu tekrar inşa etmesi için güvenmiştir. 1967'nin ardından insanlar Nasır'ı kayıpları telafi edebilecek tek lider olarak görmeye devam etmiştir. Bu düşünce sayesinde Nasır'ın yönetimi devam etmiştir çünkü Nasır hala insanların gözünde kahraman olarak görülmüştür. Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliğini oluşturan etmenler göz önünde bulundurulduğunda insanlar, Nasır'dan başkasını düşünememiştir. Nasır, Arap dünyasının kahramanı ve Mısır'ın babası olarak görülmeye devam etmiştir. Bu bağlamda bu çalışmada karizmatik liderliğin kriz durumlarında nasıl bir araç ve çözüm olarak kullanıldığı görülmektedir. Ayrıca karizmatik liderlik, yönetimin daha uzun bir süre devam ettirilmesine de katkı sağlamaktadır.

Nasır'ın bu düzeyde sevip desteklenmesi ise zamanla meydana gelmiş, halk ve Nasır arasındaki ilişki en çok Nasır'ın takipçilerinin algısına dayanmıştır. 26 Ekim 1954'te Nasır, suikasta uğramış ve bu durum onun güçlü duruşu ve karizmasıyla insanların desteğini artırmıştır. Mahmud Abdülatif, Nasır'a suikast girişiminde bulunduğu Nasır, hiçbir şekilde kıpırdamamış ve bu durum Mısırlılar tarafından kahramanca görülmüştür. Bu olayın ardından Nasır, ülkesi ve halkı için kendisini feda edebileceğini, Mısır özgür oldukça kendisinin ölümünün önemli olmadığını vurgulamıştır. Bu, insanlar tarafından Nasır'ı desteklemek için önemli bir işaret olarak görülmüş çünkü yaptığı hem kahramanca kabul edilmiş hem de suikasttan kurtulduğu için seçilmiş biri olduğu düşünülmüştür.

Nasır'a duyulan sevgi ve desteğin en önemli kanıtlarından bir diğeri de 1 Ekim 1970'de düzenlenen cenaze töreni olmuştur. 28 Ekim 1970'te Nasır'ın ölümünün duyurulmasının ardından toplumun pek çok kesimi cenazeye katılmak üzere Kahire'ye doğru yola çıkmıştır. İnsanlar Nasır için yas tutmuş, ağıt yakmış ve bağırarak onun sonsuza kadar kalplerinde olacaklarını ve devrimcileri arkasında bıraktığını söylemiştir. Bölgeden de ve diğer ülkelerden cenazeye katılmak için gelen insanlar ve liderler de olmuştur. Milyonlarca insan Mısır'ın ve dünyanın farklı yerlerinden Nasır'ı uğurlamak için gelmiş ve özellikle Mısır halkı büyük bir üzüntü duymuş, yas içine girmiştir.

Bahsedildiği üzere insanların algılarına dayalı karizmatik liderlik, Nasır için yalnızca olumlu bir kavram olarak ön plana çıkmamaktadır. Liderlerin veya yönetimlerin insanların desteğini almak ve gücünü konsolide etmek için doğal ya da yapay olarak karizmatik liderliği oluşturması gerekmektedir. Nasır, Mısır'da pek çok farklı kesim tarafından bir karizmatik lider olarak sevilip desteklenmiştir. Ancak bu bağlamda tüm Mısırlıların Nasır ve politikalarını desteklediği de görülmemektedir. Tüm ülkenin bir lideri desteklemesinin beklenemeyeceği gibi, Nasır da daha çok toplumun alt basamaklarında olan kişiler, çiftçiler, milliyetçi ve sömürge karşıtları tarafından desteklenmiştir. Orta sınıf kesimi, bazı ordu mensupları, tüccarlar ve entelektüeller Nasır'ı tamamen desteklememiş, hatta muhalif olmuştur. Bu bağlamda Nasır, yönetimi süresince Mısır'da insanların temel haklarını kısıtlayan sert kararlar almış ve ülkedeki tek güç merkezi haline gelmeye çalışmıştır. Bu bağlamda Nasır, epeyce eleştirilmiş ancak muhalif sesleri de bastırmıştır. Sonuç olarak, Nasır Mısır'da ve bölgede güçlü olarak görülse de bunun sebebi yalnızca oluşturduğu karizmatik liderliği değil, ülkedeki kısıtlayıcı politikaları da etkili olmuştur.

Nasır, yönetimini sürdürmesine katkı sağlayan karizmatik liderliğini oluştururken propaganda aracı olarak medyayı kontrol altına almış ve kullanmıştır. Basın organlarını 1960 yılında millileştiren Nasır, bağımsız grupları sınırlandırmaya ve rejime zarar gelmemesini sağlamaya çalışmıştır. Medya alanında editörlük gibi önemli pozisyonlara kişiler, Nasır tarafından atanmıştır. Ayrıca Nasır, yönetimini konsolide etmek için çoğu muhalif grubu bastırarak, siyasi partileri yasaklamış ve sivil toplum örgütlerini kapatmıştır. Nasır, yasama ve yürütme erklerini yönetimi altına almış, parlamentoyu kapatmış; sosyal hareketleri, dini ya da seküler muhalif hareketleri de yasaklamıştır. Nasır, alternatif bir ideoloji, kişi ya da grubun ortaya çıkmasını bu tür girişimlerle önlemeye çalışmıştır.

Çalışmanın son bölümünde ise Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliğinin en önemli araçlarından olan ideoloji, medya ve söylem gücü incelenmektedir. İdeolojinin karizmatik liderliğin önemli bir parçası olduğu ve yönetimin devamında önemli bir rol oynadığı görülmektedir. Nasır, Arap milliyetçiliğini ve sömürgeci karşıtlığını birleştirerek

kendine has bir ideoloji oluşturmuştur. “Nasirizm” olarak adlandırılan bu ideoloji, Nasır’ın karizmatik liderliğine ve insanların ona verdiği desteğe de katkıda bulunmuştur. Bu bağlamda ideoloji, insanların desteğini alması ve onlara bir amaç vermesi bakımından karizmatik liderliğinin önemli faktörlerinden ve dolayısıyla Nasır’ın yönetimini sürdürülebilmesinin nedenlerinden görülmektedir.

Medya ise karizma için yapılan propagandanın kaynaklarından biri olarak ortaya çıkmaktadır. Nasır, medya yoluyla yaptığı propaganda sayesinde kendisini tek lider olarak gösterebilmiş, karizmatik liderliğini geliştirmiş ve hızlandırmıştır. Nasır, ideolojisini yaymak, politikalarını anlatmak ve gücünü konsolide edebilmek için medyayı araç olarak kullanmıştır. Medya bağlamında gazeteler, dergileri, radyo, müzik ve filmler ön plana çıkmıştır. Nasır, propaganda araçlarını çeşitlendirerek pek çok kesime hitap edebilmiştir. Medyanın Nasır’ın kontrolünde olması ve basının 1960’ta millileştirilmesi de etkili olan faktörlerden biridir. Nasır yönetimi tarafından belirlenen kişilerce gazetelere ve medya organlarına sansür uygulanması ya da doğrudan ne yazılacağı belirlenmesi de söz konusu olmuştur. Nasır, medya araçları ile Mısır’ın geçmişini (özellikle Antik Mısır), zaferlerini ve Arap kültürünü övmeye odaklanmıştır. Mısırlılık kimliği oluşturmak ve milliyetçiliği güçlendirmek için bu tür faaliyetler önemli görülmüştür.

İdeoloji ve medyanın karizmatik liderlik oluşumunda önemine değinilmesinin ardından son bölümde, propagandanın bir parçası olarak Nasır’ın konuşmaları ele alınmıştır. Nasır, özellikle milliyetçilik ve birlik kavramlarını kullanarak bağımsızlık mücadelesine, tehdit algısını yaratmaya, Mısır’ın güçlü olmasına, ulusal ordusuna ve onuruna vurgu yapmıştır. Nasır’ın konuşmaları bağlamında gücünü konsolide etme stratejileri şu şekilde sıralanabilir: (i) düşman algısı ve nihai bir düşman yaratma, (ii) sömürgecilik karşıtlığı, (iii) Arap milliyetçili ve tarihi, (iv) Arap-Mısır tarihinin ve başarılarının övülmesi ve (v) Mısır halkı için bir amaç oluşturulması. Çalışma kapsamında Nasır’ın Süveyş Kanalı’nın millileştirilmesi, Çek silah anlaşması, Bandung Konferansı, BAC’nin kuruluşu ve dağılması, Ulusal Tüzüğün ilanı, Yemen müdahalesi, 1967 Arap-İsrail Savaşı’na dair konuşmaları ele alınmıştır.

Örneğin Nasır, Süveyş Kanalı'nın millileştirilmesinin dördüncü yıldönümünde, "Özgürlüğü desteklemeye, sömürgeciliğe ve araçlarına karşı direnmeye devam edeceğiz ve ilerleyeceğiz. Bizlerin ve bu ülkenin çocukların inandığı prensiplere ulaşmak için önümüzde uzun mücadeleler var." ifadelerini kullanmıştı. Ayrıca Nasır, sömürgeciliğin milliyetçiliğe zarar verdiğini, Arapları bölmeye çalıştığını belirtmiş, İsrail'in sömürgeciliğin bir ürünü olduğunu vurgulamıştı. Nasır, "Milliyetçiliği ve Arapçılığı, Atlantik Okyanusu'ndan Basra Körfezi'ne kadar olan Arap bölgesinde savunacaklarını belirtmişti ("The Speech given by Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria In the 4th Anniversary of the Revolution" 1956). BAC ilan edilirken ise Nasır, yeni güçlü ve büyük bir devlet kurduklarını, Mısırlıların ve Suriyelilerin özgür, adil ve barışçıl bir ülke kurabileceklerini ifade etmişti. Nasır, sömürgeci güçlerin birliklerini kırmak istediklerini ancak bunun imkânsız olduğunu vurgulamıştı. Nasır, sürekli olarak Arap birliğinin önemini ve milliyetçiliği vurgulamış, sömürgecilikle mücadeleye dikkati çekmişti. Ayrıca Nasır, İsrail'i düşman olarak göstermeye ve sömürgeci kuvvetlere vurgu yapmaya devam etmişti ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser at the 4th Anniversary of the United Arab Republic in Gomhouriya Square" 1962).

Mısır tarafından Yemen müdahalesi gerçekleşmesinin ardından Nasır, orduya hitapta bulunarak Mısır'ın işgal veya sömürge amaçlı Yemen'de bulunmadığını, Yemen'in içinde bulunduğu sömürgecilik etkisine karşı orada olduklarını ifade etmişti. Ayrıca Nasır, Yemen'deki çatışmaların tüm Arap dünyasını ve Mısır'daki devrimi de hedef aldığı altını çizmişti. Nasır, Yemen'deki durumu Mısır için bir ulusal güvenlik tehdidi olarak nitelendirerek, ordunun orada bulunmasına meşruiyet kazandırmaya çalışmıştı. Konuşmada Mısır ordusunun, Yemen'i özgürleştirmeye çalıştığına dikkat çekilmişti ("The Address by President Gamal Abdel Nasser in Alexandria Welcoming the Forces Back from Yemen" 1963).

1967 yenilgisinin ardından Nasır yaptığı konuşmada, sorumluluk almış ve Arap birliği fikrinin devam etmesinin önemini vurgulayarak, kendisinden sonrada bunun olması gerektiğini vurgulamıştır. Nasır, bir ulusun kendisi gibi tek kişiye dayanmaması gerektiğini belirtmiş, zaferlere dikkati çekmiştir ("The Statement Issued by President

Gamal Abdel Nasser from the Egyptian Television & Broadcasting Building Announcing His Retirement from the Presidency of the Republic to the People and the Nation” 1967). Nasır, sonrasında yaptığı bir konuşmada işlerinin hiçbir zaman kolay olmadığını, mücadele yolunun tehlikeli ve zafer yolunun ise fedakarlık, umut ve çaba dolu olduğunu belirtmişti. Özellikle konuşmada Mısır halkının mücadelesinin Nasır’dan önce de var olduğuna ve sonra da var olacağına vurgu yapılmıştı. Bu bağlamda Nasır, Mısır’ın ve davalarının kendisinin daha önemli olduğuna vurgu yapmıştı (“The Speech given by President Gamal Abdel Nasser Celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Revolution” 1967).

Söz konusu konuşmalar kapsamında Nasır’ın özellikle sömürgecilikle mücadeleye odaklandığı ve düşman olarak sömürgeci ülkeleri nitelendirdiği görülmektedir. Ayrıca İsrail de sömürgeciliğin bir aracı olarak nitelendirilerek, nihai düşman olarak görülen yapılar arasındadır. Nasır, dış güçlere dayanmak ve bağlı olmak zorunda olunmaması gerektiğinin de altını çizmiştir. Ayrıca Mısır’ın bağımsızlık mücadelesine vurgu yapan Nasır, yapılan reformları ve “devrimi” överek, bölgedeki diğer ülkelere de çağrıda bulunmuştur. Bunların yanı sıra Nasır konuşmalarında, Arap milliyetçiliğine ve birliğini vurgu yapmış; Mısır’ın güçlü ordusuna, tarihine ve onuruna dikkati çekmiştir. Nasır, siyasi ve ekonomik bağımsızlık vurgusuyla özgürlüğü, barışı ve adaleti öncelik haline getirdiklerini belirtmiştir.

İdeoloji, medya ve Nasır’ın konuşmalarından görüldüğü gibi propaganda, karizmatik liderliğe ve dolaylı olarak Nasır’ın yönetiminin devamlılığına katkı sağlamıştır. Sonuç olarak Nasır’ın kişiliği, ideolojisi ve propaganda becerisi güçlü bir karizma oluşturmasına yardımcı olmuştur. Sonrasında Arap milliyetçiliği ve sömürgecilikle mücadele bağlamında, dış politikadaki başarılarla karizmatik liderliğe dönüşen bu karizma, insanların görüşünün Nasır lehine değişmesini de sağlamıştır.

Bu çalışma, Nasır’ın nasıl imajını ve karizmatik liderliğini oluşturduğuna odaklanarak onun yönetimini 1967 yenilgisinin ardından bile nasıl yürütebildiğini anlatmayı amaçlamıştır. Bunu sağlamak için karizmatik liderliğe dair literatür üzerinde çalışılmış; karizmatik liderliğinin oluşumu, hangi araçların etkili olduğu, lider ve

destekçileri arasındaki ilişkinin karizmatik liderliği nasıl etkilediği ve karizmatik liderliğin yönetimin devamını sağlama noktasında nasıl bir katkı sağladığı incelenmiştir. Sonuç olarak Nasır, dış politikadaki bazı başarısızlıklara rağmen Arap dünyasında karizması ve prestiji sayesinde yönetimine devam etmiştir. Yönetimin devamı ise bahsedildiği üzere Nasır'ın yönetimi süresince karizmatik liderliğini güçlendirmesi olmuştur.

Öte yandan, karizmatik liderliğin gücü konsolide etmeyi ve yönetimi sürdürmeyi sağlamanın yanı sıra bazı olumsuz yönleri de bulunmaktadır. Karizmanın rutin hale getirilmesiyle, güçlü bir liderlik halef için sorun teşkil etmektedir. Karizmatik liderliğin etkileri devam ettiği sürece, o liderin politikaları dokunulmaz olarak görülür. Dolayısıyla, yeni lider ülkeyi yönetirken zor duruma düşebilir. Enver Sedat, 1970'de Mısır cumhurbaşkanı olduğunda farklı politikalar uygulamış, sosyalizm yerine liberalizme yönelmiştir. Ayrıca 1973 Arap-İsrail savaşının ardından Mısır, İsrail ile ilişkileri normalleştirmiş, istikrar ve barış sağlayarak ülkenin gelişmesine odaklanmıştır. Ancak Sedat'ın etrafı Nasır'ın etkisini sürdüren muhalif fikirlerle de çevrili kalmıştır. Ayrıca, Nasır'ın karizmatik liderliğinin Mısır halkının her kesiminde etkili olmaması ve baskıcı politikalar uygulaması, karizmatik liderliğin sınırlılıklarını da göstermektedir.

Ek olarak, bir liderin karizmatik liderlik sayesinde yönetimini sürdürmesi Nasır dışında farklı liderler için de kullanılabilir. Bu bağlamda, çalışmadaki yöntemler farklı liderlere de uygulanabilir. Arap milliyetçiliği akımı, bölgedeki diğer ülkeler tarafından da kullanılabilir ancak ideoloji karizmatik liderliğin önemli bir parçasıdır. Sömürgecilik geçmişi olan ülkeler, milliyetçi olan ve sömürgecilik karşıtı hareketler de bunun için uygundur. Ancak huzursuzluk hali, meşruiyet ihtiyacı, propaganda, tarihin ve başarıların yüceltilmesi, tehdit oluşturma, dış politika olayları da ideolojinin yanı sıra önemli faktörlerdir. Bu dinamikler, Nasır ile Mısır'a özgü olmayabilir ve başka ülke liderlerinde de görülebilir ancak Nasır örneği, karizmatik liderliğin yönetimin devamını sağlmasına katkı vermesi bakımından önemli bir somut örnek oluşturmaktadır.

B. THESIS PERMISSION FORM / TEZ İZİN FORMU

(Please fill out this form on computer. Double click on the boxes to fill them)

ENSTİTÜ / INSTITUTE

Fen Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences

Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Social Sciences

Uygulamalı Matematik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Applied Mathematics

Enformatik Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Informatics

Deniz Bilimleri Enstitüsü / Graduate School of Marine Sciences

YAZARIN / AUTHOR

Soyadı / Surname : Altun

Adı / Name : Tuğba

Bölümü / Department : Orta Doğu Araştırmaları / Middle East Studies

TEZİN ADI / TITLE OF THE THESIS (**İngilizce** / English): Charismatic Leadership in Egypt:
Gamal Abdel Nasser

TEZİN TÜRÜ / DEGREE: **Yüksek Lisans** / Master **Doktora** / PhD

1. **Tezin tamamı dünya çapında erişime açılacaktır.** / Release the entire work immediately for access worldwide.
2. **Tez iki yıl süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for patent and/or proprietary purposes for a period of **two years**. *
3. **Tez altı ay süreyle erişime kapalı olacaktır.** / Secure the entire work for period of **six months**. *

* Enstitü Yönetim Kurulu kararının basılı kopyası tezle birlikte kütüphaneye teslim edilecektir. / A copy of the decision of the Institute Administrative Committee will be delivered to the library together with the printed thesis.

Yazarın imzası / Signature

Tarih / Date

(Kütüphaneye teslim ettiğiniz tarih. Elle doldurulacaktır.)
(Library submission date. Please fill out by hand.)

Tezin son sayfasıdır. / This is the last page of the thesis/dissertation.